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Introduction
Two contrasting frontiers have framed the Chinese ecumene
since earliest times. Described by Owen Lattimore as “a frontier
of exclusion” and “a frontier of inclusion,” the northern and
southern frontiers respectively presented clearly different op-
portunities for Chinese peasants and the spread of Chinese
social and economic patterns.1 Along China’s northern
semiarid/subhumid flank, a fluid zone of contact separated the
steppe from the cultivated areas. Here the agrarian-based civ-
ilization of China alternated in its advance and retreat. The
interaction of Chinese and so-called barbarian societies there
has been a recurrent theme in Chinese economic, political,
and social history. As a frontier of continuing contention, the
Chinese polity set out to demarcate it. The Great Wall stands
today as solid testimony to the notion of exclusion and definition
which brought about the wall’s construction: the necessity of re-
ducing vulnerability to barbarian attack from the north.
The southern frontier, Lattimore’s frontier of inclusion, at
one time encompassed all of China south of the Yangtze River.
From the Han period onward as Chinese civilization moved
southward from its hearth in the loessial uplands of the Huang
Ho, migrants encountered areas that offered agricultural ad-
vantages denied by the northern climate. These advantages
brought half of China’s population to the Yangtze River basin
and areas to its south by the middle of the eighth century.
Herold J. Wiens has documented this southward penetration of
the Chinese and their impact on the non-Han peoples they en-
countered, yet the historical geographic relevance of this fron-
tier experience has not been thoroughly studied.2 In the south,
the frontier was “a wavering, shadowy fringe rather than a
clear demarcation,” according to Edward H. Schafer, who has
provided vivid literary portrayals of areas being absorbed by
Chinese civilization.3
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Taiwan does not figure in these studies of China’s frontiers
principally because of the island’s belated inclusion as a com-
ponent of the expanding southern frontier. Until the seven-
teenth century, Taiwan lay obscure 150 kilometers off the
southeast coast of China. Populated by aboriginal groups whose
prehistory is not yet firmly established, the island remained
remote until thrust into the maelstrom of European commercial
expansion in East Asia. Dutch, and to a lesser degree Spanish,
interests set in gear a process that was to lead to the island’s
transformation into a social and economic extension of south-
eastern China. During the two centuries between the expulsion
of the Dutch in 1662 by the Ming loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung
and the Japanese occupation in 1895, Chinese peasant migrants
to the island transformed the grasslands through arduous and
intensive effort, providing evidence that “the Chinese landscape
is a material expression of Chinese culture.”4 From 1895 to
1945, Japan occupied Taiwan as its first colony. During their
fifty-year tenure, the Japanese completed the transformation of
a fragmented subsistence-oriented economy and a fluid society
into a colony that must have been the envy of other colonial
powers. In the decades since Taiwan’s retrocession to China at
the end of World War II, substantial economic and social devel-
opment has taken place on the island. Events of the 1970s have
again placed Taiwan in a maelstrom, but this time it is a politi-
cal one, the resolution of which is made uncertain because of
economic realities and moral dilemmas. For thirty years, Taiwan
has followed a path quite distinct from that pursued on the
mainland across the straits. Whether conditions will permit the
island to continue to go it alone or not is uncertain. If the Taiwan
question is resolved by the island’s “inclusion” into the People’s
Republic, Taiwan again will become a frontier area for the social
and economic system of the mainland.5
This volume focuses on the patterns and processes of
Taiwan’s historical geography.6 Most of the chapters are by ge-
ographers who have carried out field research in Taiwan. Their
chapters are complemented by those of two historians and an
anthropologist. Although it is not a comprehensive treatment
of Taiwan’s past geography, the volume brings together studies
that illuminate the manner in which Chinese migrated to,
settled, and developed a frontier area. Accompanying notes
draw attention to the publications of other social scientists
which deal with intersecting themes. Although the number of
social scientists with an interest in Taiwan is not large, they are
carrying out an increasing amount of supporting research.7
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The book is divided into two sections, “Migration and Rural
Settlement” and “Urbanization and Economic Integration,” to-
taling eleven chapters. Wen-hsiung Hsu traces in Chapter 1 the
development of Taiwan in the years before the island’s incor-
poration into the Ch’ing empire in 1683. In so doing, he de-
tails the documentary history of China’s contact with the island
and sketches the nature of early mainland/island interaction.
Focusing on the seventeenth century, which he terms “a time
of radical change on Taiwan,” Hsu discusses the impact of the
Dutch, Spanish, and Cheng family interludes, especially their
respective roles in inducing Chinese to migrate to the island. I-
shou Wang covers some of the same chronology but lengthens it
to the present. His chapter, however, is from the perspective of
the indigenous groups whose settlements and culture have been
uprooted by successive waves of alien influence. Wang provides
a study of contact with outsiders often followed by the migration
of aborigines—a study complicated by assimilation as well as re-
current annihilation.
Ronald G. Knapp and Cho-yun Hsu, in their two chapters,
treat the settlement of two areas of northern Taiwan. Knapp’s
concern is with the factors which promoted a general pattern
of dispersed rural settlement on the T’ao-yuan plain during
the eighteenth century. Customary land tenure practices not
only provided a mechanism for inducing peasants to migrate
and guided the distribution of these peasants, but they also
embodied elements which fostered the elaboration of Chinese
social patterns. Cho-yun Hsu’s concern is the I-lan plain and
Chinese settlement there during the nineteenth century. His
chapter chronicles the role that personal leadership played in
the opening up of this remote corner of northeastern Taiwan.
Moreover, he details I-lan’s incorporation into other spheres of
economic interaction.
Chinese social norms and the conditions of frontier life,
Wenhsiung Hsu tells us, promoted the organization of peasant
migrants along lines defined by common surnames and common
ancestral homes. Voluntary segregation along these lines,
however, intensified parochialism and often led to disorder. His
chapter discusses the nature of voluntary associations and their
specific relationship to communal strife.
Chiao-min Hsieh’s chapter, “Sequent Occupance and Place
Names,” interprets many of Taiwan’s place names that provide
vignettes of the island’s past. To a greater degree than in most
other areas of China, Taiwan’s place names reveal the imprint
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of sequent occupance by groups as dissimilar as aborigines,
Dutch, Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese. Hsieh’s chapter con-
cludes Part One.
“Urbanization and Economic Integration” is the theme
under which the remaining chapters cluster. Tao-chang
Chiang’s contribution discusses walled cities and towns as out-
posts of imperial authority. Viewing the broader context of
Taiwan’s urbanization, he examines the origin and spread of
walled centers on the island and identifies aspects of their site
and distribution, size and shape, and function. His chapter is il-
lustrated with numerous maps and photographs. Lu-kang, once
Taiwan’s premier entrepôt and home of wealthy merchants, is
the subject of Donald R. DeGlopper’s essay. DeGlopper suggests
that pre-twentieth-century Taiwan “might be thought of not as a
single island, but as an archipelago.” In support of this notion,
he presents and analyzes the rise and precipitous decline of
Lu-kang as well as Lu-kang’s role in three related but distinct
trading systems.
The transformation of Taiwan from an aggregation of spa-
tially discrete units to an increasingly integrated island-wide
system is the subject of Yi-rong Ann Hsu, Clifton W. Pannell,
and James O. Wheeler. Using a spatial analysis approach, these
geographers focus on three aspects of the development and
structure of transportation networks in Taiwan. First they de-
scribe the salient characteristics of transportation on the island
from the 1600s to the present. Next they examine the connec-
tivity of the highway and rail networks in this century with
special concern for the relationship between network connec-
tivity and the level of regional economic development. Finally,
using graph theory, they analyze the accessibility and connec-
tivity of Taiwan’s urban centers, or nodes, on highway and rail
networks in order to reveal the spatial relationships between
nodes on a network and their level of economic growth. The role
of a distinctive transport innovation, the push car railway, in
Taiwan’s development during the Japanese period is discussed
by Ronald G. Knapp. Push car railways, Knapp suggests, were
instrumental in articulating the insular economies inherited by
the Japanese.
Jack F. Williams’ concluding chapter is a study of the island’s
principal cash crop, sugar cane, a crop which he terms the
“sweetener” in Taiwan’s development. His chapter chronicles
the growing of sugar cane and its processing from the Dutch oc-
cupation in the seventeenth century to the present. Sugar has
not only been a source of extra income for Taiwan’s peasants
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and a major source of foreign exchange; it has also had a
mixed impact on other elements of the economy and agrarian
structure. The bulk of Williams’ chapter treats the industry in
the eighty years since 1895. In so doing, he gives evidence that
the basic character of the sugar industry today was established
during the Japanese period. Unlike any of the preceding au-
thors, Williams looks ahead in assessing the role of sugar cane
in Taiwan’s future.
Over the period of two centuries, Taiwan was brought within
the Chinese pale by the penetration and elaboration of Chinese
agricultural practices and social patterns and without the force
of imperial arms. The passage from a sparsely populated, un-
developed, and at times fugitive condition to relative economic
and social stability was seldom smooth. Taiwan remained in
some ways a raw frontier up until the Japanese occupation. As
the authors in the eleven chapters indicate, the historical geog-
raphy of Taiwan is an absorbing one that demands further study.
The frontier experience on Taiwan was not uniform; nor can it
be used as an analog for other frontiers on the mainland. Still,
its study helps clarify the process by which Chinese entered,
settled, and developed alien territory. Lattimore’s description of
the southern frontier as a frontier of inclusion is appropriate for
Taiwan. The migration of Chinese peasants imprinted frontier
Taiwan with social and economic patterns quite similar to those
found along the coastal mainland of southeastern China.
A NOTE ON PLACE NAMES
Except for Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Keelung, and Kaohsiung,
all of the place names mentioned in the text are romanized ac-
cording to the modified Wade-Giles system. A Place Name Index
at the back of the book includes an indication of map location
for most of the places mentioned.
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Part One
MIGRATION AND RURAL
SETTLEMENT

1
From Aboriginal Island to
Chinese Frontier: The
Development of Taiwan
before 1683
WEN-HSIUNG HSU
The Chinese colonization of Taiwan was essentially a process
that occurred during the seventeenth through nineteenth cen-
turies. In this three-century period what had been a remote and
alien island was imprinted with social and economic patterns
similar in many respects to those found along the southeast
coast of China (Figure 1-1). Both Chinese and western civ-
ilization reached the island during the seventeenth century,
a period of dramatic change. From 1624 to 1662 the Dutch
maintained a trading presence along the island’s southwestern
coast; from 1626 to 1642 the Spanish occupied outposts in the
north. But it was Chinese peasants who first came in large
numbers under Dutch encouragement that extended Chinese
agricultural practices and social patterns to the island and set
the stage for incorporation into the Chinese ecumene. Chinese
settlers also launched an anti-western uprising in 1652 in
protest against Dutch exploitative mercantilism. Ten years later,
the Ming loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga) expelled the
Dutch and in the process facilitated Taiwan’s passage from
a foreign trading colony into a Chinese settlement frontier.
This chapter traces Chinese awareness of Taiwan, as sketched
in Chinese records, and chronicles the events and activities
that led to the island’s incorporation into Ch’ing China in
1683–1684. Above all, we will be examining frontier settlement
and development during the seventeenth century.
3
Figure 1-1. Taiwan: general location map.
BEFORE 1624
Recent archaeological evidence alters the orthodox belief that
Taiwan’s original inhabitants were exclusively non-Chinese abo-
riginal groups whose roots may be traced to Southeast Asia.
Nonetheless, the present-day ethnographic diversity of Taiwan’s
aboriginal inhabitants as well as the spatially and temporally
varied archaeological evidence do not allow one to write with
confidence about the island’s prehistory.1 For this and other
reasons, the indigenous early history of Taiwan will not be dealt
with here although an attempt will be made to extract pertinent
comments from the Chinese records wherever they suggest the
nature of the island before its colonization by large numbers of
Chinese.
When the Chinese started to acquire some knowledge of
Taiwan and to sail there is still open to interpretation. Modern
historians assume that between the third century B.C. and the
T’ang dynasty (A.D. 618–906) some twelve names were used to
refer to the island. It is possible that some of these early names
were used by the Chinese broadly and vaguely to refer to the
whole series of islands found in the East China Sea—notably
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the Ryukyus, P’eng-hu, and Taiwan. Before T’ang times, even
though Chinese may have sailed to both the Ryukyus and
Taiwan by accident, they appear to have been confused about
the location of individual islands.
Of the twelve names, I-chou and Liu-ch’iu are the most com-
monly encountered in the historical records. I-chou was the
island where expedition troops of the Wu ruler Sun Ch’üan
(reign A.D. 222–252) came onshore in the spring of 230. After
80 to 90 percent of his soldiers had died of unknown diseases,
those who survived managed to bring “several thousand” na-
tives back to China.2 The island may or may not have been
Taiwan. The name Liu-ch’iu first appeared in the seventh
century, when Emperor Yang (reign 605–616) of the Sui dynasty
sent expeditions to that island in 607, 608, and 610; in addi-
tion to captives, the Chinese brought back cloth and armor.3
Liu-ch’iu is described in the Sui-shu [History of the Sui dynasty]
as located among the islands five days’ sailing from Foochow. It
had such domestic animals as pigs and chickens, but no cows,
sheep, donkeys, or horses, and it produced little iron. With no
writing system, taxation, or penal code, the island was ruled
by a king under whom four or five commanders (shuai) gov-
erned. The natives used stone blades and the slash-and-burn
method to grow rice, millet, sorghum, and beans. They fought
each other. And not only did they use the bodies of their enemies
for sacrificial purposes but, according to the Sui-shu, they ate
the corpses of their acquaintances as well.4 Historians generally
believe that what is recorded in the Sui-shu as Liu-ch’iu is the
present-day island of Taiwan. But the descriptions of the loca-
tions, products, farming, organizations, and social customs are
closer to those of the Ryukyus than those of Taiwan.5 It may be
that the compilers of the Sui-shu give a composite account of
both places.
Though separated from the mainland by no more than 200
kilometers, Taiwan could not be easily reached by the Chinese
before Sung times (960–1279). Moreover, Fukien, the mainland
area closest to Taiwan, was not well developed until after the
Southern Sung period (1127–1279). Chinese seafarers, in
sailing to either the Ryukyus or Japan, set out in summer in
order to avail themselves of the southeast monsoon and the
northeastward equatorial warm current (kuroshio).6 Navigation
was hazardous in the straits between the mainland and Taiwan
because of shallows and strong currents. Unpredictable winter
gales, the passage of fronts, violent summer typhoons—all com-
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pounded the difficulties. Nineteenth-century recognition of such
natural conditions is discussed in a later chapter by Donald De-
Glopper.
Chinese started to avail themselves of the periodic
northwest wind of winter to sail to the P’eng-hu archipelago
and settle during the Sung dynasty. As evidenced by the dis-
covery of two Northern Sung coins bearing the emblems of
the Hsi-ning (1068–1077) and Cheng-ho (1111–1117) periods as
well as many shards of Sung pottery and porcelain jars (both
glazed and unglazed), Chinese migration to the P’eng-hus may
have come as early as the late eleventh century.7 Southern
Fukienese fishermen, lured by the abundance of fish around
the archipelago, eventually settled in P’eng-hu by 1171. In that
year it was reported that the Visayan (Pisayan, P’i-she-yeh)
from the Philippines attacked Chinese settlers in P’eng-hu.8
The Visayans, who were “skillful in navigation and eager for
war and raids for pillage and booty,”9 took away millet, hemp,
and wheat and captured some settlers as guides for plundering
China’s southeast coast. To guard against further raids by the
Visayan people, Ch’uan-chou prefect Wang Ta-yü ordered some
two thousand shacks built in P’eng-hu and stationed soldiers
there for farming.10
Increased knowledge of the archipelago is revealed in the
geographical work Yu-ti chi-sheng [Brief accounts of various
places in the empire] by Wang Hsiang-chih (chin-shih 1195).
Here P’eng-hu was described as “a group of thirty-six islets in
great billows” in the “outlying region” (wai-fu) of Ch’uan-chou
which could be reached in three days.11 Chinese knowledge of
the existence of more than half of the sixty-four islets in the
archipelago suggests that they explored and probably inhabited
some of them in the twelfth century. The southward movement
of the Sung court to Hangchow, the encouragement of maritime
activities by the government, the successful campaigns against
piracy, the introduction of the mariner’s compass, and the con-
current improvement in shipbuilding of the period all enhance
the likelihood that Chinese braved the waves to sail beyond
P’eng-hu to Taiwan during the thirteenth century.12
The seaport from which the Chinese most likely sailed to
Taiwan during the thirteenth century was Ch’uan-chou, then
a hub of international trade. Fifty-three countries maintained
trade relationships there; merchant seamen from Arabia,
Persia, Italy, India, the South Seas, and possibly Africa even
formed a foreign quarter in its southern section.13 From Ch’uan-
chou Chinese emigrated to Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia.14
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It is also probable that from this seaport Chinese merchant
seamen crossed the strait to barter with Taiwan aborigines,
though no verifiable records of this encounter exist.15
In any case, Chinese migration to P’eng-hu continued during
the Yuan dynasty (1280–1367). The great traveler Wang Ta-yuan
visited the archipelago about 1347 and described Chinese life
there as follows:
With a favoring wind they [thirty-six islets] can be reached from
Ch’uan-chou in two days and nights. There is grass but no trees;
the land is barren and not suited for growing grass. The weather
is always warm. The customs [of the residents] are rustic. Many
of the people are long-lived. Men and women both wear long cloth
gowns girded with local cotton cloth. They boil sea [water] to get
salt, and ferment millet to make liquor. They gather fish, shrimp,
snails, and clams to supplement their staple of grain. They burn
ox dung to cook fish fat for use as oil. The land produces sesame
and green beans. The goats multiply into flocks of several tens
of thousands. A family [which owns some goats] brands their
hair and cuts their horns as marks of identification, but does not
gather them in during the day or night, so that they all forage for
themselves. Their workmen and merchants enjoy the profits of a
flourishing trade.16
It appears that the Chinese settlers there were self-sufficient,
though Wang Ta-yuan did not mention whether they raised such
domestic animals as pigs, cows, ducks, and chickens. Nor did
he comment on Chinese social organization and religious life.
A poem written by the Yuan poet Hung Hsi-wen (1282–1366),
however, reveals that the Chinese there already had temples to
worship the sea goddess Ma-tsu in the second half of the four-
teenth century.17 The size of the Chinese population in P’eng-
hu, though unknown, must have been large enough for the Yuan
court to appoint a subprefect (hsun-chien ssu) there during
the Chih-yuan period of Emperor Shih-tsu (1264–1294).18 With
this appointment, P’eng-hu was officially incorporated into the
empire for the first time in Chinese history.
During the Yuan period, expeditions were sent to Liu-ch’iu
in 1292 and 1297. The Liu-ch’iu reached by troops of the second
expedition was said to be “close to Ch’uan-chou” and is likely to
have been Taiwan.19 Wang Ta-yuan followed his visit to P’eng-hu
in 1347 with a visit to Taiwan in 1349, but he did not mention
seeing any other Chinese. His observation that its inhabitants’
customs were different from those of the P’eng-hu population
Chapter 1
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suggests that this Liu-ch’iu was not yet peopled by Chinese.
Nevertheless, his reference to “pottery from Ch’u-hou” (the
present Li-shui in Chekiang) implies the presence of Chinese
merchants on the island by the 1340s.20 At that time, Chinese
seamen from Fukien and Chekiang apparently sailed to Taiwan
only to barter with the natives; they had no intention of settling
there.
In the second half of the fourteenth and the entire fifteenth
centuries, southern Fukienese continued to migrate to P’eng-
hu and both Chinese and foreign seamen also passed by Taiwan
(then called Small Liu-ch’iu) in their voyages; but with the
exception of traders and pirates, they rarely went ashore. It
was not until after the second half of the sixteenth century
that southern Fukienese fishermen and merchants sailed to
Taiwan regularly and settled there. Throughout the Ming period
(1368–1644), however, the imperial court never recognized the
island as part of China.
Sometime after the founding of the Ming dynasty in 1368,
the subprefect at P’eng-hu was recalled. With continuous
southern Fukienese migration P’eng-hu nevertheless main-
tained its trade relationship with the mainland. Chinese set-
tlers, most of whom “did not rear any wives or daughters,”
elected elders as their headmen and brought serious litigation
cases to Ch’uan-chou for arbitration.21 Still, in dealing with the
threat of Japanese pirates along the coast, the Ming court or-
dered all settlers to return to the mainland in 1372, one year
after a maritime prohibition policy went into effect.22 Some
of them may have defied the order by remaining in P’eng-hu;
others might have sailed to the island of Taiwan.23 In any case,
southern Fukienese continued to sail to P’eng-hu; and, as a
result, the Ming court in July 1404 dispatched officials there to
call back the “wandering people” (liu-min), a euphemism for pi-
rates, smugglers, fishermen, and merchants who transgressed
the maritime prohibition.24
In order to evade the Ming authorities, the Fukienese who
traded with Japan would stay clear of the mainland coast by
sailing closer to Taiwan and the Ryukyus during the mid-six-
teenth century. The Chinese who traded with Southeast Asia
also started taking the East Sea Compass Course (tung-yang
chen-lu), passing by southwestern and southern Taiwan.25 Some
of these merchant seamen sojourned on the island to barter
with the aborigines. Though they established friendly relation-
ships with these people, Chinese considered them “similar to
beasts” and thought the island “uninhabitable.”26 In referring
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to the island, Chinese used two more names: Hsiao-tung tao
(“little eastern island”) and Ta-hui kuo (“the country of Ta-hui”),
a corruption for the Tayouan tribe which lived on an islet near
present-day Tainan.27 Chinese called Taiwan “a little eastern
island” because it was almost directly east of P’eng-hu; and
under the impression that the place belonged to the Tayouan
people, they also referred to it as “the country of Ta-hui.” From
Tayouan (sometimes spelled “Tai-ouan”) or Ta-hui, Chinese de-
rived the name Taiwan.
Besides fishermen and merchants, Chinese pirates also used
P’eng-hu and Taiwan as a haven during the second half of the
sixteenth century. Chinese and Japanese piracy was especially
rampant during the reign of Chia-tsing (1522–1566); of the 146
pirate raids on Fukien that were recorded from 1370 to 1616,
some 131, or about 90 percent, took place during this period.28
Among the Chinese pirates, the most famous were Lin Tao-
ch’ien and Lin Feng (Limahong or Dim Mhon). Lin Tao-ch’ien, a
Hakka pirate from Ch’ao-chou, after being chased out of Fukien
by Ming naval forces under the command of Yü Ta-yu, retreated
to Pei-kang in southwestern Taiwan about 1563. Aware of the
danger in sailing off the island’s southwest coast, Yü Ta-yu
stayed in P’eng-hu where he built a fort at An-ao (Wen-ao) to
keep close watch on the pirate.29 Lin, however, did not stay long
in Pei-kang; late in 1567 he again ravaged the mainland. He re-
mained active on and off China’s southeast coast for ten more
years until 1578 when he went to Southeast Asia. Some of his
followers later reportedly returned to Taiwan to live.30
Lin Feng, another pirate who was dubbed “the terror of
China,” moved his forces from P’eng-hu to Taiwan on 3 No-
vember 1574.31 Upon debarking at Wang-kang (on Taiwan’s
southwest coast?), he was attacked by the aborigines and had
to sail back to P’eng-hu. There, after seizing a Chinese junk
returning from Manila, he decided to move on to the Philip-
pines, possibly with the intention of colonization. With sixty-two
ships carrying 2,000 men and 1,500 women, including a number
of artisans, he arrived in Luzon on 29 November but returned
to P’eng-hu in August of the following year.32 From there he
ravaged Fukien. On 27 December he retreated to Wang-kang on
Taiwan for the second time. On 15 January 1576, when he again
forayed along China’s southeast coast, the Ming naval forces
chased him across the straits and sank more than twenty of his
ships.33 Lin Feng then fled to Southeast Asia.
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In spite of the maritime prohibition and pirate depredation,
southern Fukienese continued to sail to the P’eng-hu archi-
pelago. From Chin-men, twenty Hung clansmen migrated to
P’eng-hu in 1581.34 On the west coast of Taiwan, the abundant
supply of fish and the lucrative deer trade with the aborigines
gradually attracted more Chinese fishermen and merchants
there.35 In 1589, among the eighty-eight ship licenses the Ming
government granted to trade with Southeast Asia, four to eight
were permitted to sail to Taiwan for fishing and trading; the
number of such licensed junks increased to ten in 1593.36 The
ships that crossed the strait without licenses might have been
even more numerous. Chinese merchants, most of them from
Ch’uan-chou and Chang-chou, used agates, porcelain, cloth,
salt, brass hairpins, and bracelets to barter with the natives for
deer meat, skin, and horns. Some traders even knew the abo-
rigines’ languages.37
Southern Fukienese settlement of southwestern Taiwan had
begun by the early 1590s. In 1596, when a Portuguese ship was
becalmed for several days off the southwest coast, “several of
those on board who had been shipwrecked there … in 1582 no-
ticed that there was now cultivated land and people who were
working on it, presumably Chinese immigrants from Fukien.”38
The southern Fukienese settlers, however, were still very few,
so few that the Ming scholar Ch’en Ti in 1603 did not notice any
of them when he visited there.39
Europeans generally did not show interest in Taiwan until
the seventeenth century. The Portuguese coasted along
northwest Taiwan on a voyage to Japan from Malacca in the
early 1540s (possibly 1542). Thrilled by the beauty of the hills
of the island, they called it Ilha Formosa (Beautiful Island).40
On a world map drawn by the Portuguese cartographer Lopo
Homem in 1554, the name “I. fremoza” [sic] appears in a series
of islands south of Japan.41 To European navigators, however,
Taiwan remained primarily terra incognita during the second
half of the sixteenth century. Portuguese ships occasionally
wrecked off the island’s southwest coast, but they apparently
never voluntarily landed on it.42 Although some nineteenth-
century writers have written that the Portuguese established
a settlement in northeastern Taiwan at present-day Chi-lung
(Keelung) in 1590, there seems to be no historical evidence to
confirm such a claim.43
Among the governments of East Asian countries, only Japan
showed interest in Taiwan during the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. In 1593 Toyotomi Hideyoshi
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TABLE 1–1
Arrivals and Settlements in P’eng-hu and Taiwan before 1600
Time P’eng-hu Taiwan
Before Sung Chance arrival Chance arrival
Sung
(960–1259)
Chinese fishermen,
merchants
Chinese merchants (?)
Yuan
(1260–1367)
Chinese fishermen, Chinese merchants,
farmers, merchantsa travelers
Ming
(1368–1600)
Chinese fishermen, Chinese fishermen,
farmers, merchants;a farmers, merchants;a
Chinese and Japanese Chinese and Japanese
pirates; European seamen pirates; European
seamen
a Some of these fishermen, farmers, and merchants also settled
there.
(1536–1598) insisted that the “the ruler of Taiwan” pay tribute
to Japan, but this demand was to no avail. The Tokugawa bakufu
government also made two attempts at occupying Taiwan in
1609 and 1616. In the late 1620s Japanese merchants even took
some Taiwan aborigines to Japan to offer “the sovereignty to the
Emperor.”44 But the enforcement of the sakoku (national iso-
lation) policy in 1635 ended the Japanese government’s interest
in the island during the two centuries that followed.
Chinese voyages and migration to P’eng-hu and Taiwan
before 1600 are summarized in Table 1-1. Although Chinese
may have occasionally reached Taiwan by accident in ancient
and medieval times, they were confused about the location of
the islands in the East China Sea. Despite the increase in their
knowledge of overseas countries during the twelfth century, ad-
verse sea currents and winds deterred the Chinese from sailing
to Taiwan regularly until after the sixteenth century. Yet the first
civilized people who declared occupation of the island were not
Chinese but Dutch.
Chapter 1
11
THE ISLAND AS EMPORIUM
The expansion of European mercantile interests in East Asia,
coupled with the negligence of the declining Ming court,
brought Dutch occupation to the southwestern section of
Taiwan from 1624 to 1662 and Spanish occupation to portions
of the north from 1626 to 1642. As part of their colonial policy,
both the Dutch and the Spanish interacted with the aborigines,
but it was the Dutch who encouraged Chinese migration and
promoted agriculture.45 The Dutch founded the United East
India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) on 20
March 1602 to implement their mercantilism in Asia. They first
reached P’eng-hu on 7 August 1604, when two of the com-
pany’s ships commanded by Admiral Wybrank van Warwijk were
drawn by a gale to the archipelago on their way to China. In
1618, with the ultimate goal of monopolizing the Asian trade,
the Dutch established the company’s Asian headquarters at
Batavia (Jakarta) in Java. Four years later, on 10 April 1622,
the company’s governor-general, in the belief that “there is
no people in the world who can serve us better than the
Chinese,”46 dispatched Cornelis Reijersen to command sixteen
ships and two thousand soldiers to sail for China. They arrived
at Ma-kung of P’eng-hu on 11 July.47 On the morning of 27 July,
guided by an experienced Chinese fisherman, Reijersen led two
vessels toward the island of Taiwan; at noon they anchored two
nautical miles off the islet of Tayouan, the present site of An-
p’ing.48 They then surveyed southwestern Taiwan for four days
without landing anywhere and returned to P’eng-hu. There the
Dutch started to build a fort at Feng-k’uei-wei in August 1622.
They stayed in P’eng-hu for two years until 26 August 1624,
when Chinese troops forced them to dismantle the fort and
leave for Tayouan with thirteen ships.
On the islet of Tayouan, the Dutch constructed Fort Orange
on a sand spit as the company’s headquarters, which they later
named Zeelandia.49 On the main island of Taiwan, early in
January 1625, the Dutch East India Company’s first governor at
Tayouan, Martinus Sonck, gave fifteen pieces of cangan cloth
to the Sinkan aborigines in exchange for a tract of land.50 The
Dutch called the place Sakam (Ch’ih-k’an in Chinese). It was to
develop into the city of Tainan in the following two and a half
centuries (Figure 1-2).
Spanish interest in Taiwan can be traced back to 1598 when
a typhoon forced the aborting of an expedition from Luzon,
but no subsequent colonization efforts were made until the
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Figure 1–2. Taiwan during the Dutch period.
Dutch occupation of southwestern Taiwan was seen as a po-
tential threat to Spanish security in the Philippines.51 Prudent
in pursuit of their objectives, the Spanish decided in 1626 to
take northern Taiwan in order to keep an eye on the Dutch.
Moreover, the Spanish planned to attract Chinese merchants
to northern Taiwan, to reestablish with the Japanese the trade
that had been broken off a year earlier, and to use Taiwan as
a stepping-stone for their missionary work in both China and
Japan.52 Though they stayed in Taiwan for sixteen years, the
Spanish failed in these pursuits.
On 5 May 1626 a fleet of fourteen Spanish vessels carrying
three hundred soldiers and commanded by Antonio Carrendo
de Valdes left Cagayan for Taiwan. Five days later, the Spanish
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anchored off a headland on northeastern Taiwan which they
named Santiago (San-tiao-chiao as corrupted into Chinese).
After reaching Chi-lung (San-tissima Trinidad) on 12 May, they
constructed Castle San Salvadore on the present She-liao-tao.
On 16 May, the Spanish, without the consent of the natives,
declared that part of Taiwan the property of their king, Don
Philippe, and collected tree branches, sand, and some exotic ob-
jects as evidence of their occupation.53
The Spanish reached Tan-shui (Tamsui) in 1628 where they
built Fort Santo Domingo; in March 1632, they sailed up the
Tan-shui River and entered the Taipei basin.54 The inhos-
pitability of the natural environment and the lack of funds,
however, vitiated the Spanish colonization of northern Taiwan.
During their occupation the Spanish population in any given
year never exceeded five hundred; they were on good terms
with only eight aboriginal tribes. When the natives at Tan-shui
revolted in 1636, Spanish colonial interest in the island began
to languish. The Dutch defeated the Spanish on 26 August 1642,
and nine days later drove them out of northern Taiwan.55
In contrast to the Spanish, the Dutch made gains in Taiwan.
Of the United East India Company’s twenty factories
throughout the world, the Tayouan factory was the second most
profitable, after those in Hirade (1609–1641) and Deshima
(1641–1855) in Japan. Dutch revenues in Taiwan were drawn
from various taxes and triangle trade, increasingly profitable es-
pecially after the Portuguese were ousted from Japan in 1639.56
The company exported Taiwan’s dried venison, sugar, and
rattan to China; deerskins and sugar were sent to Japan as well
as other countries. Between 1634 and 1661, the island pro-
duced an annual average of about 68,000 deerskins, 50,000 of
which were shipped to Japan.57 After 1645, Taiwan annually
produced 9,000 piculs of sugar, and after 1657, 17,000 piculs,
which was sold as far away as Persia.58 From China the Dutch
imported porcelain, silk, and gold and then shipped them to
Japan, Batavia, the Netherlands, and other European countries.
It has been estimated that between 1602 and 1657 the company
shipped more than 3 million pieces of Chinese porcelain to
Europe, mostly by way of Taiwan.59 From Batavia the company
imported marine products, pepper, linen, spice, amber, lead, tin,
and opium and then sold them to China.60
The company’s revenue was also enriched by a variety of
onerous taxes imposed upon the Chinese for fishing, trading,
growing rice, hunting deer, and butchering pigs in Taiwan.
Though drawing a handsome revenue from both trade and
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taxes, the Dutch spent only half of it on operating the Tayouan
factory, salaries of soldiers, construction of forts, and mainte-
nance of ships.61 Apparently little was done directly for the
benefit of the island; private involvement of the company’s em-
ployees in the trade further tended to exacerbate Dutch ex-
ploitation.62
In exercising their colonial control, the Dutch used both re-
ligion and force—the first to appease the aborigines and the
second to subdue them.63 The first Dutch minister, George Can-
didius (1597–1647), arrived in Taiwan on 4 May 1627. The fol-
lowing year, on 27 December, he reported from Sinkan that
there were 128 natives “who knew the Prayers and were able
to explain in the most satisfactory manner the principal ankles
of the Christian faith; but who for certain reasons have not
yet been baptized.”64 In 1656, among the native population
of 10,109 in the twenty tribes, some 6,078, or 60 percent,
“could answer questions concerning Christian doctrines.”65 The
company, which did not attempt to evangelize the Chinese, used
force when religion did not serve their purposes. The company’s
soldiers made up half of the Dutch population, which never
exceeded two thousand.66 In 1636 the Dutch pacified the plains
aborigines at Mattau and Soulang near Sakam, at Lungkiau in
the southern tip, and in other parts of the island.67 The Dutch
achieved this ruthlessly. In the Hsiao-liu-ch’iu islet, they set fire
to aboriginal settlements, slaughtered three hundred of those
who escaped the fire, and condemned the survivors to hard
labor.68
In protest against Dutch exploitation, some fifteen thousand
Chinese men led by Kuo Huai-i (Fayet or Faiet, a headman of
a village near Sakam) revolted on the evening of 7 September
1652—an action that became the first Chinese antiwestern up-
rising in modern history. The rebels, constituting the majority of
the Chinese settlers, were mostly peasants who “thought them-
selves too much oppressed by the company” and “longed for
liberty.”69 Most of them, however, carried bamboo sticks and
few were armed. With the aid of two thousand aborigines, the
Dutch put down the uprising in fifteen days. Approximately four
thousand Chinese men as well as five thousand women and
children were reportedly captured or killed during and after the
revolt.70
After the uprising, fewer Chinese migrants and traders went
to Taiwan, especially after 1656, when the Manchus enforced
maritime prohibition and Cheng Ch’eng-kung laid an embargo
against the Dutch. And to take precaution against Chinese
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attack, the Dutch started constructing Fort Provintia at Sakam,
where most Chinese lived. The fort, completed the following
year, was not as well built as Zeelandia and never ensured
Dutch control of the island.
DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE DUTCH AND
SPANISH
In spite of their exploitation, the Dutch contributed to the
development of Taiwan through their recruitment of Chinese,
promotion of agriculture, and education of the aborigines. The
Spanish succeeded only in the evangelization of small numbers
of natives in the north.
The Dutch did not intend to evolve a European-style agricul-
tural system on Taiwan, but instead encouraged migrants from
southeastern China to come to the island to reclaim land and
gather deerskins. Disregarding the restrictive maritime policy
of the Ming court, the Dutch occasionally used trading ships
to carry Chinese to the island free of charge. In 1632 some
Dutch vessels carried 170 southern Fukienese to Taiwan; re-
portedly a thousand more asked to come aboard, but, laden
with merchandise, the Dutch had no more room.71 To expedite
the recruitment of Chinese immigrants from 1636 to 1638, Su
Ming-kang (Bencon, d. 1644), a southern Fukienese who had
served as Chinese captain for the company at Batavia, was
brought to Taiwan.72 Other Chinese merchants and pirates such
as Cheng Chih-lung (d. 1662, Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s father) were
also possibly entrusted by the Dutch to arrange Chinese mi-
gration. In fact, Cheng Chih-lung himself once took the initiative
in arranging Chinese migration to Taiwan. According to Chinese
sources, sometime between 1628 and 1631 when Fukien was
afflicted by a drought, he shipped “several tens of thousand of
people” to Taiwan. Every three migrants shared one ox and each
received 3 taels of silver.73 The number of migrants and oxen,
however, may be overestimated; it does not seem likely that so
many oxen could be found during a time of famine.
Although the ships owned by the Dutch and Cheng Chih-
lung carried southern Fukienese to Taiwan, most emigrants
went there aboard Chinese fishing and trading junks. An es-
timated 100 to 400 Chinese ships left the mainland for the
island annually after 1625. After 1636, more junks arrived as a
result of the efforts of Su Ming-kang, the peace in the straits,
and the subjugation of the aborigines near Tainan. The Chinese
CHINA’S ISLAND FRONTIER
16
ships sailing to Taiwan in 1637, for example, numbered 491
(188 trading junks and 303 fishing boats).74 Not all Chinese
came directly from the southeast coast of China; some sailed
from Luzon. In 1639–1640, when the Spanish massacred 23,000
Chinese in Luzon, those who managed to flee either returned to
China or emigrated to Taiwan.75 In 1642, despite the company’s
complaint that its trade with China was declining and Chinese
fishing activities were slackening, approximately two hundred
Fukienese fishing boats still sailed to the island.76 Six years
later, some seven or eight thousand famine-stricken Chinese on
the coast of Fukien went to Taiwan, but most of them returned
after the famine was over.77 After Kuo Huai-i’s revolt in 1652,
however, fewer Chinese arrived.
It is not known how many Chinese settled in Taiwan during
the Dutch occupation. I estimate that the Chinese population
reached around forty or fifty thousand toward the end of Dutch
rule. In determining the size of the Chinese population, two
main difficulties are encountered. First, most of the southern
Fukienese fishermen and merchants did not settle permanently
there, and many farmers were merely seasonal migrants.
Second, only a portion of the Chinese population was actually
under Dutch control. When the Dutch arrived in 1624, the
number of Chinese living in Taiwan was estimated to have been
25,000.78 This number reappears frequently as an estimate of
Taiwan’s population at various times and cannot be corrobo-
rated as accurate at the onset of Dutch settlement. In 1640,
3,568 Chinese settlers paid poll taxes as did 11,000 in 1650,
but the Chinese population was obviously greater; otherwise it
would have been impossible for Kuo Huai-i to lead 15,000 men
in revolt two years later.79 From 1653 to 1655 a serious famine,
which resulted from a locust attack, claimed 8,000 Chinese
lives.80 In 1661, famine struck the island again, yet Governor
Frederick Coyett estimated the Chinese population to be “about
25,000 armed men, besides women and children.”81 Consid-
ering that the Chinese population was mainly composed of men,
its size at the end of the Dutch occupation was most likely to
have been 40,000 to 50,000, almost double that of Coyett’s es-
timate.
Chinese residents were concentrated primarily in Tayouan
and Sakam. They had already lived in and near the aboriginal
villages of Soulang and Mattau before the arrival of the Dutch,
but it appears that they did not establish any distinct settle-
ments.82 After Fort Zeelandia was built at Tayouan in 1624,
they immediately set up residence on its east side and even-
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tually founded the unwalled Chinese quarter.83 The following
year some hundred Chinese junks sailed to Tayouan to fish and
purchase dried venison and deerskins.84 The Spanish estimate
in 1626 that 5,000 Chinese and 160 Japanese lived in Tayouan,
though exaggerated, suggests that in two years Tayouan had
become a populated islet.85 Chinese merchants and farmers
also moved to Sakam in 1625 after the Dutch acquired it from
the aborigines; by October of that year they had built thirty or
forty huts there. The following year the Chinese settlement was
damaged by both fire and epidemic, but it soon was rebuilt.86
Chinese settlers were mostly men: fishermen, merchants,
farmers, hunters, craftsmen, peddlers, coolies.87 Although Table
1-2 cannot reflect the general trend of Chinese migration to
Taiwan, it does indicate that female passengers made up a small
proportion of the total number of Chinese sailing to the island.
After 1630, in order to encourage the Chinese to engage in
farming, the company let them claim land, lent money to them,
provided them with seeds, farm implements, and oxen, helped
them to dig irrigation ponds, protected them from aborigine
attack, and promised to buy foodstuffs from them.88 These
Chinese peasants were, in a sense, the tenants of the Dutch
“crown fields,” for all landownership was ultimately vested in
the name of the Dutch monarch. In 1640 the company raised
1,200 to 1,300 head of oxen, most of which were shipped to
Taiwan from China’s southeast coast, P’eng-hu, Batavia, and
India.89 During the Dutch period, the land developed by Chinese
settlers covered approximately the present Tainan area and
the northern section of Kaohsiung hsien to the south. In this
region the Dutch promoted the cultivation of rice, sugar cane,
tea, hemp, wheat, and indigo, but they succeeded only in the
growing of rice and sugar cane. They also introduced some veg-
etables and fruits to Taiwan, such as peppers, Dutch beans,
coarse greens, parsley, tobacco, tomatoes, breadfruit, custard
apples, jackfruits, lemons, mangoes, and watermelons, all of
which became common only in later times.
The Dutch made five maritime explorations to eastern
Taiwan in search of gold from 1636 to 1642. To their disap-
pointment, the aborigines obstructed them from mining any
gold, and their interest in the east also subsided after the
Spanish left the north. In 1644 the Dutch planned to survey
the island from the northern tip to Tayouan and then make
a detailed map.90 The survey was never seriously undertaken,
however, and only a few sketchy maps were drawn (Figure 1-3).
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TABLE 1–2
Chinese Sailing to Taiwan: March 1655–February 1658
Date Number
of
Chinese
Ships
Sailing
to
Taiwan
Number of
Passengersa
Average
Number of
Passengers
per Ship
Number of
Female
Passengers
Percentage
of Female
Passengers
Mar.–Dec.
1655
173 6,937 40 623 9
Jan.–Dec.
1656
169 5,079 30 921 12
Jan.
1657–Feb.
1658
131 5,792 44 223 4
a Only a portion of these passengers permanently settled in
Taiwan.
SOURCE: Nakamura Takashi, “I.V.K.B. yaku kokusenya Taiwan
koryaku ki ni tsuite” [A study on I.V.K.B.’s book concerning
Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s attack of Taiwan in 1661], in Kanada
hakushi kanreki-kinen shōshigaku ronsō [Collected papers on
bibliography in honor of Dr. Kanada’s sixty-first birthday]
(Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), p. 749.
Before their expulsion by the Dutch, the Spanish did little to
develop northern Taiwan. Their sole achievement was to prop-
agate Catholicism among the indigenous people. About thirty
Dominican and Franciscan priests did missionary work, estab-
lishing churches at five places and converting some four
thousand aborigines.91 Missionaries did not come again until
the late nineteenth century.
During their occupation of Taiwan, the Dutch and the
Spanish intended to use the island to sustain their hopes of Eu-
ropean domination in East Asia. The Dutch, by virtue of their
longer stay, not only succeeded in their efforts at colonial mer-
cantilism but also proselytized Protestantism among the abo-
rigines and taught many of them to read. The Dutch efforts
to promote Chinese migration and farming eventually came to
serve more the interests of Chinese peasants than their Dutch
masters. After the 1652 uprising, mainland events also came
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to be linked with conditions developing on the island. In 1656,
in an attempt to deal with Ming loyalists, the Ch’ing authori-
ties proclaimed a prohibition on migration across the straits.
Soon after, the celebrated Ming loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung
(Koxinga) enforced an embargo against the Dutch East India
Company.92
THE CHENG PERIOD
Cheng Ch’eng-kung expelled the Dutch and began Chinese rule
of Taiwan on 10 February 1662. He had come a long way to
reach his decision to take Taiwan. On 6 January 1647, Cheng
Ch’eng-kung, at the age of twenty-four, made a pledge of broth-
erhood together with ninety men at Lie-hsu, located between
Hsia-men (Amoy) and Chin-men (Quemoy), and launched their
cause “Oppose the Ch’ing and restore the Ming.”93 Thereafter
he was constantly plagued with a scarcity of provisions and
desperately needed a suitable base for his operations. In
1659–1660, after twelve years of fighting the Manchus, Cheng’s
debacle at Nanking forced him to retreat to Chin-men and Hsia-
men, where his sources of supply were further reduced and his
search for a large base to quarter his disaffected soldiers was
reactivated.
Two places suited Cheng’s purposes, Luzon and Taiwan. In
January 1660, he determined to take Taiwan to “settle his gen-
erals and soldiers and their families.”94 Over the objections of
other Ming loyalists, Cheng Ch’eng-kung, a stubborn man who
had experienced nineteen triumphs and eight defeats, made
up his mind to wrest the island from the Dutch. His decision
became firmer after October 1660, when the Manchus ordered
the residents of Hai-ch’eng and T’ung-an of southern Fukien to
move inland in an attempt to cut off Ch’eng’s source of man-
power.95
On 23 April 1661, Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s fleet, consisting of
some 200 vessels and 25,000 men (including two companies
of Negroes), set sail from Liao-lo for Taiwan. They arrived in
P’eng-hu the following day, leaving there on 28 April.96 Two
days later, in dense dawn fog, Cheng’s fleet reached Wai-sha-
hsien off the present city of Tainan. Assisted by “25,000 Chinese
settlers,” a “few thousand” Cheng soldiers landed at Lu-erh-
men in less than two hours.97 The Dutch in Fort Zeelandia
(totaling about 1,140 persons), with only two vessels, 3,000
pounds of gunpowder, and a limited supply of other ammu-
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Figure 1–3. Seventeenth-century Dutch map of Taiwan (Eyland
Formosa).
nition, watched the Chinese troops advance.98 Becoming what
they themselves had ridiculed as “melancholy spectators,” the
Dutch offered little resistance. On Cheng’s part, hampered by
problems of feeding his tired and hungry soldiers, he chose
to give priority to quartering them rather than attacking the
Dutch. It was not until 10 February 1662, nine months after his
siege, that about nine hundred Dutch formally surrendered.99
With the Dutch gone, Cheng attempted to extend his influence
to the Philippines but never realized his plan. He died on 23
June 1662 at the age of thirty-nine. His son, Ching, and
grandson, K’o-shuang, continued to govern Taiwan for twenty
years until their surrender to the Manchus in 1683.
The Cheng rule on Taiwan, as a British merchant witnessed,
was “very severe.”100 The government was mostly militarized;
throughout the entire Cheng period there were at least 338
military officers, but only 56 civil officials.101 The island was
virtually governed by martial law. Stealing was punished as se-
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verely as murder. People who surreptitiously felled a bamboo
were decapitated if identified. As a result, it was said that
nobody dared to steal and no stables were necessary for
cattle.102 Among the Chinese population, pao-chia machinery of
mutual policing was implemented.103 The Cheng family levied
various taxes on people who owned land, houses, boats, ponds,
fishing nets, cattle, mills, and other property. After 1674 adult
males between sixteen and sixty years of age also paid a month-
ly poll tax. The taxes were so onerous that people sold even
their daughters to pay.104 Yet the control over the Chinese was
apparently effective. Although there were aboriginal uprisings
in 1661, 1665, and 1682, the Chinese themselves never re-
volted.105
Popular support of the Cheng regime eroded during the final
years of the family’s rule. In 1680 Cheng officials conscripted
three thousand Chinese adult males into the army and had
merchants and settlers provide other services. The following
year, when the Cheng family planned to extend house taxes
from the capital at Tainan to the countryside, 30 percent of the
villagers reportedly destroyed their huts. Their protest finally
compelled the Cheng family to drop the proposal. In the spring
of 1683 many settlers starved when famine visited the island.
The Manchu court took advantage of this opportunity to attack
Taiwan.106
DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE CHENGS
During the two decades of Cheng family rule, more migrants
sailed to Taiwan, doubling its Chinese population. Besides en-
couraging farmers to reclaim the wilderness, the Cheng family
adopted a military colonization system to settle soldiers and
also continued international trade to increase revenue. Fur-
thermore, with the assistance of Ming intellectual refugees,
they reestablished Chinese political institutions and set up
schools for both the Chinese and aborigines, thus introducing
Chinese high culture to Taiwan.
The exact number of Chinese in Taiwan during this period
is not known. My conservative estimate of the island’s Chinese
populution at the end of Cheng rule is 100,000—twice what it
was during Dutch times. It was again migration that mainly ac-
counted for the population growth. The two largest immigrant
groups were soldiers (and their families) and peasants. In
1661–1662 Cheng Ch’eng-kung led about 25,000 soldiers to
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Taiwan, and in 1664 Cheng Ching brought 4,000 more.107 Al-
though the Chengs ordered their lieutenants and soldiers to
bring their families, not all of them complied; in the 1670s
about half were still without families.108 Most of the immi-
grants, however, were peasants of Fukien who went to Taiwan
in defiance of the Manchu policies of maritime prohibition
(1656–1684) and coastal population removal (1660–1681).
The Manchu policy of removing the coastal population, first
enforced in Hai-ch’eng and T’ung-an in October 1660, was later
extended to include other areas of Fukien, Kwangtung,
Kiangnan, Chekiang, and Shantung. The people of Fukien and
Kwangtung suffered the most under this policy because of their
support of the Chengs. Kwangtung residents in some counties
were thrice ordered to move to the area about 50 li from the
coast—20 li more than the normally required distance. In
Fukien, even if people moved inland the taxes remained, and the
yamen runners followed to collect them.109 With fields deserted,
many peasants could not find food and subsequently starved.
Those who could acquire foodstuffs did not necessarily survive,
for they were sometimes killed by bandits or eaten by tigers.110
In the long run, the draconian Ch’ing policy compelled some
people on the southeast coast of China to migrate to Taiwan.
The Ch’ing court repealed the policy of removing the coastal
population in 1681 while planning to attack Taiwan. But the fear
of Manchu brutality during their preparation for the expedition
only intensified the returning farmers’ frustration in changing
wasteland into fields; many of them left their homes for good.
According to Chinese traders at Nagasaki, an unknown number
of people from China’s southeast coast migrated to Taiwan in
the early 1680s.111 In April 1682 the journal register of the
British Tongking Factory noted that in the South China Sea 206
Chinese junks “were cruising about to get a place where they
may provide rice” and added that they were “all forced to fly
their country to save their lives.”112 At that time, it was ap-
parently safer to live in Taiwan than along China’s southeast
coast, where the Ch’ing policy had driven many to banditry.113
Taiwan was labeled a “paradise” in 1669 because of the con-
scientious efforts of such Cheng advisors as Ch’eng Yung-hua
(1633–1681).114 Two years later the island produced a bumper
harvest, news that eventually reached the destitute population
on the coastal mainland.115 Furthermore, with Cheng Ching’s
forces occasionally occupying coastal areas in southern Fukien
and northern Kwangtung between 1676 and 1680, the improved
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communications between the southeast coast and Taiwan
prompted the refugees to change their unfavorable image of the
island.
Not all the refugees went to Taiwan of their own volition.
Cheng Ching provided ships for some Ming imperial clansmen,
such as Chu Shu-kuei, and scholars, like Li Man-ch’un, to sail
to the island. A number of able-bodied men were drafted under
duress by Cheng Ching into his army and were later shipped
to Taiwan.116 After 1675, Cheng Ching banished three cate-
gories of people to Tan-shui in the north and Lang-ch’iao on the
southern cape: the relatives of Chinese officials who had de-
fected to the Manchus; scholars who defied him; and common
people who refused to pay him taxes or duties.117 The pirates
also seized women on the southeast coast of China and sold
them in Taiwan.118
The Cheng family encouraged reclamation of the
wilderness—with special emphasis on the benefit of officials and
soldiers at the expense of the economic well-being of common
people. Though changing the name of the Dutch East India
Company’s “crown fields” to “government fields,” the Chengs
had the tenant peasants till the same fields and lead the same
rough life.119 Except for the fields that were already claimed
by proprietors or cultivated by farmers, all civil and military of-
ficials could enclose land as their permanent possessions and
lease it to the common people. Moreover, these officials could
establish other estates and engage in commerce and fishing.
The Cheng regime also urged Chinese proprietors to apply for
permits and open up new land.120 Yet no special efforts were
made to ameliorate peasant life.
The most extensive and systematic mode of land reclamation
at that time was military colonization. Twenty-one days after
coming ashore, on 22 May 1661, Cheng Ch’eng-kung spread out
half his soldiers for farming. After the Dutch surrendered, he
garrisoned An-p’ing and Ch’eng-t’ien (Tainan) with two brigades
and sent out the others to open up new land. In August 1664
Cheng Ching also dispersed one-third of his own troops over
the western coast to farm.121 By 1670, military colonization had
become institutionalized. For the first three years the soldiers
were paid and provided with cattle and supplies; thereafter they
were supposed to become self-sufficient from their farming. The
number of military colonizers increased during the 1670s. In
1680, when the two pirates Chiang Sheng and Ch’iu Hui joined
Cheng Ching, they too dispersed their followers for military col-
onization.122 In 1683, while twenty thousand soldiers were sent
CHINA’S ISLAND FRONTIER
24
to defend P’eng-hu against Manchu attack, there remained on
Taiwan an equal number engaged in farming.123 Many had been
well settled and some even married native women.124
The areas developed by the Chinese in Taiwan during the
Cheng period were more extensive than before, though still
concentrated in the southwestern part. Of the areas reclaimed
under the military colonization system, thirty-seven sites are
identified in Table 1-3. The table shows that thirty-two of the
thirty-seven sites, or 90 percent, are in the present Tainan
and Kaohsiung areas. This distribution also roughly reflects the
pattern of the Chinese population and cultivated fields.125 The
Cheng regime, however, never formulated any specific plan for
the development of northern Taiwan, letting it remain a region
of “birds’ nests and beasts’ caves.”126 Though Chinese soldiers
encamped at northern outposts, planned exploration for gold
and future development there were nevertheless frustrated by
the early defeat of the Cheng forces.127
Most of the island remained in the hands of the aborigines,
whose agriculture and life remained distinct from that of the
Chinese. Only the aborigines in the vicinity of Tainan used
sickles, plows, hoes, or rakes. In September 1661, Yang Ying, a
Cheng advisor, recommended that each tribe be given a plow, a
rake, and a cow and that a Chinese peasant be assigned to it in
order to teach the aborigines farming. No historical evidence,
however, indicates that Yang’s proposal was ever adopted or
that such a methodical sinicization of aboriginal agriculture oc-
curred.128
The Chengs established salt farms and promoted the culti-
vation of rice but deemphasized that of sugar as a means to
solve the food supply problem.129 Even so, each year Taiwan
still produced an average of 10,000 piculs of sugar.130 They also
continued to trade with Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia to
enrich their treasury. Cheng Ching even invited all countries
except Ch’ing China to trade with Taiwan.131 He let the British
maintain a commercial factory at Tainan (1673–1683) to fa-
cilitate acquisition of ammunition from them.132 Such interna-
tional trade ended in 1683 with the Ch’ing occupation of the
island.
Chinese learning was introduced to Taiwan with the estab-
lishment of Chinese educational institutions and instruction by
Ming refugee intellectuals. In September 1665, Ch’en Yung-hua
proposed building a Confucian temple at Tainan; the temple
was completed the following February. After April 1666, the
Cheng family set up schools in the Chinese-populated areas
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TABLE 1–3
Military Colonization Sites: 1662–1683
Region and County Number of Sites
North
Hsin-chu 1
Central
Nan-t’ou 1
Yun-lin 1
South
Chia-i 1
Tainan 16
Kaohsiung 16
P’ing-tung 1
TOTAL 37
SOURCES: “Tainan-ken ka imin no enkaku” [History of Chinese
migration to Taiwan county], Taiwankanshü kiji [Studies in
Taiwan history and customs], 2(5)(1902):340; Taiwan shihō
[Private laws of Taiwan] (Kobe: 1910), vol. 1. pt. 1, pp. 68–70;
Lien Heng, T’ai-wan t’ung-shih [General history of Taiwan]
(Taipei: 1955), pp. 353–355.
as well as in the aboriginal villages near Tainan. Regulations
for the civil service examination were formulated and in 1670
a national learning academy (kuo-hsueh) was established at
the capital.133 Ming refugee scholars also helped propagate
Chinese culture on the island. Of them, the greatest was Shen
Kuang-wen (1612–1691?), acclaimed as the first person to in-
troduce a literary tradition there. Shen, a Chekiang native,
once served as subdirector of the Ming Imperial Stud (T’ai-p’u
Szu). Around 1652 he drifted to Taiwan from Quemoy: “I said
I merely came here temporarily. Yet for long I have despon-
dently stayed.” For approximately two decades he lived among
the aborigines at Backlavan, where “the quietude of hills could
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reside” in him. He composed poems to express his regret for
being “hungry but alive,” and late at night he “listened to the
moon and shut the door to take in the mountain.”134 The Ming
refugees, while “listening to the moon” (a poetic omen of Ming
restorationism), transmitted Chinese political institutions and
literary traditions to Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
Taiwan was largely ignored by outsiders before the sixteenth
century. Chinese first inhabited the P’eng-hu archipelago in the
mid-twelfth century and incorporated it into the empire toward
the end of the thirteenth. Even though Chinese seamen also
had reached the main island of Taiwan by accident before the
twelfth century, they were probably confused about the identity
of the islands in the East China Sea. In fact, unfavorable winds
and ocean currents prevented the southern Fukienese from
sailing to Taiwan regularly in medieval times. Starting with the
fourteenth century, however, Chinese merchants nevertheless
braved the waves to reach southwestern Taiwan and barter with
the indigenous people. Both southern Fukienese fishermen and
pirates occasionally found shelter on the southwest coast of the
island but did not form permanent settlements there until the
end of the sixteenth century. The Portuguese, who gave Taiwan
the name Formosa in the early 1540s, as well as other European
navigators, passed by the island, yet none made an effort to set-
tle there until the seventeenth century.
Taiwan is the only Chinese area that has been colonized
by three foreign powers: the Dutch (1624–1662), the Spanish
(1626–1642), and the Japanese (1895–1945). Taking Taiwan pri-
marily for their mercantile and religious interests, the Dutch
and Spanish had only limited success in the evangelization
and education of the natives. Although the Dutch encouraged
Chinese migration by carrying the immigrants and providing
them with agricultural necessities, most migrants took Chinese
junks to cross the strait. About 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese had
settled on Taiwan by 1652; some of them apparently had sur-
vived Dutch persecution after their earlier uprising against
colonial exploitation had failed a decade before. The Dutch also
promoted the cultivation of rice and sugar cane, and they intro-
duced new vegetables and fruits as well as commercial crops.
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Figure 1–4. Late seventeenth-century Chinese map of Taiwan.
The Dutch encouragement of farming not only prompted the
Chinese to expand arable fields but also demonstrated that the
island was agriculturally productive.
The Cheng family transformed the island from a foreign
trading colony into a Chinese frontier. More migrants from
southeast China sailed to Taiwan in defiance of Manchu mar-
itime prohibitions and coastal population policies. Besides
peasants, Cheng soldiers also reclaimed the wilderness under
the military colonization system. Toward the end of Cheng rule
in 1683, an estimated 100,000 Chinese settlers congregated
principally in the southwestern region, although small settle-
ments existed elsewhere on the island (Figure 1-4).
An ardent nationalist, Cheng Ch’eng-kung nevertheless
disregarded the livelihood of both aborigines and Chinese
peasants. The Cheng regime, like the Dutch before it, levied
various onerous taxes on the settlers, yet effective military
control obviated Chinese revolts. Culturally, however, some of
Cheng’s sagacious advisors championed traditional learning by
setting up schools for both the aborigines and Chinese settlers.
The Ming loyalists, who sealed their political fate on the island,
introduced Chinese high culture to Taiwan, in contrast to the
folk culture which had been transplanted there by peasant pio-
neers.
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2
Cultural Contact and the
Migration of Taiwan’s
Aborigines: A Historical
Perspective
I-SHOU WANG
The changing circumstances of the aborigines in Taiwan is one
of absorbing interest. For here is an island once exclusively
inhabited by aborigines who for the most part spoke Malayo-
Polynesian tongues and showed strong cultural affinities with
peoples in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Whatever
links they may have had with the people on the China mainland,
they were certainly decisively different from the Han Chinese.1
And now, like many other indigenous people in China and else-
where in a culturally changing world, they are being assimilated
into a more populous and more technologically advanced so-
ciety. At present there is no fear that they will be quickly elim-
inated. There are still some 250,000 of them, mostly in the
rugged mountain ranges of central and eastern Taiwan, and
their cultural heritage is still notably distinct. Furthermore, the
process of cultural change and assimilation has been a long one,
starting not with the Han Chinese but with the Dutch, and then
continuing with each successive occupation: Chinese, Japanese,
and Chinese again. So their current situation—a steady assim-
ilation into the life of modern Taiwan—is but a phase of a long
and varied history.
It is the encounter between these Malayo-Polynesian abo-
rigines and each of the intrusive culture groups—and the conse-
quent evolution of the present situation—which forms the focus
of this study. First we will establish, from historical and archae-
ological records, the distribution of the aboriginal settlements
prior to the first contact with the Dutch in the seventeenth
century. Then we will examine the acculturation, the aboriginal
responses, and the change in aboriginal settlement patterns
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during each of the successive periods of political rule: Dutch
(1624–1662), Chinese (1662–1895), Japanese (1895–1945), and
Chinese (1945 to present).
ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
The origin of the Formosan aborigines is not yet clear, but
recent archaeological findings indicate that they have lived in
Taiwan for a long period of time and inhabited both the lowlands
and the highlands.2 They were horticulturists, producing millet,
rice, tubers, and beans, and engaged in hunting and gathering.
Culturally the groups were diversified and occupied different re-
gions of the island. Little information is available in regard to
the number of settlements and the size of population.
Based on their general areas of habitation, the aborigines
can be divided into two major groups: the lowland aborigines
and the mountain aborigines. The former inhabited the western
and northern lowlands while the latter occupied the central
mountain region and eastern Taiwan. Since these two terms
also tend to indicate the time and duration of their contacts
with the invading cultures, with lowlanders having an earlier
exposure to external contacts, they will be used throughout the
chapter.
The lowland aborigines can be divided into fourteen groups
based on ethnographic traits and geographical distribution.3
Their inhabited areas are shown in Figure 2-1. In the north, Ke-
tanglan and Lui-lang inhabited the coastal area and the Taipei
basin while the Kavalan occupied the I-lan delta. In central
Taiwan, the Taokas and Papora resided along the coast while the
Pazeh, Babuza, Sau, and Hoanya lived inland in the Taichung
basin, Chang-hua plain, P’u-li basin, and Nan-t’ou area respec-
tively. In the south the Siraya, Makatau, Taivoan, Pangsola-
Dolatok, and Lungkiau spread out on the southwestern lowlands
from the Chia-i area to the Heng-ch’un peninsula.
The mountain aborigines can be divided into nine major
groups.4 In the mountain region, the Atayal and Saisiat oc-
cupied the north, the Bunun and Tsou settled in the middle,
and the Paiwan and Rukai inhabited the south (Figure 2-2). The
eastern rift valley and the eastern coastal area were the home
of the Ami, but it was the Puyama who occupied the southern
end of the rift valley. The Yami were on the island of Lan-yu.
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Figure 2–1. Areas originally inhabited by
the lowland aborigines.
In the early seventeenth century, Chinese pirates occupied
Pei-kang near the southwestern coast and assisted some three
thousand peasants of Chang-chou to cross the sea to settle in
the Pei-kang area.5 Although they did come into contact with
some lowland aborigines, their number was small and the pi-
rates’ main interest was maritime; their effect on the life of
the aborigines was therefore minimal. Up to that encounter, the
aborigines had been free of external interference and lived the
life their ancestors had lived for centuries.
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Figure 2–2. Legendary sites of original settle-
ments and present dominant areas of the
mountain aborigines.
THE DUTCH PERIOD (1624–1662)
Dutch rule in Taiwan marked the beginning of external impact
on the life of the aborigines. The Dutch came into direct contact
only with the southwestern lowland aborigines—namely, the
Siraya, Taivoan, Makatau, Pangsola-Dolatok, and Lungkiau.
They engaged in trade, missionary work, and education, ap-
pointed chieftains in the aboriginal villages, regulated the abo-
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rigines’ use of land, imposed various taxes, restricted their
movements, and encouraged the in-migration of Chinese la-
borers to cultivate the land. As a result, the life of the south-
western lowland aborigines underwent substantial change.6
The occupation of the Taiwan coastal area in 1624 by the
Dutch brought them into direct contact with the Siraya, with
whom they immediately engaged in trade. They also sent mis-
sionary workers into Siraya settlements and sought to extend
control and expand trade by sending delegates to the villages
of Taivoan, Makatau, Pangsola-Dolatok, and Lungkiau and ap-
pointed chieftains in some of the villages which lacked formal
leadership.7 By 1636 most of the villages on the southwestern
plain had been brought under Dutch rule, and in February of
that year the Europeans convened a conference of local chief-
tains from twenty-eight villages in Sinkong near present-day
Tainan.8 Although the Dutch sphere of influence covered the
southwestern plain, only the Siraya of the Taiwan plain had in-
timate and intensive contact with them. There was only limited
and indirect Dutch contact with the mountain aborigines of
southern Taiwan through the lowland aborigines.
To tighten their control and increase their revenue, the
Dutch prohibited the Siraya from moving freely between vil-
lages and regulated and taxed their use of land. Moreover, a
head tax, an export tax, and even hunting and fishing taxes
were imposed. Though this regime seemed oppressive, most of
the Siraya accepted it however unwillingly, but some fled inland
to settle among the Taivoanians.9 This flight marked the first
known incidence of externally induced aboriginal migration on
the island.
Other changes resulted from the interlocking factors of land
use and migration. The aborigines were shifting cultivators and,
in Dutch eyes, did not use the land efficiently. To utilize the
fertile lowland and increase agricultural production, the Dutch
encouraged the in-migration of Chinese laborers by providing
them with land, draft animals, tools, seeds, and some cash as
described by Wen-hsiung Hsu in Chapter 1. At that time, as
the political situation in China happened to be chaotic and pop-
ulation pressure in the Fukien area was intense, individuals
and some households from the Chang-chou area of Fukien mi-
grated across the straits. As a result, some 10,000 hectares of
land were brought under intensive cultivation and the Chinese
settlements spread out from Fort Zeelandia and Fort Provintia
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northward to Pei-kang, eastward to Hsin-hua, and southward to
Kong-shan (see Figure 2-3). In the mid-seventeenth century, the
Chinese population in Taiwan may have reached fifty thousand.
The extensive missionary work carried out by the Dutch,
particularly in the Siraya villages, exposed the aborigines to
different religious beliefs, and by 1650 many Siraya were at
least nominally converted to Christianity.10 The Dutch also es-
tablished community schools in the aboriginal villages and in-
troduced formal education; under their rule, moreover, several
surveys of population and household were conducted. Although
the areal coverage and accuracy of the surveys are difficult to
assess, their reports give at least general ideas about the size of
the villages and the population within their respective spheres
of influence. The population of the five principal Siraya villages
in 1639, for example, was reported to range from 1,000 to 3,000
(Table 2-1) and the total number of aborigines was reported to
be 68,567 in 1650 (Table 2-2).
Most of the Dutch in Taiwan resided in or near Fort Zee-
landia and Fort Provintia, both within the present-day bound-
aries of the city of Tainan. They were predominantly military
personnel along with employees of the Dutch East India
Company, merchants, missionaries, and schoolteachers. The
total Dutch population in Taiwan at its peak was reported at
2,800, of whom 2,200 were soldiers.
During the Dutch period between 1624 and 1662, both the
Dutch and the Chinese advanced into the habitats of the south-
western lowland aborigines, initiated changes in the aboriginal
way of life, and reduced their living and action space. Because
the Dutch were few in numbers and mostly resided in the fort
areas, the influence of their direct individual contact was small.
But they did possess political and economic power, and their
effect on aboriginal life was mediated not so much from indi-
vidual contact as through the institutional structure and imple-
mentation of policy. Directly or indirectly, the Dutch increased
the aborigines’ dependence on trade, imposed taxes and chief-
tains on them, introduced church and school to them, and en-
couraged a large number of Chinese to immigrate and live in
their midst. As these Chinese outnumbered both the Dutch and
the aborigines and lived in the countryside, they tended to have
greater personal contact with the latter in terms of both fre-
quency and duration than did the Dutch.
In 1661, with the assistance of the Siraya and the local
Chinese, Cheng Ch’eng-kung and his troops attacked the island
and after a lengthy siege drove out the Dutch. Thus ended
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Figure 2–3. Expansion of Chinese settlement.
[After C. S. Chen, 1950.]
Dutch rule on Taiwan. Whatever effects it may have had on abo-
riginal life were soon submerged under the inrushing tide of
Chinese immigration.
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TABLE 2–1
Population of the Siraya Villages: 1639
Village Population
Sinkan 1,047
Mattau 3,000
Soulang 2,600
Bakloan 1,000
Tavakan 1,000
SOURCE: Raleigh Ferrell, “Aboriginal Peoples of the
Southwestern Taiwan Plain,” Bulletin of the Institute of
Ethnology, Academia Sinica 32(Autumn 1971):218.
TABLE 2–2.
Population of Taiwan’s Aborigines: 1647–1655
Year Villages Households Population
1647 246 13,619 62,849
1648 251 13,955 63,861
1650 315 15,249 68,567
1654 271 14,262 49,324+
1655 233 11,029 39,223+
SOURCE: Wang Jen-ying, Population Change of Formosan
Aborigines, Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica,
Monograph 11 (Nankang, Taipei: 1967), p. 40,
THE CHINESE PERIOD (1662–1895)
The Chinese ruled Taiwan continuously for over two centuries
from 1662 to 1895; the first 21 years were under Cheng and
his descendants, and the last 212 years were under the Ch’ing
dynasty. The Chinese were primarily interested in colonizing
the lowlands, and during this period their settlements expanded
from the southwestern coast to cover most of the western and
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northern lowlands. The lowland aborigines, surrounded by the
ever-increasing numbers of Chinese, were either assimilated or
forced to seek refuge in the hills and in the remote areas of
eastern Taiwan. The Chinese did come into contact with the
mountain aborigines but because of the difficult terrain and
strong resistance they did not invade aboriginal territory un-
til the late nineteenth century. The mountain aborigines were
thus enabled to maintain their way of life well into the twentieth
century without much external interference.
Soon after Cheng and his troops arrived in Taiwan in the
early 1660s, Chinese settlements spread out rapidly in the
southwestern plain. They immediately put pressure on the
southwestern lowland aborigines. Responding to this pressure,
a group of Siraya migrated first to the Tso-cheng district in
eastern Tainan county and then to Ch’i-shan in Kaohsiung
county (Figure 2-4).11 Cheng established several military out-
posts in central and northern Taiwan, and new Chinese settle-
ments developed alongside these—a situation which resulted
in further confrontations with the lowland aborigines. During
Cheng’s rule (1662–1683) three aboriginal uprisings were re-
corded.12
Cheng’s rule was short-lived and in 1684 Taiwan was offi-
cially brought within the Ch’ing administrative system. Because
of this change, the Chinese settlements in the south continued
to expand, forcing some lowland aborigines to migrate (Figure
2-4). In the early eighteenth century, some Siraya people moved
eastward to join the Taivoan in the hills near Yu-ching. Pres-
sured by the incoming Siraya and the Chinese, the Taivoan
yielded their homeland in the 1740s and moved further inland
to the valleys of the Lao-nun Ch’i (river) and the Nan-tze-hsien
Ch’i. Chinese pressure was also felt by the Makatau, a majority
of whom retreated into the hilly area to the east of the P’ing-
tung plain, though a small number chose to migrate southward
to the Heng-ch’un peninsula.13 Those who remained became in-
termixed with the Chinese and were subsequently sinicized.
In central Taiwan, the Chinese settlements extended from
the nuclei established earlier at the expense of the aboriginal
land. In some areas, such as Nan-t’ou and Chia-i, the Chinese
came into direct contact with the fierce mountain aborigines.
As the Chinese invaded their territory, the aborigines retaliated
by killing the invaders and even raiding nearby Chinese settle-
ments. Some of the more serious conflicts resulted in aboriginal
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Figure 2–4. Migration routes in southern Taiwan.
uprisings, and during the early part of the eighteenth century,
five major revolts were reported: two in Nan-t’ou, two in P’ing-
tung, and one in Chia-i.14
As Chinese settlement expanded, the conflicts between the
Chinese and the aborigines intensified. Since the Ch’ing gov-
ernment was not interested in colonizing the mountain area and
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wished to reduce the level of conflict and protect the Chinese
villages, it established a boundary between the lowland and the
mountain regions to separate the Chinese from the mountain
aborigines and set up military posts on the major routes leading
to the aboriginal territory.15 In 1739 the Ch’ing government for-
mally prohibited the Chinese from entering the territory of the
mountain aborigines. From then until the removal of the decree
in 1875, no uprisings were recorded, though this of course does
not necessarily mean that conflicts or confrontations were en-
tirely absent during this period.
Since taking control of Taiwan in 1683, the Ch’ing gov-
ernment had restricted immigration to Taiwan; but in 1760
these restrictions were completely lifted. A rapid increase of
Chinese followed: a survey taken in 1811 indicates a total
Chinese population of over 2 million. As the Chinese population
increased, the pressure on the lowland aborigines mounted,
setting off a series of migrations.
The Chinese colonization of the I-lan delta during the
1796–1820 period forced the local Kavalan people to migrate
(Figure 2-5). Some retreated to the mountains to the north of
the delta while others moved first to the area south of Lo-tung
in the delta and later, in the 1840s, to Pei-fang-ao by land or to
Hua-lien by sea.16 In the early nineteenth century, a thousand
or so lowland aborigines of central Taiwan migrated across the
central mountains to Wu-wei in the I-lan delta. Unfortunately for
the aborigines, the Chinese were then colonizing the delta (as
Cho-yun Hsu will describe in a later chapter) and were hostile to
the immigrants. As a result, many of the latter returned to their
original homeland, though some did settle in the hills nearby.
In 1823, a group of aborigines from Wan-tou-liu in central
Taiwan migrated inland to the P’u-li basin. They were well re-
ceived by the local native inhabitants, and many more abo-
rigines from the Tachia, Taichung, Chang-hua, and Nan-t’ou
areas followed.
The continuing expansion of Chinese settlements in the
south forced the Siraya and others already in the hills to mi-
grate further across the central mountain range to eastern
Taiwan by three routes, two of which crossed the mountains
and one of which skirted the southern ranges. The northern
route, following the valleys of the Lao-nun Ch’i and the Hsin-
wu-li Ch’i to the east, passed through the territory of the Bunun
and required their assistance and cooperation; and when this
aid was replaced by Bunun hostility, the route was abandoned.
The second route, by way of Fang-liao, crossed the Ta-wu Shan
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and then followed the coast northward to the eastern rift valley,
a long trench extending north-south. It was used by the majority
of the aboriginal migrants, particularly after the abandonment
of the northern route. The southern route was used mainly by
the Lungkiau of the Heng-ch’un peninsula. Those who migrated
to the eastern rift valley settled in the area between the Hsiu-
ku-luan Ch’i in the north and the Li-lung in the south while those
who settled along the coast in the area between Ta-king-k’ou
and Ch’en-kuan-ao intermixed with those Kavalan who had re-
treated from the I-lan delta.
Many of the lowland aborigines, however, did not migrate
and were largely sinicized. They are commonly referred to in
the Chinese literature as shu-fan (ripened aborigines) as op-
posed to the sheng-fan (raw or uncivilized aborigines). The
shu-fan or sinicized aborigines are frequently referred to as Pe-
pohoan, a corruption of the Chinese p’ing-p’u-fan (plains abo-
rigines). The major factor in the acculturation and assimilation
was the long contact between the aborigines and the Han
Chinese. The establishment of educational institutions by the
Chinese facilitated the assimilation.
After more than two centuries of colonization by the
Chinese, most of the western lowland was brought under in-
tensive cultivation. Meanwhile the Chinese population in-
creased greatly from about 100,000 in 1684 to over 3 million
in 1887. To relieve population pressure, the Ch’ing government
in 1875 lifted the ban of 1739 and allowed Chinese to enter
the mountain region. Chinese settlers quickly invaded the lands
of the mountain aborigines. The Chinese government also at-
tempted to open up mountain land for colonization. The strong
resistance of the aborigines to the new incursions was evi-
denced by twenty major uprisings between 1875 and 1895.
Most of these were caused by governmental attempts to col-
onize mountain land or governmental response to the aboriginal
killing of the invading Chinese settlers.17
The mountain aborigines, particularly the Atayal and the
Paiwan, resisted strongly. Of the twenty uprisings, seventeen in-
volved the mountain aborigines. The Atayal, with ten uprisings,
led all the groups; the Paiwan followed with four. The lowland
aborigines involved in the uprisings were the Kavalan who were
forced out of the Man delta earlier in the 1840s. To protect
their newly established homeland in eastern Taiwan, they had
to resist the Chinese intrusions and revolted three times. Two
areas—eastern Taiwan and the mountain area of T’ao-yuan and
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Figure 2–5. Settlement sites and migration
routes of the lowland aborigines. [After C. S.
Chen, 1959.]
Hsin-chu in northern Taiwan—accounted for fifteen of the
twenty uprisings. There were three uprisings in the southern tip
of the island and two in central Taiwan.
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, temporarily ending
Chinese rule of the island. During the preceding two centuries
of Chinese dominion, Chinese settlements had spread
throughout the western and northern lowlands, and the former
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hunting grounds of the lowland aborigines were transformed
into agricultural fields. The original inhabitants of the lowlands
lived in a sea of Chinese culture and through long and intensive
contact they were mostly sinicized. Those who migrated to the
hills or to eastern Taiwan lived among the mountain aborigines
and were able to maintain some of their cultural heritage. Al-
though the Chinese came into contact with the mountain abo-
rigines, the latter, aided by rugged terrain and their own strong
resistance, managed to protect their living space and preserve
their way of life, at least for a longer while.
THE JAPANESE PERIOD (1895–1945)
The Japanese occupation marked the beginning of the planned
intrusion of external culture into the territory of the mountain
aborigines. Interest in the exploitation of Taiwan’s natural re-
sources led the Japanese to colonize eastern Taiwan and en-
croach upon the land of the mountain aborigines with force. To
establish firm control over the aborigines, the Japanese pene-
trated the mountain region by setting up police stations and
schools in aboriginal villages, and this control was further facil-
itated when the aborigines of remote areas were forced to re-
settle in the more accessible regions of the mountain zone.
During the first years of their occupation, the Japanese were
so busy pacifying the Han Chinese that they were able to es-
tablish only a few police guard stations in key places leading
into the aboriginal territory.18 In 1897, in response to several
incidents involving the killing of lumber and camphor workers
in the Hsin-chu and I-lan areas, a defensive guardline system
was established to protect Chinese districts. Guardlines were
cleared zones that stretched across the ranges. In addition to
guard posts located at strategic points, electrically charged
wire entanglements and mines were used. Telephone lines
linked the guard posts and other areas under Japanese
control.19 Continuing exploitation of forest products at the
margin of Atayal territory resulted in an increase of killing
and property damage by the aborigines. The Japanese coun-
tered by augmenting the number of guards and extending the
guardline to protect the camphor and timber workers. By 1900
a guardline enclosing Atayal territory was completed. At this
time the guardline was maintained simply to defend the border
district, but after the Japanese had attained full control over the
Chinese in 1902, the guardline became the offensive front. Be-
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tween 1903 and 1908, the guardline was advanced into Atayal
territory seventy-five times, and on eighteen of these occasions
fierce resistance was encountered. In 1907 a new guardline was
established in the northern end of the eastern rift valley near
Hua-lien and was subsequently extended mainly in the north
and northwest of Atayal territory. The location of guardlines and
the major guard stations along the line are shown in Figure 2-6.
Moreover, the Japanese attempted to pacify the mountain
aborigines with force. Between 1898 and 1909 the Japanese
sent eleven punitive expeditions against the aborigines, mostly
against the Atayal. The successful expeditions typically resulted
in destruction of the aboriginal villages, killing of the abo-
rigines, the flight of survivors inland, and the advance of the
guardline. The cost of this conflict was high: during this period
4,127 persons were recorded as killed and 1,545 wounded by
the aborigines. Ninety percent of these casualties were Tai-
wanese; the remainder were Japanese. The number of killed and
wounded aborigines is not known.
In southern Taiwan no guardline was established. Instead,
police stations were set up in aboriginal villages to regulate ac-
tivities. By the end of 1909, there were 123 police stations in the
mountain aboriginal territory. The distribution of the police sta-
tions in southern Taiwan is shown in Figure 2-7, The Japanese
also established seventeen schools in aboriginal villages, all in
the lowland area.20
There was some trade between the aborigines and the
lowland people, but this activity was permitted only in areas
where the aborigines observed Japanese law. There a trading
station would be attached to the guard or police station and
the aborigines would bring various forest products and game to
trade for lowland goods. From time to time, agricultural imple-
ments and seeds were offered to them. In some of the stations
medicines were kept and oftentimes were given to the sick. The
Japanese authorities encouraged the docile aborigines to mi-
grate inside the guardline or near the guard stations. By 1913
some four thousand Atayal had moved to the areas along the
guardline.21
In the 1920s a system of aboriginal reservations—Chinese
entry was forbidden—was established in the highlands and the
guardline was eliminated. Meanwhile the Japanese began to or-
ganize the resettle ment of the highland aborigines and a sense
of oppression roused the mountaineers. In 1930, the Atayal at-
tacked a Japanese police station at Wu-she and killed over a
hundred policemen and their families. As a result of this in-
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Figure 2–6. Advancement of the guardline in northern Taiwan: 1909.
cident, the Japanese intensified their forced migration program
in order to gain greater control over the aboriginal settlements.
In the Wu-she area alone, some five thousand aborigines from
thirty-eight villages were resettled.22 Elsewhere many small vil-
lages in remote areas were consolidated into larger settlements
in the more accessible foothills. The extent of the forced reset-
tlement can be seen in the declining number of settlements be-
tween 1920 and 1935. The Atayal settlements were reduced by
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Figure 2–7. Distribution of police stations in the
aboriginal districts of southern Taiwan.
86 from 267 in 1920 to 181 in 1935. The number of Bunun set-
tlements decreased by 39 from 124 to 85. More than 30 other
aboriginal settlements were eliminated.23
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The number of individuals involved in the migration was
substantial. Prior to 1930 a total of 14,145 aborigines were re-
ported to have resettled. In the decade after the Wu-she in-
cident an additional 21,642 aborigines were officially resettled.
Half of these were Bunun and 39 percent Atayal. The dislocation
of the former was substantial, for the relocated individuals con-
stituted 62 percent of the entire Bunun population in 1929.24
After the Wu-she incident, the Japanese adopted a gradual
pacification policy. Apart from moving the highland aborigines
to more accessible areas, they expanded the construction of
roads and bridges in the mountain region, extended the public
school system into that area, reduced the threat of malaria
and other environmental diseases, and introduced new crops.
As peace and stability were restored, the aboriginal population
increased. In 1906 there were 113,163 mountain aborigines.
By 1940 their population had grown to 158,321. The rate of
increase was highest during the 1930s: 12.6 percent for the
decade.25
The colonization of the eastern rift valley and the Pacific
littoral during the Japanese period brought both Chinese and
Japanese into contact with the mountain aborigines of eastern
Taiwan (Figure 2-8). Although the Chinese had attempted to
colonize eastern Taiwan in the late nineteenth century, they
had had but limited success: in 1896, there were only 3,300
Han Chinese there.26 Beginning in the 1910s, the Japanese en-
couraged the migration of both Chinese and Japanese to the
area. Despite heavy government subsidies, the early results
were far below expectations. Nonetheless, by 1935, the Chi-
nese population of eastern Taiwan increased to some 70,000.
Together with 20,000 Japanese, their combined total approx-
imately equaled that of the aborigines in the area. Thus, by
comparison, the aborigines of eastern Taiwan had far more op-
portunity for contact with the Chinese or the Japanese than had
those in the central mountain region. The Japanese also en-
gaged in resettling mountain aborigines from the eastern slope
of the central mountain region into the eastern rift valley; by
1938, some 1,859 households with a total of 10,850 aborigines
had been resettled in the valley.27
Thus the fifty years of Japanese rule greatly altered the
settlement pattern of the aborigines and brought about sub-
stantial changes in their dealings with outsiders. In addition to
encroaching upon Atayal land in the north, the Japanese en-
couraged the migration of Chinese and Japanese to eastern
Taiwan, consolidated the highland aboriginal settlements into
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Figure 2–8. Colonization during the Japanese
period. [After C. S. Chen, 1950.]
the more accessible areas, and moved many of the aborigines
of the eastern slope of the mountain region into the eastern rift
valley. They also established police stations and schools in the
aboriginal villages. They did continue to prohibit the Chinese
from entering the mountain region, however, thus preserving
the mountain areas, in the main, for the highland aborigines.
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Japanese rule over Taiwan ended with their defeat in World
War II, and in 1945 the island was returned to China. But in the
meantime China itself had changed from an imperial dynasty to
a republic, and this change was to bring different attitudes and
policies to Taiwan in the postwar era.
THE POSTWAR ERA
Under the new Chinese government, the aborigines became cit-
izens of China with the same legal rights as the Han Chinese.
They can by law, for example, move freely and participate in
the political process. To protect them from exploitation, the
Chinese government continues to maintain the reserve system
in the mountain region, forbidding Chinese to enter without
a permit but leaving the aborigines free to depart or enter.
Such Chinese as do live in the mountain region are typically
policemen, schoolteachers, and shopkeepers. The Chinese in-
terest in exploiting mountain resources has led them to build
roads, dams, and powerlines, a development which has brought
many transient Chinese workers into the region.28 The con-
struction of roads has improved the accessibility of these areas
and increased the interaction between mountain aborigines and
lowland people, while the completion of the east-west highway
in central Taiwan has brought tens of thousands of tourists in
annual transit through this region. Moreover, the Chinese gov-
ernment resettled thousands of retired soldiers in the moun-
tains. So, despite governmental restrictions, the Chinese
presence in the region is on the rise and the highland aborigines
are constantly exposed to the Chinese way of life.
Many highland aboriginal youths have descended to the
lowland for education or military service. Since there is no high
school or college in the mountains, those pursuing education
beyond the elementary level have to come down to the lowlands.
Meanwhile, as citizens of the Republic of China, the young male
adults have an obligation to serve in the armed forces and many
are drafted into the military for two or three years. As the
students and draftees live among the Chinese in the lowland,
their exposure to the Chinese way of life is intensified. As a
result, many of them choose to stay there after completing their
education or military service. Those who return bring infor-
mation back to their villages whence it is diffused throughout
the mountain region.
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The increasing presence of the Chinese in the mountain
region and the growing interaction between upland aborigines
and lowland people have intensified the acculturation process.
Meanwhile, the increasing awareness of better economic op-
portunities and a more appealing life in the Chinese-dominated
lowlands has encouraged aborigines to migrate there. As the
mountain aborigines in eastern Taiwan have had greater con-
tacts with the Chinese than have the highland aborigines, and
as the Chinese colonization of eastern Taiwan has intensified,
many more aborigines have migrated from eastern Taiwan to
the western lowlands than from the highlands.
The migration of individual aborigines into the western low-
lands is indicated by the rapid increase of the aboriginal pop-
ulation in that area in recent years. Between 1962 and 1971,
the aboriginal population in the western lowlands more than
doubled from 5,575 to 12,773.29 The migrants are predomi-
nantly Ami, Atayal, and Paiwan. In 1966, for example, there
were 8,453 aborigines in the western lowlands: 3,054 Ami,
2,108 Paiwan, and 1,855 Atayal. These three groups comprised
over 80 percent of the aborigines in the western lowlands. Most
of them resided in the major urbanized areas or in the town-
ships adjacent to their homelands.30
Apart from individual migration, there have been numerous
voluntary resettlements, mostly within the mountain region and
eastern rift valley. A survey taken in 1966 shows that a total
of 111 movements were recorded, including 31 cases of re-
settling whole villages and 80 cases of resettling some village
members (Table 2-3). The resettlement of whole villages in-
volved mainly the Paiwan; the partial resettlements mainly af-
fected the Atayal, the Tsou, the Paiwan, and the Ami. The Saisiat
and the Puyuma were not involved. The resettlement of the
Paiwan was from the mountain slopes to the lower foothills
(Figure 2-9). The moving of the Atayal village was necessitated
by the construction of Shih-men Dam, but the general direc-
tion of Atayal movement, which involved only some members
of some villages, was southward into the areas settled by the
Bunun and the Ami. The movements of the Ami were from the
eastern coastal range down into the rift valley and from the
northern end of the rift valley southward. Most of the move-
ments were from small villages into large settlements. But the
movements of the Tsou were from large villages into the unin-
habited land within their territory and generally involved only
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TABLE 2–3
Number of Postwar Resettlements: 1945–1966
Tribal Group Whole Villages
Resettled
Partial Villages
Resettled
Total
Atayal 2 29 31
Bunun 1 4 5
Tsou 0 22 22
Rukai 1 4 5
Paiwan 21 11 32
Ami 6 10 16
TOTAL 31 80 111
SOURCE: Compiled by the author from Wei Hwei-lin and Wang
Jen-ying, A Survey of Population Growth and Migration
Patterns among Formosan Aborigines, Occasional Papers of the
Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, National Taiwan
University, no. 3 (Taiwan: 1966).
three to five households—a migration which seemed to be con-
sequent to growing population pressure in the villages of the
Tsou.31
Although all these movements were voluntary, the Chinese
government played a decisive role. Many of the shifts, particu-
larly those from inaccessible highland areas and those involving
large numbers of aborigines, were financed by the government.
Nineteen of the Paiwan’s thirty-two movements, for example,
were into new government-constructed communities.32 Up to
1964, the Chinese government had spent over NT$3 million
to assist forty-three movements of ten households or more in-
volving 14,269 aborigines.33
Since the resettlements were from highlands to the more ac-
cessible foothills, they tended to heighten contact between the
aborigines and the Han Chinese and exposure to the Chinese
way of life. The migration of the aborigines into the western
lowlands has increased the flow of information between the
Chinese-dominated lowlands and the aboriginal homelands. As
the trend continues, there will be more individual aborigines
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Figure 2–9. Resettlement of the Taiwan aborigines.
[After Wei and Wang, 1966.]
living among the Chinese and acculturation will likely intensify.
Meanwhile, the increasing interest in exploiting mountain re-
sources will send more Chinese into the mountain region and
accelerate the acculturation process in the aboriginal home-
lands as well.
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3
Settlement and Frontier
Land Tenure
RONALD G. KNAPP
A striking contrast between the nucleated settlement patterns
of southern Taiwan and the dispersed patterns found in the
northern half of the western coastal plain has been noted by
geographers and others (Figure 3-1). This twofold typology has
been repeated so often that it is sometimes forgotten that the
complexity of the colonization process and accompanying agri-
cultural development in fact produced a mosaic of rural set-
tlement forms that is as noteworthy for the variety of represen-
tative components as it is for its seemingly regional sameness.
Not only has no comprehensive island-wide study of existing
settlement patterns been carried out but there has been only
limited examination of the origins and alternations of any one
particular pattern. It is unreasonable to assume that certain
factors compelled a nucleated or a dispersed pattern which,
once established, endured and replicated itself.
This chapter makes no pretense of systematically dealing
with settlement throughout the island of Taiwan. Rather, it fo-
cuses on the settlement history of several areas found on the
900-square-kilometer T’ao-yuan alluvial fan of northern Taiwan.
Chinese migrants came to this area in numbers only at the end
of the seventeenth century. By 1841, as many as fifty thousand
pioneers were transforming the grasslands through arduous
and intensive effort. Over the past two and a half centuries
this region has become not only a highly productive agricultural
area with increasing rural densities but, more recently, an area
of significant urban and suburban development. An early intent
of my research was to treat the genesis of settlement and the
intensification of settlement forms as population increased and
agriculture developed. Intent, unfortunately, has been compro-
mised by reality. The materials for such a sequential study are
not abundant, and those that are available are uneven and se-
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Figure 3–1. General patterns of
rural settlement.
lective. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, I shall attempt to
treat the origin and spread of selected rural settlement patterns
and identify the factors which brought them about.
Like other areas north of the Cho-shui River, the T’ao-yuan
alluvial fan has been described as having a dispersed or scat-
tered rural settlement in contrast to the predominant compact
or nucleated type found in the southern half of the island.
Several authors have examined the physical and cultural factors
that most likely operated to bring about such distinctively dif-
ferent patterns.1 These factors may be summarized as:
1. The availability of water (measured usually in terms of
rainfall but also including groundwater)
2. The nature of the vegetative cover
Chapter 3
53
3. The degree to which there was a threat from the abo-
riginal inhabitants
4. Land tenure practices
In discussions concerning the earliest stages of settlement one
gets the impression that natural factors played a compelling
role. I contend, however, that the physical factors were less lim-
iting than has been suggested and that land tenure practices
carried from southeastern China proved crucial in initiating a
dispersed pattern of settlement, especially on the T’ao-yuan
plain.
Taiwan straddles the Tropic of Cancer and although there
are differences in the temperature regimes of the northern
and southern halves of the island, a very long—if not year-
round—growing season based on temperature was available
to migrants anywhere on the coastal plain. The seasonality of
rainfall, however, did present distinct north-south differences,
and it is this factor that some see as contributing significantly
to the adoption of one settlement form or another. Ch’en Cheng-
hsiang, for example, states that “in the northern part of
Formosa where there is a fair amount of rain in every month
throughout the year people are free to select their abodes.
But in the south where the dry season lasts as long as half a
year through the winter season when often there will be not
a drop of rain for several months, water supply is a serious
problem for the inhabitants.” Ch’en goes on to suggest that
natural vegetation, a correlate of available water, was “chiefly
responsible” for the regionally dissimilar settlement patterns.
Citing an easily debatable “general rule of human geography,”
he states that the forested areas of the north brought forth
scattered settlement while the prairie of the south spawned
compact rural settlements.2 This relationship between forests
and dispersed settlement on the one hand, and grasslands and
compact villages on the other, has been reiterated in the
English-language literature by Chiao-min Hsieh and Yu-chin
Kang, among others.3
That these natural factors were major influences, let alone
determinants of a given pattern, is doubtful in spite of the fact
that contrasting precipitation patterns in northern and southern
Taiwan do exist. On the T’ao-yuan alluvial plain, rainfall is fairly
abundant, with at least 1,500 millimeters per year. A summer
maximum is common, yet moderate amounts fall as well during
the winter months. Settlers there certainly did have more site
options than did pioneers in southern Taiwan and, consequently,
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could have chosen to live in nucleated settlements on the T’ao-
yuan plain if they had wanted to. They were hardly compelled
to live apart in isolated households because of the ubiquity
of water. The natural vegetation argument, likewise, seems to
lose value under further examination. Casting aside any attempt
to justify a causal connection between wooded areas and dis-
persed settlement, there is no real evidence that the T’ao-yuan
area was wooded when first settled by Chinese. A Chinese
traveler who traversed the plain in 1697 on the eve of Chinese
settlement records that he encountered not even a tree on the
lower T’ao-yuan plain.4 Eighteenth-century Chinese gazetteer
maps give no indication of any obstructing natural vegetation.
Only in the eastern foothills were woodlands found. The 1717
Chu-lo hsien gazetteer, in fact, compared the T’ao-yuan plain
to the richer areas of Chang-chou and Ch’uan-chou in Fukien,
stating that Chinese pioneers “could easily transform it into
several thousand parcels of rich and fertile fields.”5
The early eighteenth-century migrants to the T’ao-yuan
plain were not confronted with hostility from aborigines as
other pioneers had experienced in southwestern Taiwan. Only
four distinct and separate aboriginal villages (she), each a
compact settlement encircled by a bamboo thicket, were found
on the plain. Land was abundant for the game the natives
hunted. Moreover, interaction between the new arrivals and the
indigenous groups occurred as a result of small-scale trade,
cooperation in agriculture, and even limited intermarriage.
Chinese migrants built a nucleated settlement immediately ad-
jacent to Nan-k’an she. In time, the aborigines were displaced
and the site was occupied by Chinese. Chinese settlement near
the K’eng-tzu she was dispersed and has remained that way to
the present. In 1741, as a result of cooperative effort, the Hsiao-
li canal system was begun in what is today the southern portion
of Pa-te hsiang to bring water to six dispersed villages occupied
by Chinese and aboriginal settlers. There was, in short, no im-
mediate threat to the Chinese presence. Chinese settlers, as a
result, formed nucleated as well as dispersed rural settlements.
Just as insecurity does not always lead to agglomeration, the ab-
sence of an aboriginal threat need not lead to dispersion.
The settlers who reached the T’ao-yuan area came directly
from the coastal areas of southeastern China or by way of
southern Taiwan where nucleated settlements had been the
norm.6 It does not seem unreasonable to assume that they
would have chosen, if that is the appropriate word, to recon-
stitute a familiar settlement form: the nucleated type. That this
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did not usually occur on the T’ao-yuan plain, even when allowed
because of the availability of water and the lack of an aboriginal
threat, is intriguing. In southeastern China, nucleated settle-
ments were frequently distinguishable on the basis of lineage
characteristics. Migration to the T’ao-yuan plain and settlement
there, on the other hand, was seldom accomplished by kinsmen.
There were exceptions, however, as in the case of the migration
of members of the Sung family who built a compact settlement
in 1745 in what is today a part of P’ing-chen hsiang. It is not sur-
prising that these arrivals were K’o-chia (Hakka) and originated
from Chia-ying district of northeastern Kwangtung. Known for
their clannishness, K’o-chia migrants formed other compact set-
tlements in the rugged uplands of T’ao-yuan and adjacent areas
of Hsin-chu and Miao-li hsien.7
Customary land tenure patterns associated with frontier
reclamation, it seems, were more crucial than any of the factors
cited above in bringing about a dispersed pattern of settlement
in the T’ao-yuan area. That these specific land tenure practices
did not operate early in southern Taiwan reflects the unusual
circumstances of early Chinese settlement there under the
aegis of the Dutch and the Cheng family. During the period of
Dutch rule, as discussed by Wen-hsiung Hsu in Chapter 1, all
land was vested in the name of the monarch. This wang-t’ien
(“crown fields”) system arranged Chinese settlers into compact
villages. Deep wells were dug under Dutch supervision to mit-
igate water shortages. Agriculture in Taiwan during the Dutch
occupation improved through the importation of 1,200 to 1,300
head of draft cattle and the industry of Chinese peasant pio-
neers. Development during the Dutch interlude demonstrated
the productive potential of Taiwan. When the Dutch were ex-
pelled in February 1662, by the forces of the anti-Ch’ing Ming
loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga), southwestern Taiwan
had numerous nucleated settlements along the coastal plain
around Fort Zeelandia. Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s occupation of the
island brought an interlude of Chinese military colonization that
denied private ownership of land. Recalcitrant aborigines and
the hardships of frontier life took a heavy toll on the settlers,
comprised not only of soldiers but of Chinese peasants. The
peasants migrated to Taiwan in violation of imperial decrees
against maritime activities between 1656–1684 and evaded the
policy of forced removal during 1660–1681 whose purpose it
was to remove the coastal population of the mainland to areas
10 miles or so from the coast. Military discipline and the dic-
tates of unsettled conditions nurtured the formation of clus-
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tered reclamation and farming camps in southern Taiwan. In
1683 Ch’ing forces finally subjugated the remnants of the
Cheng family’s army and navy, and in the process brought
Taiwan under direct Chinese suzerainty for the first time. Be-
cause early imperial control was in fact illusory, being more
cartographic than real, clandestine peasant migration brought
unknown numbers of Chinese to the virgin areas of central and
northern Taiwan where customary rather than officially sanc-
tioned practices often guided reclamation and settlement.
Authority pursued the Chinese pioneers into the frontier. In
1684 when Taiwan was formally incorporated into the empire as
a fu (prefecture) of Fukien province, the island was divided into
three hsien (districts or counties). The accoutrements of admin-
istration for all three lay close to the densely populated south-
western coastal area which had been held by the Dutch. The
virgin land of Chu-lo hsien stretched northward across half of
the coastal plain. In response to clandestine settlement, the use
of a small port at the mouth of the Tan-shui River, which itself
gave entrance to the yet-to-be developed Taipei basin, and es-
pecially because of a violent insurrection in 1721 which demon-
strated the ineffectiveness of Ch’ing authority, an administrative
reorganization took place.8 Chu-lo hsien was subdivided into
Chang-hua hsien and Tan-shui t’ing. This administrative subdi-
vision was accompanied not only by systematic reclamation of
the Taipei basin but also by efforts to open up the T’ao-yuan
plain.
THE PATENT SYSTEM
Settlement on the T’ao-yuan plain occurred principally as a
result of imperial consent.9 Organizationally, reclamation and
settlement differed significantly from that carried out earlier
in southwestern Taiwan. Reclamation of land was not only re-
garded as a criterion of merit for local officials; it was also an
easy way for prominent individuals to acquire wealth. Inasmuch
as all land on Taiwan belonged in principle to the emperor, the
land could be legitimately acquired only by complying with de-
fined procedures set down by the Board of Revenue, whose
ultimate responsibility was the collection of land tax. Peasant
pioneers, in some cases, negotiated with the aborigines for the
right to cultivate a parcel of land. Either the parcel was ob-
tained for a single payment or periodic rent was to be paid
(fan-tsu). Where there was no aboriginal presence to contend
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with, settlers sometimes assumed squatter’s rights to virgin ter-
ritory.10 More likely, however, an expanse of land would be ac-
quired by petitioning the provincial authorities. Approval would
be accompanied by a patent or estate certificate (k’en chao or
chih-chao) which granted the recipient perpetual “ownership”
of an ill-defined tract if he could bring the land under culti-
vation. Such a reclamation effort could not be accomplished
in a short period of time because of the nature of wet-rice
agriculture. Recognizing that a regulated and interconnected
water supply necessitated an arduous and labor-intensive res-
culpting of the land, a ten-year reclamation period was allowed
until 1723 when the period was reduced to six years for paddy
fields.11 An added inducement to quick reclamation was a three-
year reprieve from the land tax. Whenever the reclamation
effort did not proceed according to schedule, the patentee’s
rights to unreclaimed land could be assigned to another peti-
tioner.
It was this patent system which guided the distribution of
the immigrant peasant population and brought about a general
pattern of dispersed rural settlement on the T’ao-yuan plain
that has continued down to the present. Scattered among the
isolated farmsteads that are characteristic of dispersed set-
tlement were a number of nucleated settlements whose exis-
tence curiously owes much to the same range of factors which
brought about dispersed patterns. This simultaneous, yet nec-
essarily complementary, evolution of disparate settlement pat-
terns has been ignored by those who suggest a twofold and mu-
tually exclusive typology of rural settlement for Taiwan. There
is no denying that dispersed settlements were most common
on the T’ao-yuan plain, but it is being argued here that nu-
cleated settlements emerged under the same conditions which
prompted dispersed settlement.
Before tracing the settlement and reclamation of several
areas of the T’ao-yuan plain that will give evidence of the dual
formation of both types of settlement, it should be useful to
sketch the general outlines of the complex land tenure practices
which brought about this development. In the first place, the
patent holder (k’en-shou or yeh-hu) normally did not carry out
the reclamation of the tract obtained from the government. A
regulated and interconnected water supply demanded a res-
culpting of the land, an effort of sufficient magnitude that the
labor and capital requirements could not be shouldered easily
by a single patent holder. Moreover, the time limitations im-
posed by the patent certificate forced prompt reclamation. To
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Figure 3–2. The i-t’ien liang-chu land tenure system.
accomplish this, peasants were recruited from the already con-
gested areas of southern Taiwan or directly from the coastal
areas of Fukien and Kwangtung. This mobilization of landless
peasants introduced land tenure practices that had been
common in Fukien province and proved especially suitable in fa-
cilitating frontier reclamation.12
Known as the i-t’ien liang-chu (“one field, two owners”)
system, this land tenure practice was at least a two-tiered and
usually a three-tiered arrangement in which the so-called re-
cruited tenant was granted certain rights of ownership not nor-
mally associated with tenancy (Figure 3-2).13 In exchange for
an annual rent payment, the pat entee transferred land surface
(t’ien-pi) rights to the tenant while retaining proprietary title to
the subsoil (t’ien-ku).14 The tenant’s rights were extraordinary
to the extent that he had the prerogative of leasing or even
selling his surface rights. Surface and subsurface rights were
independent of one another and one could be alienated without
affecting the other.
Annual rent paid by the tenant was either a fixed amount or
a percentage of the grain crop. Fixed rent was more desirable
for the peasant tenant, as it provided him with a concrete in-
centive to invest labor in capital improvements and exercise
careful tillage. The fruits of increased productivity accrued to
him alone and not to the patentee. Usually the patentee was
absent and even unaware of the exact location and size of re-
claimed parcels. In this way, the individual peasant could manip-
ulate the patentee and maximize his opportunity for gain. The
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annual rent payment was called ta-tsu (“the big rent”) and the
patent holder became known as ta-tsu-hu (“big rent keeper”).
Out of this payment the patentee was obligated to pay the gov-
ernment land tax on the basis of reported cultivable acreage
within his patent. The remoteness of the imperial bureaucracy
allowed him also the opportunity to evade his revenue obliga-
tions.
Many tenant entrepreneurs, in fact, recruited still other
peasant migrants to carry out reclamation work. Such sub-
tenant cultivators (hsien-keng tien-hu) were bound in an espe-
cially unfavorable way to the original tenant, for whom they
labored to resculpt the plain and to whom they paid as much as
60 percent of their grain crop once reclamation was completed.
The subtenant’s “landlord,” called the hsiao-tsu-hu (“little rent
keeper”), enjoyed the highly satisfactory middle position in this
three-tiered pyramid.
Available land documents define patents and subdivided
tracts only as to the general point-to-point dimensions without
specifying the bounds. No cadastral survey was carried out.
Size, it seems, only took on significance after land was re-
claimed and taxes could be assessed. When subtenants, usually
single males, were recruited and mobilized to bring about recla-
mation, each would be provided with a simple thatched hut on a
parcel of land. The multiplication of tenants and subtenants led
to the proliferation of isolated farm cottages—the prototypical
image of the dispersed village. Patent organization and social
norms as well brought about a number of nucleated settle-
ments, in some ways anchors in a sea of isolated farmsteads.
Moreover, a small number of nucleated settlements developed
independently of the patent system.
Reclamation contracts usually stated that it was the re-
sponsibility of the tenant to irrigate his own tract. Gazetteers
give prominence to the cooperative water conservancy facilities
(shui-li) built through the efforts or sponsorship of peasants,
tenants, officials, or wealthy individuals. For the most part,
piecemeal and minor acts of landscape modification charac-
terized the earliest efforts. On the T’ao-yuan plain “the fields
depended upon the heavens” (k’au t’ien t’ien) and few wells
were sunk for irrigation purposes. This practice was allowed be-
cause of the relative abundance of annual rainfall and the lack
of a pronounced dry season. On the other hand, year-to-year
variability militated against a sole reliance on nature. The con-
struction of ponds (p’i) was an important means of water control
here. Although uncommon in southern Taiwan or on the south-
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eastern mainland, they served well on the alluvial plain to catch
and retain rainwater or stream overflow. Ponds could be con-
structed with a modicum of labor. An area would be excavated
and the removed materials used to bank the rim. In many cases,
excavated materials were piled on an adjacent site and, when
thoroughly packed, served as the foundation for permanent
dwellings. The contemporary spatial association of ponds and
dwellings and their ubiquity reflects a further stimulus to the
development of a dispersed rural settlement pattern. Canal net-
works articulated some of these ponds but generally the shallow
ponds serviced only nearby areas. By the twentieth century
some eight thousand ponds of various sizes covered 9 percent
of the alluvial plain.15
SPECIFIC SETTLEMENT HISTORY
From a practical point of view it is usually easier to trace
the history of a nucleated village than a dispersed one. In the
case of a named nucleated village, a few dwellings are con-
tiguous and occupy a common site that expands in size as the
number of dwellings increases. The peasants’ fields surround
the joint settlement. This was the common form which emerged
in southern Taiwan, where today upward of twenty-five clus-
tered farmhouses make up a settlement.16 When documents
refer to such a settlement by name, there is no difficulty in ap-
plying the information to a specific site and even locating it
on an extant historical map. Moreover, although early records
often deal with the origin and development of a corporate
village they seldom tell the location of individual dwellings
which constitute the village. Only since a land survey was con-
ducted between 1898 and 1905 has it been possible to deal with
individual dwelling sites on maps.17
Earlier sections of this chapter have introduced several
circumstances that led to nucleated villages on the T’ao-yuan
plain. It is now time to turn to the origin of the dispersed vil-
lages. Patent settlement on the plain began with the granting
of a k’en-chao to Kuo Kuang-t’ien in 1729. Kuo recruited 106
former soldiers, each of whom obtained a parcel of land for
reclamation. They were joined by other soldiers who had served
in the campaigns to pacify the Taipei basin. An additional ex-
tensive tract was obtained by Kuo from the Pa-li-fen aborigines
to satisfy the needs of new migrants. The area which they de-
veloped covered much of today’s Ta-yuan and Lu-chu hsiang as
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Figure 3–3. The spread of selected patent settlements.
well as portions of Kuan-yin and Kuei-shan hsiang and Chung-li
chen (Figure 3-3). Altogether twenty-four chuang or corporate
villages were established.18 Each of these corporate villages
comprised an unspecified number of isolated farmsteads, many
of them named. Most of these chuang have survived to the
present as ts’un (administrative villages). Among several nu-
cleated village centers were Hsu-ts’o chuang and Ta-chiu-yuan
chuang. Virtually all the early settlers under Kuo’s patent were,
like him, from Chang-chou prefecture in Fukien province. Kuo
Kuang-t’ien and his descendants retained the ta-tsu rights in
recognition of the original patent, but the names of the hsiao-
tsu holders are now obscure.
It may be appropriate here to elaborate on the fact that set-
tlement on the T’ao-yuan plain was distinguished clearly on the
basis of the native place of the migrants. In a later chapter
on frontier social organization, Wen-hsiung Hsu underscores
the significance of t’ung-hsiang (common ancestral home on
the mainland) and t’ung-hsing (common surname) as elements
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which fostered cohesion and at the same time exacerbated
tension. At this point, it is only necessary to clarify some of the
spatial manifestations of these bonds and the degree to which
settlement was guided by them. The territorial exclusivity of
early settlement endured over the years and is made vivid in the
results of a 1926 Japanese survey.19 Ten of the fifteen townships
on the plain had more than 90 percent of their population of
either Fukien or Kwangtung origin; several had 100 percent. As
mapped elsewhere, the alluvial plain was split apex to base by a
line separating Fukien-originating settlement from Kwangtung-
originating settlement.20 Exclusivity takes on added meaning
when one reviews districts (fu or chou) of origin and discovers
that every township on the plain had in 1926 a clear majority of
its population from a specific mainland fu or chou; several ex-
ceeded 90 percent. These townships ranged in size from 33 to
105 square kilometers and consisted of eleven to twenty-three
villages. Although the 1926 survey did not present the patterns
of origin on a village by village or compound by compound basis,
information gathered by the author in 1966 indicates that many
dispersed villages in four of the townships contained a high
percentage of residents whose ancestors came from the same
mainland hsiang (rural township).21 Indeed, the t’ung-hsiang or
“common locality” bond was an important guiding force in early
reclamation and settlement.
A second stimulus to settlement came about as a result of
a patent granted Hsueh Ch’i-lung in 1737. His was to the east
of that granted Kuo Kuang-t’ien. Hsueh, himself of Kwangtung
origin, journeyed overland from the An-p’ing area of southern
Taiwan with several hundred ex-soldiers; some of them had
their native place in Kwangtung but the majority came from
Chang-chou and Ch’uan-chou in Fukien. In carrying out recla-
mation these groups did not cooperate. Instead, those of Fukien
origin stayed in the eastern part of the patent adjacent to
the Fukien settlers in Kuo Kuang-t’ien’s patent. Those of
Kwangtung origin spread to the south and west. In 1744, Sung
Lai-kao, a hsiao-tsu holder and a Hakka of Kwangtung origin,
opened up portions of Pa-te hsiang and then moved to establish
Sung-wu-chuang (the Sung family village) in what is now P’ing-
chen hsiang. Today at least 25 percent of the households in this
area have the Sung surname. Almost all these settlements were
of the dispersed type. A notable exception was the settlement
at Hu-yu-chuang, which in addition to being a nucleated village
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had a small market as well. Later it was renamed T’ao-tzu-yuan,
reportedly because of the presence of a grove of peach trees.
Today it is the site of the important city of T’ao-yuan.
To the south and west of these two large patents similar
reclamation went on, although almost exclusively by migrants
of Hakka origin. In the 1780s, a patent was granted to three in-
dividuals for the opening of the rugged area in what is known
today as Yang-mei township. Up to that time the area had been
occupied only by a military encampment directed at the abo-
rigines. Many nucleated rural settlements were founded here.
One of these had nearly fifty households, most of whom were
engaged in agriculture although several were reported to have
managed small businesses. Today it is the site of the town of
Yang-mei. Most of the other settlements were dispersed, even
those in the hills.
SUMMARY
The i-t’ien liang-chu land tenure system spurred the clearing
and reclamation of land. Not only was it a positive factor in in-
ducing poor peasants to migrate from the mainland, but it also
guided the distribution of the immigrant population and played
a major role in defining the patterns of dispersed rural set-
tlement. Each subtenant was provided with a simple farm hut
on a parcel of land. His initial efforts were probably solitary as
he burned the grass and began tilling with only the simplest of
tools. The first crops were most likely dry crops such as millet
and vegetables. In resculpting the fields for wet-rice farming,
greater and certainly more coordinated efforts were required.22
Where necessary, land was leveled so that the flooded field
would have uniform depth. Ponds were excavated and sup-
porting drainage and irrigation methods were employed. Un-
doubtedly, yields were influenced greatly by these efforts.
One clear result of this complex land tenure arrangement
was a high degree of tenancy. Tenants may have made up more
than 75 percent of the households.23 Ownership, moreover, was
masked by the manifold interrelationships linking the ta-tsu-
hu (“big rent keeper”), hsiao-tsu-hu (“little rent keeper”), and
keng-ting (“subtenant cultivator”). Contracts were usually oral
and thus open to controversy, especially upon the death of one
of the principals. Except where tea fields were opened, the av-
erage cultivable area for a household was about 1 hectare, an
amount approximating the minimum for subsistence. The orig-
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inally contiguous parcels granted to subtenants in time were
subdivided so that fragmentation of parcels and a greater
degree of dispersed settlement occurred.24
Settlement and agricultural development are indeed
complex phenomena not easily explained on the basis of one
or two factors. Furthermore, once identified, a set of factors
should not be viewed, as so often is done, as compelling set-
tlement patterns that are exclusively nucleated or dispersed.
Certainly neither limited supplies of water nor an aboriginal
threat led to nucleated settlement on the T’ao-yuan plain as
had been the case earlier in southwestern Taiwan. A broader
range of choices was available. Reclamation organization, as
represented by the i-t’ien liang-chu system, did promote dis-
persed rural settlement with individual farmsteads acting as
focal points for intensive and articulated wet-rice agriculture;
but it brought nucleated settlements to the plain as well. An ag-
gregate of settlements, whether dispersed or nucleated, came
to be identified as communities through the presence of a web
of social and economic relations that were derivative of the
land tenure system. Through the penetration and extension of
Chinese agricultural practices and social norms, and without
the force of imperial arms, T’ao-yuan and other areas of frontier
Taiwan were brought within the Chinese pale.
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4
The Chinese Settlement of
the I-lan Plain
CHO-YUN HSU
Factors stimulating the initial settlement and subsequent
development of the plains and basins of Taiwan differed ac-
cording to area and period. Although such a statement may
appear strikingly obvious, it is a fact whose dimensions only
have become clear as researchers have probed the specifics of
local or regional history on the island. The preceding chapter
discusses patent-derived development of an area of north-
western Taiwan, indicating that customary land tenure prac-
tices brought from the mainland guided the emergence of spe-
cific rural settlement patterns. On the I-lan plain of north-
eastern Taiwan, however, such practices did not operate.
I-lan, roughly a triangular-shaped 320-square-kilometer
plain rimmed on one side by the sea and on the others by
ridges extending above 1,000 meters, persisted as an isolated
fragment remote from Chinese colonization throughout most
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Figure 4-1). Ac-
cessible by land only after three days’ journey from the Taipei
area, the plain was not settled and developed in full force
until the nineteenth century.1 A special character of its devel-
opment was the leadership role of several entrepreneurs in ini-
tiating pioneer settlement and bringing I-lan within the pale
of Chinese administrative control. This essay chronicles this
special character. Moreover, using information from gazetteers
and other sources, we shall examine the waxing and waning of
rural development in terms of population and land use changes
during the nineteenth century. Finally, the nature of kinship and
household organization are sketched to the degree that they re-
flect frontier development.
Although Ch’ing authorities had received tribute from the
local tribes in the I-lan area, then known as Ko-ma-lan, as early
as 1695, the earliest attempts to colonize it did not take place
until a Taipei landlord named Lin Han-sheng led a group of
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Figure 4–1. General map of the I-lan plain. (Areas above 1,000
meters are shaded.)
peasants into the area in 1770. Lin and his men faced resistance
from the aborigines who, quite rightly, suspected the intentions
of the intruders. Lin was killed, and no serious attempts were
made by Chinese peasant pioneers for another twenty years.2
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Wu Sha was responsible for the eventual Han colonization
of Ko-ma-lan, but only after two decades of personally directed
reclamation in a less endowed nearby area of northeastern
Taiwan. Wu Sha, according to his family record, was born in
1731 in a small village of Chang-pu, Fukien, and at the age of
forty-three joined other Fukienese sailing across the straits.3 In
Taiwan he first made a living as a servant, although it is not
clear whether he was a domestic servant or a helper in some
business establishment.4 Apparently frustrated, Wu left the city
to settle in a remote corner of Taiwan at San-tiao-chiao (Cape
Santiago, as the Spanish called it). An ambiguous phrase in his
biography—jen-hsia—indicates that Wu Sha possibly managed
to establish leadership among lower-class members of the local
community; whether this indicates a secret society connection
is not clear. One of his means for living was trading salt and
clothing with the aborigines who were scattered throughout the
San-tiao-chiao area. It appears that the tribal people trusted
him but the reasons are not clear. It may be that the salt smug-
gling he controlled, in contravention of the government mo-
nopoly, provided a means for gaining local influence.
With this advantage, Wu hosted a great number of those who
had found little luck elsewhere. Wu Sha provided all newcomers
with an ax and a peck of rice and then sent them into the hills to
sustain themselves by cutting wood and collecting ivy tissues.
Wu and his followers gradually converted portions of the nearby
hills into cropland. The aborigines, who depended on hunting
and fishing for their livelihood, did not attempt to intervene.5 By
1787, more and more migrants from Chang-chou and Ch’uan-
chou of Fukien and Ch’ao-chou of Kwangtung had come to join
Wu Sha, and in the process he gained their loyalty.
In the fall of 1796, with the financial assistance of some
Taipei friends and after consulting several others who traded
with the aborigines, Wu Sha led more than a thousand
Fukienese migrants into the Ko-ma-lan plain to initiate Chinese
reclamation. Among them were two hundred armed militia and
twenty-three interpreters able to speak the tribal languages.
The settlers built a fortified earthen settlement in the north-
eastern corner of the plain and named it T’ou-wei (“First Forti-
fication”). The astonished aborigines resisted strongly and the
militia suffered heavy casualties. Among the dead was Wu Sha’s
younger brother, Wu Li. Wu Sha’s friend and fellow trader in
the salt smuggling business, Hsu T’ien-sung, persuaded the pio-
neers to halt their advance. Wu Sha and his men temporarily re-
treated to San-tiao-chiao. In the following year smallpox spread
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among the aborigines. It is claimed that Wu Sha saved two
hundred lives by providing free medicine, and as a result the
grateful aborigines agreed on a truce and yielded part of their
land to Wu Sha and his men.6 Wu Sha then built two more for-
tified bases named Erh-wei (“Second Fortification”) and San-
wei (“Third Fortification”). Wu Sha applied for and was granted
a charter of reclamation from the Taipei magistrate so that he
could have a free hand to carry on his pioneering activity. An
official seal was issued to him which recognized his position as
I-shou (militia captain).
With both aboriginal cooperation and Taipei yamen
authorization, Wu Sha recruited more “tenants.” Each farm of
5 chia (almost 5 hectares) was required to pay twenty silver
dollars for the maintenance of the militia who were stationed at
eleven strategic positions to protect travelers along the newly
opened roads through the wooded hills. More newcomers
swarmed to I-lan to stay. Wu Sha not only expanded the settled
area but also instituted a community covenant which was
signed in the villages.7 At the end of the year Wu Sha died.
His nephew, Wu Hwa, replaced Wu Sha’s son as successor to
his leadership. In 1798 Han settlers penetrated deeper into the
river delta, and more fortifications were established. The pop-
ulation consisted of three groups: those of Chang-chou origin,
comprising more than 90 percent; those of Ch’uan-chou origin,
a small minority; and the K’o-chia (Hakka), exclusively militia
men.
In 1802 nine leaders—seven Chang-chou men, one Ch’uan-
chou, and one Hakka—led nine detachments with a total of
1,812 able-bodied men. They invaded and occupied the center
of the river valley where they built Wu-wei (“Fifth Fortifi-
cation”), the site of today’s I-lan city. Lots were drawn to dis-
tribute the newly acquired land among these three groups.
Again the Chang-chou group obtained the lion’s share. The
three groups, suspicious of each other as well as of the abo-
rigines, were always alert even while working in the fields. Wu
Hwa, however, remained the acknowledged leader of the entire
I-lan area.
In 1804, more than a thousand aborigines under the
pressure of Chinese settlement migrated from central Taiwan
to the southern half of the I-lan plain. The situation became
more complicated when the two minority Han groups chal-
lenged the dominance of the Chang-chou group by making al-
liances with the aborigines. An armed feud went on for more
than two years before the Chang-chou group was able to defeat
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the Ch’uan-chou and Hakka contenders. No sooner was a truce
achieved than I-lan faced an invasion of pirates who intended
to establish a permanent base at an I-lan harbor and from this
area outside Ch’ing jurisdiction prey upon the prosperous set-
tlements along Taiwan’s western coastal plain. Wu Hwa and his
followers managed to resist these efforts by blocking the en-
trance to the waterway. In the next year, the pirates came again.
A community leader of Wu-wei, Ch’en Tien-pan, requested the
Chinese government to send in armed forces. Meanwhile, Wu
Hwa and other militia captains joined forces with the gov-
ernment navy and defeated the pirates.8
As a result of these events local leaders pleaded with the
Fukien authorities to extend civil and military administration to
the Ko-ma-lan area. An official was dispatched to the region and
in 1810 a memorial recommended the incorporation of Ko-ma-
lan into the Ch’ing administrative structure.9 Accordingly a ring
of willow trees was planted around the proposed administrative
center on the site of the Wu-wei settlement (Figure 4-2). Harry
Lamley has described in detail the local and official reasons
which prompted the building of the walled city here.10 Pertinent
are the following comments:
Leaders among the Chinese settlers scattered over the Ko-ma-
lan plain also were anxious to have an administrative center built
and government instituted in the region. The rise of a walled
city representing imperial authority promised security from in-
ternal strife and external attacks that their enclosed villages were
unable to provide. No one settlement or group, they realized,
could offer its members adequate protection or curtail the de-
structive “armed conflicts” rampant among the local Chinese in-
groups.
The chaotic situation in the Ko-ma-lan region lent a sense
of urgency to the building of I-lan. Early in 1813, the occupants
of the Wu-wei village site were moved elsewhere and work on
the moats and enclosures was promptly begun. This construction
was divided into five sections. The predominant Chang-chou set-
tlers provided the labor for three of the sections, and the smaller
Ch’uan-chou and Hakka communities were each held responsible
for building one section. Local heads from various groups were
placed in charge of the work undertaken in their respective sec-
tions. According to an official account, the inhabitants labored
diligently under this arrangement without thought of material
reward. Within nine months the moats had been dug and an
earthen and bamboo enclosure erected….
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Figure 4–2. Gazetteer map of Ko-ma-lan. [From Ko-ma-lan t’ing-chih.]
Nevertheless, I-lan was still by no means a defensive bastion.
Local protection continued to stem mainly from the small military
force stationed within the city, whereas defense against outside
attack was provided by coastal garrisons and distant mountain
guard posts….
The construction of a number of officially sponsored temples
and shrines at the outset indicates that this new seat of gov-
ernment was expected to play a civilizing role in the Ko-ma-lan
region.11
Following the official installation of government, more mi-
grants poured into the region. The new subprefecture (t’ing)
faced manifold problems. Judging from discussions among local
magistrates recorded in the I-lan gazetteers, it seems that the
most urgent problems were regulation of the tax rate, con-
tinuous reclamation of land by newcomers, and construction of
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office buildings, jails, and roads. The reclamation of land nat-
urally provoked two related problems: reservation land for the
aborigines and tax exemption for new fields.12
Ko-ma-lan remained a subprefecture until 1874 when the
Japanese made their first attempt to invade Taiwan. In the
same year, the last frontier of I-lan, its southeast corner, was
also completely cultivated by the joint effort of Han Chinese
and sinicized aborigines. Taxation recording, a topic examined
later in this chapter, was then established. With a resolution to
strengthen the defense of the island, the Chinese government
reorganized the administration of Taiwan. Ko-ma-lan was ele-
vated to the status of a full-fledged county in 1875 and renamed
I-lan.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Ch’en Shao-hsing, using population figures from gazetteers,
compiled a table which is useful for examining the region’s
nineteenth-century demographic history.13 A brief glance at
Table 4-1 suggests some problems in its use, however. For
example, the number of households is shown as not having
changed for several years. Furthermore there is no way to de-
termine the validity of the numbers; no year-to-year census
was taken. Ping-ti Ho, in fact, has cautioned about the use of
population data found in gazetteers. Inadequate registration
procedures, evasion, and official peculation are but some of
the problems that confounded the accurate reporting of valid
numbers. Moreover, because the ting or adult male was the
taxation unit used during the Ming and Ch’ing periods, the
numbers available do not constitute a census in the strict sense
of the word. This indeed is true of many gazetteers.14 But I be-
lieve the I-lan case is an exception in spite of questions raised
by the numbers. Since the ting quotas had been frozen by a
decree in 1712, all local ting taxation units subsequently were
fixed on the basis of the 1711 ting returns. Ko-ma-lan, a newly
annexed territory, therefore had no previous record as a base
to set the ting taxation. Moreover, since there was no longer
a poll tax, neither local people nor local officials had any rea-
son to make false reports.15 The figures given for 1815 are
also in agreement with the figures offered by Yang T’ing-li in
his poetry.16 A further consideration is the Japanese census
enumeration of 1899, which gave I-lan’s population as 98,524,
considerably less than the 106,713 of 1851.17 It is probable
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that, during the first years of Japanese occupation, social dis-
turbances and instability caused a decrease in popu-
lation—especially among relative newcomers who might have
tended to pack up and return to their former homes during the
chaos and uncertainty of the takeover. Comparing the upper
limits with the lower limits, we may say that the gazetteer data,
although far from precise, are useful guides to trends of change
and patterns of distribution. Ch’en Shao-hsing draws the con-
clusion that the average annual growth rates for the period
1822 through 1851 most likely resulted from natural growth
rather than immigration.18
The immigrants to I-lan were for the most part attracted
to the cultivated land which was generally confined to the
300-square-kilometer alluvial plain. Reclamation activities, it
appears, were directly related to this finite amount of land.
Such activities were restrained once the population density per
unit of arable land reached its maximum. Density figures, ar-
rived at by dividing the population by the amount of arable land
in chia (almost a hectare), are presented in Table 4-2.19 In 1810,
a large number of settlers began to enter the plain. While arable
land was yet available to be cultivated, the density of population
per chia remained high. After 1814, the more land that was cul-
tivated the lower the ratio. It then began to rise again when the
inflow of immigrants exceeded increases in available cultivable
land. From Table 4-2, it appears that saturation occurred some-
where between 1822 and 1829, during which time the density
ratio rose after having reached bottom in 1822. In the same
period, according to the data, there was an unexplained de-
crease in the amount of arable land.
The fluctuations of these density ratios, however, should be
adjusted to include considerations of the productivity of the
land. It is likely that fertile land was cultivated first and less pro-
ductive land later. In the I-lan case, the river delta which em-
braced the best land was first inhabited; tidal land, low valley
lands, sandy banks, and other less advantageous places were
not tilled until the former had been reclaimed. Yang T’ing-li, the
first magistrate, took note of this differentiation of potential pro-
ductivity in classifying the land into three grades: upper, middle
and lower. Although the records available to us do not yield de-
tails of the proportions of these grades, it is possible to use tax
information to suggest productivity. If we assume that each shih
of grain submitted to the government represented a unit of pro-
ductivity (which we do not know in precise terms), the man-
per-unit rate would be 2.31 in 1822, 2.07 in 1829, and 3.00 in
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TABLE 4–1
Population of the I-lan Plain: 1810–1831
Year Households Individuals Growth Rate
%
Household Size
1810 14,452 42,904 — 2.97
1814 6,011 62,243 — 10.35
1815 6,011 62,967 1.16 10.48
1816 6,177 65,489 4.01 10.60
1817 6,289 66,602 1.70 10.59
1818 6,398 68,154 2.33 10.65
1819 6,502 69,763 2.36 10.73
1820 6,617 70,325 0.81 10.63
1821 6,626 70,920 0.85 10.70
1822 6,626 72,912 2.81 11.00
1823 6,626 74,424 2.07 11.23
1824 6,691 74,731 0.41 11.17
1825 6,739 75,087 0.48 11.14
1826 6,830 75,478 0.52 11.05
1827 6,830 76,257 1.03 11.17
1828 6,830 77,187 1.22 11.30
1829 6,830 78,082 1.16 11.43
1830 6,830 78,871 1.00 12.55
1831 7,370 79,671 1.01 10.81
1832 7,370 79,850 0.22 10.83
1833 7,370 82,390 3.18 11.18
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1834 8,193 86,392 4.63 10.54
1835 8,193 86,392 — 10.54
1836 8,193 86,820 0.50 10.60
1837 8,193 87,370 0.63 10.66
1838 8,193 88,211 0.96 10.77
1839 8,193 89,673 1.66 10.95
1840 8,249 91,766 2.33 11.92
1841 8,332 93,532 1.92 11.22
1842 8,332 94,502 1.04 11.34
1843 8,332 95,481 1.04 11.46
1844 8,332 96,801 1.38 11.62
1845 8,348 97,985 1.22 11.74
1846 8,363 99,105 1.14 11.85
1847 8,357 99,889 0.79 11.98
1848 8,357 100,088 0.20 11.98
1849 8,374 102,443 2.35 12.23
1850 8,383 104,282 1.80 12.44
1851 8,383 106,713 2.33 12.73
1846.20 Thus the seeming decline in the population per unit of
arable land ratio of 1846 suggests the continued growth of pop-
ulation. It was not until after 1874 that the southeast corner of
the I-lan plain was finally cultivated and incorporated into the
taxable land record.
Information from the 1899 reassessment of the 1886 field
classification system for tax purposes tells us that the quality
of a great many fields was upgraded because of increased pro-
ductivity—a consequence of soil amelioration brought about by
Chinese agricultural practices. Moreover, while population had
remained largely at the 1846 level, the acreage of taxable land
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TABLE 4–2
Population/Arable Land Ratio
Year Population
(A)
Arable Land (chia)
(B)
Ratio
(A/B)
1810 49,204 2,443 17.5
1814 62,243 4,309 14.4
1822 72,912 5,743 12.7
1829 78,082 5,283 14.8
1846 99,105 7,275 13.6
had increased dramatically. Land which previously had been tax
exempt, such as tidal lands, sandbars, and edges of hill slopes,
seems to have been utilized by the time of the 1899 survey. The
area which had been annexed in 1874 continued to be rated
mostly as lower or lowest in productivity.
Towns took their place alongside the rural settlements, al-
though not in great number. Several nucleated fortified bases
were built in the decades after Wu Sha and his men built T’ou-
wei. When the Ch’ing authorities were pondering whether to
incorporate I-lan into the administrative system, the viceroy
of Fukien and Chekiang, in a memorial to the court, named
thirteen I-lan settlements in addition to Wu-wei. Those who
lived outside these small towns were classified as wei-wai ling-
hu (a few residences scattered outside the fortified settle-
ments).21
When Yang T’ing-li came to I-lan, its new capital—Wu-
wei—was a settlement of at least two thousand thatched huts,
which incidentally were gutted by a major fire in 1810 as
recorded in Yang’s poetry.22 If each of these huts housed five
persons, Wu-wei’s population may well have exceeded ten
thousand, approximately one-sixth of the total population of Ko-
ma-lan. If each hut contained a household often persons, as
Ch’en Shao-hsing suggests in Table 4-1, then one-third of the
population would have been in residence in Wu-wei—an as-
tonishingly high degree of concentration. The census of 1936,
it should be pointed out, did show an interesting parallel
phenomenon. The figures reveal that I-lan city represented 26
percent of the district’s population.
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Returning to Table 4-2, suppose we take 1822 as a wa-
tershed for the population/arable land ratio, after which date
the increases in arable land did not match the increases in pop-
ulation. Then, using the 1822 ratio of 2.31 men per unit of pro-
ductivity, we can estimate that the farming population would
have been 66,602 in 1829 and 76,507 in 1846. The remaining
population were likely residents of towns. Indeed, it was said
that the last resort for the poor people was “going to the city
[I-lan].”23
In the table of population growth (Table 4-1), Ch’en Shao-
hsing gives an annual growth rate. During certain years, the
growth rate suddenly rose dramatically—an indication of a large
inflow of migrants either directly participating in rice pro-
duction or indirectly attracted to Ko-ma-lan by a booming
economy. Examining Table 4-1, we find a big leap in the years
1810–1819. During this period land was abundant and the rapid
growth in population was not unexpected. The growth rate
declined to 0.80 percent in 1820–1821, and according to the
figures surged again to the level of more than 2 percent in 1822.
Perhaps it was not sheer coincidence that in the preceding year,
1821, the Taiwan government designated I-lan to supply rice
to the military granary in northern Taiwan after having experi-
enced an extremely bad harvest in both the Taipei basin and
the central plain alone the west coast.24 This measure suggests
that I-lan was probably the only region in the northern half of
Taiwan to have had normal rice production. The rice price in
1816 was 0.64 liang of silver per shih; the official price in 1821
was 1.4 liang of silver per shih.25 The obvious profit seems sig-
nificant enough to inspire would-be planters as well as hungry
vagabonds to swarm to I-lan.
The trend of population increase continued for two years
until the growth rate fell back to 0.41 percent in 1824, 0.48
percent in 1825, and 0.52 percent in 1826. In I-lan this was an
eventful period. Many migrants departed after an anti-Manchu
plot was discovered in the winter of 1822. Another rebellion led
by camphor workers did break out in 1823 and the regular army
was mobilized to crush it. Meanwhile, at the end of 1823, an
edict was issued to resurvey the land.26 Local disturbances and
the deportation of migrants were already discouraging signs;
now the announcement of another land survey obviously posed
difficulties to landowners who tended to evade tax obligations.
The growth rate took another upturn in the 1833–1834
period. In the preceding year, 1832, the rice-rich southwestern
plain of Taiwan suffered a severe drought which ruined the
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entire crop. A large-scale peasant uprising affected the whole
southern Taiwan area and lasted from fall to winter.27 Mean-
while, the Taipei basin was struck by a natural disaster and
crop failure.28 Ko-ma-lan, far from these affected areas, should
have been a main rice-producing area in that period. In 1834,
however, I-lan also had a poor harvest. Local shortages were al-
leviated by drawing from reserves in the Everlevel Granaries.29
In the same year, large-scale land reclamation in the Hsin-chu
area, to the south of Taipei basin, was approved by the local ad-
ministration.30 I-lan’s lean year and Hsin-chu’s potential outlet
for migrants may have combined to slow population growth for
several years beginning with 1835.
Gazetteers reveal that ships sailing from the I-lan ports
carried rice to the mainland and brought back textiles,
hardware, housewares, chinaware, and other staples. The
mainland markets were chiefly in the Shang-hai area and
Chang-chou and Ch’uan-chou of Fukien. I-lan farmers, who
could have had two crops of rice a year, never stored much
for their own consumption. The importance of the rice trade is
demonstrated by the fact that general stores were usually found
in the rice trader’s shop.31 The price of rice in the 1840s re-
mained fairly high until the end of the decade when the rice
market on the mainland was captured by rice imported from
Southeast Asia and shipped by foreign boats through the treaty
ports. Taiwan rice prices thus fell sharply after 1850.32
After the Japanese occupation, Taiwan became a principal
supplier of rice for the home islands. To increase production,
the Japanese colonial authorities energetically instituted a
series of agricultural improvements and encouraged the recla-
mation of still more land.33 I-lan once again gained significance
as one of the main rice production areas. In statistics taken in
1905 the arable land in I-lan comprised only 35 percent of the
Taiwan total, yet the rice produced in I-lan exceeded 8.2 percent
of the island’s total.34
AGRICULTURE AND INVESTMENT
Edgar Wickberg has divided the rural economy in late
nineteenth-century Taiwan into four types: subsistence rice pro-
duction; small-scale tea cultivation mixed with rice production;
surplus, market-oriented rice production; and large-scale tea
cultivation.35 I-lan definitely falls into his third category—the
surplus, market-oriented rice production. Nevertheless, I-lan
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developed along a path distinctly different from what had been
experienced in other areas of Taiwan. In most parts of Taiwan,
the patent holder who was granted the privilege to open the
land acquired title to it. These patent holders or yeh-hu, as dis-
cussed in the chapter by Ronald Knapp, collected ta-tsu (“the
big rent”) from tenant entrepreneurs they recruited who them-
selves often collected hsiao-tsu (“the little rent”) from subtenant
cultivators.36 The existence of yeh-hu made taxation an indirect
process with the yeh-hu responsible for paying all government
taxes. From the viewpoint of the government, the “service” of
a handful of yeh-hu indeed could be either a real help or a real
nuisance. Often the yeh-hu was in an advantageous position to
pay less tax or even withhold payment. Therefore, when Yang
T’ing-li first proposed the establishment of a subprefecture at
Ko-ma-lan, it was one of his conditions that no yeh-hu privileges
be granted there.37
Wu Sha’s descendants and others who had certain vested in-
terest in the region were disappointed to learn that they were
not to enjoy the privilege. Several attempts were made by local
dignitaries or adventurous persons to acquire yeh-hu status
and thereby gain access to a secure future. No patents were
granted, however. Ko-ma-lan remained the only place in Taiwan
where no yeh-hu were created.38
The situation described here does not mean that there were
no local large-scale landowners. In fact, two categories of
landowners came into existence: one resident in Ko-ma-lan and
the other composed of persons such as Wu Sha and his fol-
lowers, most of whom remained influential in local affairs. The
rise of the Ch’ens during the late nineteenth century illustrates
the resident notables. Ch’en Hui-huang, a Ch’ang-chou immi-
grant, managed to obtain the assistance of sinicized aboriginal
migrants to open land in the southeast regions of the plain.
The migrant tribes, driven by the Han Chinese from west of
the Central Mountains, had already adopted much of Chinese
culture—especially advanced farming techniques. They served
as a vanguard, spearheading Chinese penetration into the ter-
ritory of the indigenous tribes. In the mid-nineteenth century,
Ch’en led a mixed force of Chinese and aborigines into the
southern part of the I-lan delta. Ch’en reached agreement with
the tribal migrants indicating that he would extend a loan of
20 liang of silver for each chia of land reclaimed and that
after the loan was paid back in three years, Ch’en, who was to
be the landlord, and the borrower, who was to be the tenant,
would share the opened land. If the latter failed to liquidate the
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TABLE 4–3
Land Tenure in 1903
Region Independent Farms Tenants
County seat 375 797
Yuan-shan 3,056 4,797
Min-chuang-wei 2,776 3,331
Fu-chou 1,127 2,940
Ssu-wei 4,397 4,483
T’ou-wei 1,902 6,823
Lo-tung 1,671 2,119
Erh-chieh 1,459 2,623
Ch’ing-sui-kou 1,546 602
Hung-sui-kou 2,537 2,606
Li-tse-chien 2,182 3,683
Mao-a-liao 1,052 1,493
TOTAL 24,074 35,297
debt, all the land would go to Ch’en. By this agreement, Ch’en
Hui-huang automatically acquired large landholdings when the
newly reclaimed land was registered in 1874 in the local ad-
ministration records.39 It is understandable that a considerable
portion of southern I-lan farmers then fell into the category of
tenants. A census taken in 1903 (Table 4-3), eight years after
the Japanese occupation, revealed a high rate of tenancy.40 It
should be noted that in the region Ch’en Hui-huang dominated,
namely Fu-chou, each independent farmer faced almost three
tenants. Meanwhile, the Wus dominated T’ou-wei where the
ratio of the two groups was more than three to one.
Another category of landowner took advantage of the newly
opened I-lan: wealthy entrepreneurs living in the Taipei region.
The forefathers of this group included the early partners of Wu
Sha who financed his reclamation activities. Ke Yu-ch’en, Ho
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Hui, and Chao Lung-sheng were all citizens of Tang-sui.41 The
investment made by these three led to the construction of ir-
rigation facilities which were made available to farmers for an
unspecified rent. As more and more irrigation facilities were
needed and local peasants were unable to finance their con-
struction, other corporate groups put forward capital in return
for the right to receive rent. In one contract which has been pre-
served, it is said that four persons jointly financed the construc-
tion of a system to irrigate six villages where previously the
small irrigation channels dug by the farmers had been insuf-
ficient. The entire work of irrigating 247 chia took four years
(1807–1811) to complete. Those who relied entirely on the new
system paid rent of 4 shih of rice per chia; those who already
had access to the small system paid 2 shih of rice per chia. The
cost for the entire system was 4,868 silver (Mexican) dollars,
and the annual rent income is estimated at some 700 shih, a
cash value of some five hundred silver dollars. The magnitude
of the profit is obvious. This contract was drafted as if the prin-
cipals were partners. The seller who already held half the total
shares sold to the buyer half of his shares because he (the
seller), having residence outside the irrigated region, “was not
able to take good care of the management.”42
Another contract was signed by two partners who jointly
purchased from a third party, also a corporate group, an ex-
isting irrigation system complete with all equipment. The lion’s
share, three-fourths of the total, actually belonged to Lin Kuo-
ying, son of the wealthiest man in northern Taiwan, Lin Ping-
hou.43 The Lins’ interest in I-lan was not new. As early as 1822
Lin Ping-hou had paved stone steps along a main route through
the mountains between the Ko-ma-lan and the Taipei region.
The annual repair job was also taken care of by Lin Ping-hou
and his eldest son Kuo-hua.44 The Lins, today known as the Lins
of Pan-chiao, had sent large shipments of rice to North China
several times as a donation to help relieve famine. Lin Ping-hou
and his children thus won both honor and eminence on a nation-
al level. The rice-rich Ko-ma-lan area, though not the major in-
terest of the Lins, who had large landholdings in the Taipei
basin, still attracted much of their attention. Indeed, the author
who recorded the merit of paving roads expressed great admi-
ration for the detailed knowledge Lin Ping-hou commanded of
the Ko-ma-lan area.
In other words, the market-oriented rice production
economy of I-lan had provoked outside as well as local in-
vestment. What strikes me most is that almost from the be-
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ginning of the region’s settlement by Chinese there had been
people who aimed at a purpose that went beyond looking for
new land to make ends meet. Also surprising is that formal con-
tracts and corporate activities had become part of daily life.
KINSHIP AND HOUSEHOLDS
The presence of strong lineages in South China has aroused
speculation on their origin. One of the most eloquent statements
is that presented by Maurice Freedman, who has suggested a
correlation between strong lineages and a number of socioeco-
nomic factors: rice cultivation, extensive irrigation, and frontier
conditions.45 Taking fieldwork in Hong Kong’s New Territory as
a case, Jack Potter later substantiated part of Freedman’s hy-
pothesis by explicitly naming four elements favorable to the de-
velopment of a strong lineage—a rich agricultural environment,
frontier conditions, the absence of strong governmental control,
and commercial development.46
Burton Pasternak has argued that frontier conditions should
not be viewed as a favorable factor encouraging the emergence
of strong lineages. He has suggested that large localized lin-
eages should represent a “second stage” phenomenon in
frontier regions when local population begins to strain land
and water resources and ethnic alliances become less critical.
Pasternak regards strong lineages as an answer to the in-
creasing intensity of intravillage conflict.47
In the case of I-lan, one finds that problems which required
corporate effort were solved by means other than lineage orga-
nization. Hakka guards provided I-lan farmers as well as trav-
elers with effective protection against the hostile aborigines,
for example. Local order was generally kept by the headman
(chieh-shou), who was leader of a reclamation band. Irrigation
construction was financed by outside investment. And many
such activities were carried out by concerned parties who
signed formal contracts with explicit rights and obligations.
What Freedman viewed as favorable conditions to create strong
lineages seems to have spurred the growth of local ties and
the commercialization of agriculture. Very few strong lineages
appeared in I-lan in the nineteenth century, yet I-lan people
erected scores of temples during this period. Even in 1933,
when I-lan was sufficiently wealthy to maintain no less than
two hundred temples for various dieties, there were only three
lineage temples in the whole region.48 The villages in I-lan
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remain small and scattered. Moreover, there were almost no
compact villages dominated by one or a few surnames, a phe-
nomenon not uncommon in southern Taiwan. Few I-lan villages
can claim a population of as many as three hundred.49
The temple organization of the Lins represents an inter-
esting case to test the hypotheses suggested by Freedman,
Potter, and Pasternak. When Wu-Sha entered I-lan, there were
no eminent figures known as Lin. Yet when the second wave
of migration pushed into the heartland of the region, there
were two persons with the surname Lin among the nine band
leaders, though there is no record to reveal their actual rela-
tionship. More Lins appeared as more migrants entered I-lan.
By 1835, one generation after I-lan was opened, the Lins of
seven mainland Chang-chou counties jointly erected a temple
called Chui-yuan-t’ang (Hall to Trace the Remote Origin). The
Lins, however, came from seven different places and were far
from real kinsmen. No attempt, therefore, was made to recon-
struct a genealogy. In fact, one of the principal contributors
to the temple was Lin Ping-hou’s family, who lived in Taipei,
not I-lan. The temple was dedicated to worshiping ancestors
who were vaguely symbolized by a tablet inscribed “Fathers and
Mothers of Various Branches of All Generations” in addition to
a tablet with the names of the alleged first Lin in Fukien and his
wife. The corporate estate of the temple was 50 chia of land that
supported activities such as the spring and autumn festivals at
which ancestors were worshiped; scholarships were distributed
to the children of the members; poverty relief was given to
those who were in need, whether Lins or not. In the early twen-
tieth century, there was a quarrel among the managers and in
1931 bylaws were adopted by all the Lins in I-lan to set up a
management and policymaking body to be composed of elected
representatives and supervisors.50 This case indicates the weak
position of the Lin lineage organization. Neither fang nor chih,
both lineage segments, was ever mentioned as actual kinship
units below the Chui-yuan-t’ang. Among the temple’s activities,
there was no mention of financing irrigation work, protecting
members in court suits, or other matters on an exclusive basis.
Even the poverty relief continued to extend beyond the Lin
members.
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CONCLUSION
I-lan’s development during the nineteenth century presents an
interesting case study of Chinese frontier settlement. It is clear
that foreign initiatives, military colonization, and patent-derived
efforts spurred development in other areas of Taiwan but did
not nurture settlement of the I-lan plain. It was entrepreneurial
leadership that guided early pioneering activities and affected
subsequent development. Are the patterns described in this
chapter unique to I-lan? The answer awaits detailed studies of
other local areas in Taiwan as well as pockets of Han settlement
on the southern mainland of China.
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5
Frontier Social Organization
and Social Disorder in
Ch’ing Taiwan
WEN-HSIUNG HSU
Taiwan was regularly rent by popular disturbances during the
Ch’ing period (1683–1895), a turbulent time characterized by
a common saying: “A minor revolt every three years and a
major one every five years.” Among the Chinese, violence was
mainly expressed in banditry, communal strife (hsieh-tou), and
popular uprisings. Banditry was rampant after the early eigh-
teenth century and at least seventy-seven instances of com-
munal strife and sixty-eight uprisings were recorded. The oc-
currence of social disorder was partly conditioned by the un-
stable frontier situation. With the gradual disappearance of
the frontier after the mid-nineteenth century, both popular up-
risings and communal strife became less frequent. Social dis-
order reflected the degree to which Ch’ing authority and local
voluntary associations operated in an area. This chapter ex-
amines the relationships between social organization and two
major forms of social disorder, communal strife and popular re-
volts, with a special emphasis on some of the geographic as-
pects.
BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
The nature of migration to Taiwan and settlement there led to
a variety of organizational responses. Peasant pioneer migrants
often remained remote from the formal Ch’ing administrative
system for decades or longer. They depended, for the most
part, on systems of social control which were based on a range
of voluntary associations that met the needs of the migrants.
Although the clearing of land could be an individual activity,
effective control of water demanded collective action. Hence
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Chinese peasants in Taiwan could not function independently
of other Chinese migrants as was usually the case with the
atomistic efforts of European farmers in colonial America. Fur-
thermore, the persistent threat posed by the aboriginal inhabi-
tants promoted mutual defense.
Neither the migration of kinsmen nor the early emergence
of nuclear families facilitated stability. Lineage groups which
most likely would have, at the least, fostered internal stability
were rare on Taiwan. Moreover, an unbalanced male/female
ratio prevented some Chinese men from establishing families
and compelled them to seek associational ties outside kinship.
The danger in crossing the straits, the rugged frontier life, the
Ch’ing policy against women’s migration before 1790—all con-
tributed to the abnormal composition of population. The com-
pilers of the T’ai-wan hsien-chih in 1720 remarked that it was
extremely difficult for Chinese men to marry because women
were scarce.1 The sagacious official Lan Ting-yuan (1680–1733)
observed in 1721 that among 257 residents in Ta-p’u (in Chu-
lo hsien) only one was a woman.2 Six years later, the governor-
general of Fukien and Chekiang, Kao Ch’i-cho, reported that
new settlers in Feng-shan, Chu-lo, and Chang-hua hsien were
“all without wives.”3 A popular saying, “Having a wife is better
than having a god,” aptly expressed the frustration of Chinese
men over their bachelorhood. However exaggerated this
remark might be, the abnormal sex ratio during the eighteenth
century is quite apparent.
To ease rough life in the island frontier lacking lineage
support, people of the same surnames (t’ung-tsung), ancestral
places (t’ung-hsiang), and dialects helped each other. Mutual
aid rarely transcended ethnic and geographical boundaries. The
aborigines, far from being helped by the Chinese, were in fact
exploited by them. Among the settlers, people migrating from
Ch’uan-chou and Chang-chou, prefectures in southern Fukien,
and the Hakka from Kwang-tung developed communal ani-
mosity in their competition for land. Despite its limitations,
mutual aid remained the most common mode of functional rec-
iprocity of social action in Ch’ing Taiwan.4 The compilers of the
Chu-lo hsien-chih (1716) described this idea as follows:
Because native-born residents are few and settlers do not have
close relatives, people from the same mainland districts are
treated as kindred. They help each other in illness and death,
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with all neighbors attending funerals. Residents generally give
out money to aid the poor and homeless. Even stingy people do so
in order to avoid being ridiculed by others.
A stranger who has lost his way is welcome to lodge at
someone’s home. If he and the host are of the same surname, they
treat each other as brothers or nephews; if they are of different
surnames, they will later regard each other as cousins.5
Although strangers were sometimes refused lodging, vil-
lagers in general were willing not only to “take off their clothes”
but also to “give their food to the needy” during the early eigh-
teenth century.6 As late as 1894, a Japanese visitor still saw
very few hostels on the island because travelers generally could
lodge with friends.7 Since a spirit of mutual aid governed the
whole complex of social relationships, refusal to help the needy
was considered a moral failure.
Another paradigm of social action was religious belief. The
Chinese on Taiwan worshiped some 131 dieties, whose images
were mostly from the mainland. The insecurity of living on the
island frontier drove the settlers to supplicate gods for pro-
tection and well-being. It was said that Chinese on Taiwan wor-
shiped deities more earnestly than they cared for their own
ancestors.8 Chinese religious fervor is most clearly manifested
in the three thousand temples they built during the Ch’ing
period. These temples did not include the ubiquitous roadside
shelters for the Earth God, the most common deity on the
island. In order of the number of temples devoted to each, the
five other popular deities were Wang-yeh (in eighty-five dif-
ferent forms), the Goddess of Mercy (Kuan-yin), Ma-tsu, Sakya-
muni, and Kuan Yu. The cult of Kuan Yu exemplifies Chinese
religiosity on Taiwan. Kuan Yu, as a historical figure, was the
valiant and loyal general of Liu Pei, the founder of Shu Han
(221–264), but as an idol he was both a benevolent sage incar-
nating many virtues and an omnipotent god protecting people
in all seasons. The cult of Kuan Yu was also promoted by the
Chinese government after the third century; during the Ch’ing
dynasty it became a state religion. In Taiwan, even Buddhists
and Taoists considered him their temple guardian; sworn
brothers, secret societies, and commercial guilds worshiped
him as a tutelary god.
In place of lineage ties, the Chinese settlers formed various
social organizations along the lines of common geographical
background and personal interest according to the dictates of
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mutual aid and religious beliefs. Sworn brotherhoods, secret so-
cieties, and religious associations are illustrations of this fra-
ternity.
SOCIAL AFFILIATIONS
Sworn brotherhoods (chieh-pai hsiung-ti) were ubiquitous in
Ch’ing Taiwan. Though also common in Fukien and Kwangtung,
they became more important for the social life of Chinese set-
tlers on the island frontier. During the Dutch period
(1624–1662), the Chinese who had arrived on the island formed
brotherhoods among themselves and with the natives. In Cheng
times (1662–1683), the practice became so common that the
Chinese settlers and the plains aborigines simply called each
other brothers or relatives (fu-tun).9 The spread of this alliance
of friendship was encouraged—not only by the need for mutual
aid, but also by its use as a justification for occupying the abo-
rigines’ lands. Sworn brotherhoods also facilitated aggressive
action. After the Ch’ing takeover in 1683, the first Chu-lo hsien
magistrate, Chi Ch’i-kuang, observed that such a system engen-
dered three social evils: gambling, banditry, and fighting. He
then sought to check its spread.10
The Ch’ing government considered the sworn brotherhoods
as clandestine and subversive organizations and therefore sup-
pressed them, the first dynasty in Chinese history that ever took
legal action against such groups.11 But because sworn brother-
hoods were primarily formed in the countryside, officials could
seldom detect their existence until the early eighteenth century.
They flatly admitted in 1720 that they had never heard of such
organizations in the city.12 In 1721 Chu I-kuei and fifty-one other
men pledged brotherhood in a hamlet, yet officials discovered it
only after some of the rebels were captured during an uprising
later that year.13
After the mid-eighteenth century, with the increase in pop-
ulation and the migration of vagrants to urban areas, the
covenanted groups also became common among the city folk.
Because of their expansion, an article specifically dealing with
Fukien province, in which Taiwan was a prefecture, was added
to the Ch’ing Penal Code in 1764: sworn brothers, regardless
of their number or leadership, were to be strangulated.14 Per-
secution, however, did not curb the spread. By the mid-nine-
teenth century, the sworn brotherhood was practically ubiq-
uitous in the populated areas of Taiwan, rural and urban alike.
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As Intendant Hsu Tsung-kan (1790–1866) observed: “The more
strictly you deal with sworn brothers, the stronger the group be-
comes.”15
Sworn brotherhoods could be formed with or without initi-
ation rituals. A formal ceremony was held in front of Kuan Yu’s
picture or statue at a temple, in a private house, or in the open
air. In the ceremony, a sheet of red paper was copied out for
each initiate. The paper, pressed with his personal seal, listed
his name, age, birthdate, birthplace, mainland ancestral place,
address in Taiwan, and the names of his family members. It also
included an oath:
On the date here mentioned, in the temple of Kuan Yu, we made a
sacrificial offering and pledged our loyalty to one another. Here-
after we will live and die together, help each other in times of
emergency, and never betray one another. Whoever flinches from
hardship shall be struck down by a thunderbolt.16
After taking the oath and drinking blood, the most capable
member was elected “elder brother” or “big brother,” and the
others were called according to their ages.17 Men otherwise un-
related were now bound by a blood oath and formed a cohesive
primary group.
The members of covenanted groups came from all walks of
life: peasants, vagabonds, soldiers, merchants, manual workers,
and scholars.18 The membership was exclusively in terms of ge-
ographical origin; the Ch’uan-chou people, for example, joined
only their own groupings. Brotherhoods were generally re-
served for adult males. Though composed of men of all ages
(married and unmarried), they usually attracted people of the
same age—those in their late teens and early twenties seemed
most likely to form them.19 Even teenagers as young as fifteen
did so.20 The group was generally small, often fewer than ten
members. A person might join more than one covenanted group,
however, and hence be entwined in a web of social affiliations.
Sworn brothers formed a reference group; they lived up
to their own contracultural norms that deviated from China’s
great tradition and tended to disregard the law. They also easily
became a natural group for gambling both among themselves
and with nonmembers. Gambling sometimes led sworn brothers
to social deviance: their behavior degenerated when they re-
sorted to banditry in order to pay back gambling debts.21 Their
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oath committed them to help each other and to take vengeance
on those who harmed their brothers, thus contributing to the
frequency and scale of communal feuds.
In spite of government persecution, sworn brotherhoods not
only survived but even expanded and formalized into secret so-
cieties. The most common and famous one was the Heaven and
Earth Society (t’ien-ti hui). The first reference to the Heaven
and Earth Society in Chinese historical documents was made
during Lin Shuang-wen’s rebellion in 1787–1788 on Taiwan. The
society was not founded on the island, however, and scholars
have been debating when, where, how, and by whom it was
established. The Heaven and Earth Society that the rebel Lin
Shuang-wen joined in 1784 was said to have been propagated
by a man from Chang-chou, named Yen Yen, who went to Taiwan
a year before. Yet one of the branches of the Heaven and Earth
Society, the Small Sword Society, was already active in 1782
when its members were involved in communal strife in the
Chang-hua area. The following year government soldiers cap-
tured one of its members and gouged out his right eye.22 In
any case, from 1783 to 1786 the Heaven and Earth Society
attracted a great number of vagrants after they learned that
it facilitated not only reciprocity but also racketeering. Tenant
peasants joined the society to protect themselves from op-
pression by landlords and hoodlums; well-off people became
members to avoid being harassed and robbed.23 The members
of secret societies on the island were mostly people from Chang-
chou and Ch’uan-chou. The Hakka, who used the secret soci-
eties to unite themselves in Kwangtung, were the least likely to
do so on Taiwan because they generally lived in nucleated set-
tlements and had more organized community associations.
The secret society had more strictly defined structures of
leadership and compliance than the sworn brotherhood. Unlike
the sworn brotherhood, whose participants could let their fam-
ilies know of their affiliations, the secret society forbade its
brothers to divulge their membership to anyone. Members often
suppressed their individuality in subordination to it, becoming
the victims of what George Simmel calls “de-selfing” (Entselb-
stung).24 Though “drawn together by a sense of mental and
moral kinship,” the secret society members did not necessarily
get an amulet that provided total protection.25 They obeyed
orders unconditionally—even if it meant participating in plans
involving robbery, blackmail of their own kinsmen, communal
strife, or revolt against the government.
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The third major type of social organization, the religious
society, was established to worship patron deities, to promote
fellowship, to facilitate public well-being, and to provide pro-
tection in times of social disorder. It was generally the largest
voluntary association in a rural or urban community. Though
sometimes organized in conjunction with the construction of
a temple, many religious societies were neither in charge of
a temple nor related to one.26 Besides arranging activities re-
garding patron deities and temples, the religious societies
played an important role in community affairs. They held fes-
tivals, organized idolatrous processions, and sponsored pil-
grimages; they also arranged visits to the mother temples on
both the island and the mainland where their guardian deities
had obtained divinity. Some of the religious societies drew
members from other areas and organized communities into
“worshiping circles.”27
These worshiping circles in certain areas were coterminous
with connubium locales where residents chose their spouses
and thus consolidated the communities through both religious
beliefs and affinal ties. The religious associations also exercised
social sanctions against the members. When disputes came up,
the leaders were frequently invited to resolve them; and, if nec-
essary, the members mediated the disputes in open meeting.
Finally, by mobilizing residents in defense against attack from
outside, the religious societies could contribute to community
security, but they could also involve the members in intergroup
feuds.
The network of voluntary associations on the island consti-
tuted a mechanism of social control. They had functions the
government was unwilling or unable to perform; some, such
as secret societies, formulated a set of rules to regulate the
conduct of their members. The leaders (mostly commoners),
therefore, could mobilize the members more easily than the
local power elite or officials could. In a sense, then, the vol-
untary associations exerted more control over their members
than did the state, thus enhancing the traditional autonomy
of communities. They took part in feuds often without the
awareness of the government. Social organization, in other
words, contained the seeds of social disorganization and posed
a counterweight to the state. Even so, the legitimate organi-
zations—such as religious societies—never challenged the gov-
ernment; on the contrary, they invariably helped officials to put
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down popular disturbances. In contrast, the illegitimate organi-
zations like sworn brotherhoods and secret societies rose up in
arms.
POPULAR UPRISINGS AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION
The frontier condition, with an armed population and weak
government surveillance, invited violence. Once the settlers
possessed weapons to protect themselves against attack by abo-
rigines and bandits, it was also easy for them to fight among
themselves and even rise up against the government. As men-
tioned earlier, the immigrant society was composed mainly of
unattached men who, once organized, were more likely to
create disturbances.
Ch’ing military and civil control on Taiwan was indirect
and minimal. Though the island was considered as a frontier
important to national defense, the military forces there were
imposing only on paper. Before the 1860s Taiwan officially main-
tained ten thousand or more troops and had some ninety ships,
double the number of any province. Official quotas, however,
often inflated the real numbers. The soldiers, recruited from
Fukien and Kwangtung, were required to be married, but often
they were vagrants. The government’s delay in the construction
of city walls and the lack of mounted troops further weakened
Ch’ing political control on the island. Established as a pre-
fecture, Taiwan was under the jurisdiction of Fukien until 1887
when it became a province. At the hsien level, the Manchu court
adopted the expedient policy of local autonomy in which it in-
vested neither money nor talent. The Ch’ing government on
Taiwan, as an official acknowledged, was one of the worst in the
empire.28 People bitterly called venal bureaucrats “cash-eating
officials” and challenged their political legitimacy.29
During 212 years of Ch’ing rule, sixty-eight revolts broke out
on Taiwan, an average of one every three years. The most se-
rious rebellion, led by Lin Shuang-wen in 1787–1788, may be
used as a dividing line for the history of political disturbances
in Ch’ing Taiwan. Before it, during the first half of Ch’ing rule
(104 years from 1683 to 1787), there were thirteen revolts, an
average of one every eight years. But during the second half
of Ch’ing rule (107 years from 1788 to 1895), fifty-five took
place, an average of one every other year. The frequency of up-
risings was greatest during the seventy-five years between Lin’s
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Figure 5–1. Areas of popular uprisings in Ch’ing Taiwan.
(The location of four uprisings cannot be determined.)
rebellion in 1787 and the second largest rebellion led by an-
other leader of the Heaven and Earth Society, Tai Ch’ao-ch’un,
in 1862—forty-three revolts took place, an average of one every
1.8 years. After Tai’s disturbances, however, twelve uprisings
occurred, approximately one every 2.7 years, during the re-
maining thirty-three years of Ch’ing rule. This pattern suggests
that with the passage of the frontier after the mid-nineteenth
century, popular uprisings also became less frequent.
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Revolts flared up in all populated areas of Taiwan (Figure
5-1). The south, the earliest settled region, recorded the highest
incidence of popular uprisings—forty, or 59 percent of the total.
A region developed later, eastern Taiwan, experienced only five
revolts, all taking place during the nineteenth century. The up-
risings tended to occur in what might be called the marginal
areas, characterized by a relatively mobile and mixed popu-
lation (southern Fukienese, Hakka, and aborigines), armed res-
idents, and nominal government control. Twenty-five revolts
broke out in the marginal regions contiguous to mountains. His-
torically, any frontier at its early stage of development is mar-
ginal in nature. In this context, more revolts can be considered
to have occurred in the marginal regions. As the heterogeneous
population, and hence the marginal areas, moved north, the
focus of popular uprisings also shifted northward, stimulating
as a consequence the construction of walls around towns and
incipient cities.30
Of the sixty-eight revolts, sixty-six started in rural areas. But
because the rebels regarded the seizure of the hsien seat as
the defeat of the local authorities, they usually proceeded there
after attacking military garrisons and acquiring weapons in the
countryside. Even so, only seven uprisings ever took either the
hsien capitals of Feng-shan, Chia-i, or Chang-hua. The occu-
pation of the prefectural capital Taiwan symbolized control of
the island, yet only Chu I-kuei’s rebels seized it in 1721, and
only for fifty days. Three other uprisings in later times led by
Lin Shuang-wen (1787–1788), Ts’ai Ch’ien (1805–1806), and Lin
Kung (1853) all attempted to take it, but none ever succeeded.
Sworn brotherhoods and secret societies formed the nuclei
of rebel organizations. The government considered them sub-
versive and its efforts to suppress them often provoked their
members to rise up in arms. Sworn brotherhood groups
launched at least twenty-seven uprisings, or 39 percent of the
total. Ubiquitous as they were, such groups might have been in-
volved in more than these revolts. Since an oath enjoined sworn
brothers not to divulge their affiliations, rebels generally con-
cealed their memberships after being captured. This practice
obscured the role of covenanted groups in many revolts. In any
case, with a sworn brotherhood at the core of an insurgent orga-
nization, the rank and file of the rebels easily increased. The
nucleus of Chu I-kuei’s group was composed of fifty-two sworn
brothers in 1721; as each of them recruited more, the number of
rebels quickly swelled to a thousand and later to ten thousand.31
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Among the twenty-seven known sworn brotherhood uprisings,
ten were actually led by secret societies (eight by the Heaven
and Earth Society, two by the Small Sword Society).
If an uprising was not led by a sworn brotherhood or a secret
society, its organization was still largely modeled after them.
The rebels were organized into bands (ku), a term commonly
used in the Heaven and Earth Society; each band then was as-
signed a flag. The number of bands varied with the scale of
revolt. During Chang Ping’s uprising (1832), the rebel forces
comprised forty-one bands, each consisting of 100 to 300 men.32
During the uprisings, neither sworn brotherhoods nor secret
societies espoused egalitarianism, upheld ideology, or ex-
pressed demands for economic reforms. Indeed, the dynamic
role of the Heaven and Earth Society in the making of the re-
volts was organizational. Its rules aimed at forming a cohesive
covenanted group but were not directed against the gov-
ernment. Although the society’s avowed political goal was be-
lieved to be “oppose the Ch’ing and restore the Ming,” only its
1853 revolt ever raised this slogan. The sworn brotherhoods
and secret societies, after all, were not political groups origi-
nally attempting to seize power. Normally these two groups did
not become politicized until after government troops were dis-
patched to search for their members.
Lineage organization, uncommon and weak on the island,
was rarely used by the rebels. The only case I can find is one
in 1862 when a rebel leader by the name of Hung Ts’ung mo-
bilized his clansmen to fight against government troops in the
present Ts’ao-t’un area.33 Although a few instances of feuds
among some surname groups erupted in the late eighteenth
century and the second half of the nineteenth century, none
of the large clans ever revolted against the government.34 The
lineage organization usually allowed no bifurcation of power.
Serving as the custodians of harmony and peace among the
clansmen and as buffers between the government and the com-
munity, synaptic village headmen or elders would foil any at-
tempt at revolt. A leader of Lin Shuang-wen’s lineage had tried
to dissuade him from revolt because it could “exterminate the
entire lineage”35 During Ch’en Chou-ch’uan’s uprising (1795),
two civil service degree holders in the Lu-kang area even led
people to round up their own rebel clansmen.36 Nevertheless,
few lineage organizations on the island were strong enough to
prevent their kinsmen from revolting or to protect them in times
of social disorder.
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Social unrest prompted people to establish societies for
mutual protection—such as the counterrevolt organization of
“righteous volunteers” (i-min). This organization was first
formed during Chu I-kuei’s uprising in 1721 when some 10,200
Hakkas from seven hamlets in the Hsia-tan-shui valley
(southern Taiwan) united to resist the rebels. The most famous
counterrevolt association of this kind was the Hakka Six Detach-
ments (liu-tui) in the Feng-shan area, a group which still exists
today as a community organization devoid of military function.37
After 1721, such volunteers were invariably mobilized to attack
the rebels; when the people from Ch’uan-chou revolted, the
Hakkas and those from Chang-chou would become volunteers
fighting against the rebels and vice versa.
Though originally intended to protect their own commu-
nities, the organizations of “righteous volunteers” themselves
also created disturbances. In fact, many residents justified their
participation in feuds by joining the organizations. They refused
to pay taxes under the pretext of preparing supplies, and some-
times they openly plundered, causing greater havoc than the
rebels and bandits. During the uprisings in 1832–1833, Hakka
volunteers indiscriminately attacked the southern Fukienese in
the P’ing-tung area.38 As a result, often the government simul-
taneously had to cope with both the uprisings and the Hakka
disturbances.
Another voluntary association, the commercial guild (chiao),
was established primarily to promote merchants’ interests but
also organized forces of counterrevolt. After the popular up-
risings broke out in the countryside, the merchants generally
financed militia to defend the cities where they did business.
At T’ai-wan-fu (present-day Tainan), the amalgamated Three
Guilds (san-chiao) were instrumental in defeating the rebels
led by Ts’ai Ch’ien in 1805–1806 and by Lin Kung in 1853.
The active involvement of the commercial guilds in defending
the capital city of T’ai-wan-fu prevented the insurgents from
seizing it after 1721. These commercial guilds, unlike other vol-
untary associations which escalated popular uprisings, actually
contained them and protected the cities. Some of the guilds,
however, could not avoid involving themselves in feuds.
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COMMUNAL STRIFE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Discord had existed among the Chinese people before their
emigration to Taiwan, but it was given a wider base and in-
tensified by the frontier situation.39 Competition for land
heightened friction. In the early eighteenth century, rivalry
among the three regional groups in claiming land and obtaining
irrigation water gradually changed from object-centered com-
petition to opponent-centered conflict. Chinese allegiance to
ancestral places further aggravated factionalism. But because
their defense against the aborigines required joint effort, their
dissension did not result in overt infighting until 1721 when Chu
I-kuei’s uprising broke out.
Supraorganization on the island heightened the potential
for conflict. Most voluntary associations not only were tinged
with regional biases but also failed to work out a device of co-
option by which they could have included hostile forces in the
community’s authority structure. In emphasizing internal soli-
darity, moreover, the voluntary associations intensified enmity
against other groups. A leader’s success in minimizing intra-
group friction also tended to broaden the dimensions of inter-
group conflict.
Communal strife on the island, unlike that in Fukien and
Kwang-tung, was rarely clan oriented. In terms of geographical
origins, surnames, and occupations of the participants, seventy-
seven instances of communal strife in Ch’ing Taiwan are shown
in Table 5-1. Strife between the southern Fukienese and the
Hakka had the highest incidence rate: twenty-four instances, or
31 percent. The twenty-two outbreaks of fighting between the
people of Chang-chou and those of Ch’uan-chou tended to occur
in the areas where Hakka strength was weak. Altogether, the
first two types of strife between different regional groups ac-
counted for forty-six instances, or 57 percent of the total, and
the scale of the fighting was also much greater than that of the
other three types.
The feuds between different surname groups and the in-
fighting among the same surname groups were not the same
as lineage strife. Though not necessarily of direct common de-
scent, the surname groups often felt a quasi-kinship bond and
easily entered into conflict by helping their own surname
people. The strife between people of the same occupation in-
volved porters (one instance), soldiers (three instances), and
musicians (four instances), all of whom had their own organiza-
tions before the outbreak of fighting.
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TABLE 5–1
Major Types of Communal Strife
Participants Instances
Chang-chou people vs. Ch’uan-chou people 22
Southern Fukienese (people from both Chang-chou
and Ch’uan-chou) vs. Hakka
24
Different surname groups 11
Same surname groups 4
People of the same occupation 8
Unknown 8
TOTAL 77
Communal strife afflicted almost the entire Chinese-popu-
lated area on the island. It broke out twenty-seven times (32
percent of the total of seventy-seven instances) in the earliest
developed south, twenty-one in the central region, nine in the
north, eleven in the east, and nine in places unknown (Figure
5-2). This kind of fighting was primarily a rural phenomenon
on Taiwan—with the exception of five outbreaks, all occurred
outside cities. In the urban areas, though the heterogeneous
and concentrated population increased the potential for con-
flict, the relatively tight government control there tended to
forestall minor brawls from evolving into feuds. The predom-
inant settlement of southern Fukiencse in the cities also pre-
cluded the possibility of infighting between them and the Hakka
there. The division of labor in the cities might have structured
the residents into solidarity within their distinct groups, leading
to conflict with others. The propinquity of urban dwellers and
the variety of groups, however, developed a mechanism of
checks and balances that averted conflict for the sake of
common interests.
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During the 212 years of Ch’ing rule, Taiwan experienced
communal strife on the average once every 2.7 years. From the
first outbreak in 1721 to the end of Ch’ing rule in 1895, a span
of 174 years, one instance of communal strife occurred every
2.2 years. During the eighteenth century there were nineteen
incidents, or 25 percent, and during the nineteenth century,
fifty-eight outbreaks, or 75 percent. In 1862, however, Tai
Ch’ao-ch’un’s rebellion marked the last flare-up of social con-
flict between the southern Fukienese and the Hakka on the
west coast of Taiwan. Feuds after the 1860s were waged pri-
marily among same surname people, between different surname
groups, and among same occupational groups. From 1863 to
1895 there were a total of sixteen reported incidents. The only
Fukienese-Hakka fighting during this period took place in the
newly developed southeast coast of the T’ai-tung area; the other
fifteen feuds occurred among different surname groups (eight
instances), same surname people (two instances), same occu-
pational groups (four instances), and one in which the circum-
stances are not known.
After 1865 the southern Fukienese descendants and Hakka
occasionally brawled, but such incidents no longer led to a
greater social chasm. Although population pressure and re-
duction in government military forces after the mid-nineteenth
century made social conflict more likely, communal strife ac-
tually became less frequent. The population figure is not known
for mid-nineteenth-century Taiwan, but it was reported that
little uncultivated land existed on the western coastal plains.40
Overall administrative surveillance did not improve even after
1875 when more counties were established. The government
troops, on the other hand, were decreased by half in 1869, from
14,425 to 7,621, and in 1881 there was a further cut to 4,500.
Despite these conditions favorable to social disorder, fighting
between the southern Fukienese descendants and Hakka in
western Taiwan did not take place. It appears that with hostile
groups drawn into direct and intense contact in feuds and re-
volts, Chinese had gradually allayed their enmities and mended
their differences. In the mid-nineteenth century, the frontier
that provoked violent action was vanishing, and despite the ves-
tiges of integrative strains, social conflict simmered down. After
the 1860s, if the frontier existed in western Taiwan at all, it was
the frontier of inclusion (more properly social integration), not
the frontier of exclusion.41
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Figure 5–2. Areas of communal strife in Ch’ing Taiwan.
(Nine instances of communal strife cannot be located.)
Voluntary associations contributed to the frequency and
scale of communal strife. With their internal spontaneity, as-
criptive voluntarism, and exclusively regional memberships, the
sworn brotherhoods, secret societies, and associations of
righteous volunteers were readily used by the combatants in
two types of communal strife: the fighting between the Chang-
chou people and the Ch’uan-chou people and the feud between
the southern Fukienese and Hakka. Especially active were the
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associations of righteous volunteers. Organized in the popular
uprisings, they became institutionalized in feuds; and while
helping to bring the revolts to an end, they also engendered and
prolonged feuds. With a stockpile of weapons (including can-
nons), they were prepared for any fighting between regional
groups. In a sense, the feuds of these two types were waged
largely between two consolidated associations of southern
Fukienese and Hakka volunteers.
Commercial guilds, though structuring the factionalism of
the merchant groups into amiable rivalry, still caused divisions
in their spheres of influence, but only those in the north en-
gaged in feuds. The Upper Guild (ting-chiao) and Lower Guild
(hsia-chiao) in the Taipei area masterminded the communal
strife between the Chang-chou and Ch’uan-chou groups in
1853. By contrast, the merchant groups in T’ai-wan-fu were
amalgamated into the Three Guilds and never experienced
armed conflict among themselves. Chinese feuds on Taiwan,
after all, generally originated from regional and communal
jaundice rather than from commercial interests.
Though feuds in Taiwan were not religious wars, the
temples, as centers of community activities, often became the
headquarters of the combatants. Since most religious associa-
tions took charge of temples, they were inevitably involved in
communal strife. Before a battle, the participants worshiped in
their temples to supplicate the patron deities for divine pro-
tection. The occupation or destruction of the temple symbolized
the defeat of one party and the triumph of another. During the
1853 feud in Taipei, the Ch’uan-chou people even went so far as
to set fire to the image of the Chang-chou people’s patron god,
K’ai-chang sheng-wang, snatched its statue, and gouged out its
eyes and nose. In order to have their god returned, the Chang-
chou people swallowed the insult and yielded.42 After the feud,
the partisans enshrined their martyrs and occasionally estab-
lished a religious association to ensure worship. Such martyr
worship further aggravated group enmity.
CONCLUSION
Taiwan’s frontier situation was characterized by an armed
population, unbalanced sex ratios, ineffective political control,
weak lineage organization, and supravoluntary association—all
of which were interrelated and contributed to the occurrence
of social disorder. Voluntary associations on Taiwan were origi-
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nally joined by pioneers of similar geographical background and
personal interest to facilitate reciprocal assistance and promote
religious beliefs. Serving as interstitial mechanisms for the set-
tlers’ social life, these organizations also mobilized themselves
into action for various purposes, both legitimate and illegit-
imate, thus increasing social disturbance. The occurrence of
social unrest, on the other hand, increased the number of vol-
untary associations as nonrebels united to protect their own
communities by forming such societies as the organizations of
righteous volunteers. Table 5-2 summarizes the involvement of
five types of voluntary organizations in social disorder.
The most violent and destructive incidences of social dis-
order were popular uprisings and communal strife. Sworn
brotherhoods and secret societies actively participated in the
revolts against the Ch’ing government. Of sixty-eight revolts,
sworn brotherhoods launched twenty-seven, of which ten were
actually led by secret societies. In general, it was after gov-
ernment troops attempted to crack down on them that their
members resisted and later revolted. The role of these voluntary
groups in the revolts, however, was organizational; they offered
neither ideology nor specific programs for reshuffling political
power. To be sure, it was their negative consciousness of op-
position and not their positive consciousness of revolution that
stimulated them to revolt.
Communal strife on Taiwan was mostly waged between dif-
ferent regional groups rather than between lineages as on the
mainland. The frontier condition of Taiwan before the mid-nine-
teenth century generated social conflict, but it was supraorga-
nization that intensified communal strife. In emphasizing soli-
darity of in-groups, the voluntary associations also aggravated
hostility toward out-groups, especially those organized by
people from other mainland districts, thus heightening possi-
bilities for fighting. Feuding in turn enhanced social organiza-
tions and enlarged their size. Even the religious societies, which
were relatively open in terms of membership, exacerbated vio-
lence because combatants often used temples as headquarters
during feuds. The residents, however, did not fight for religious
reasons.
Both popular uprisings and communal strife were inter-
locking sociopolitical problems in the history of Taiwan: the
areas plagued with communal strife also had a high incidence
of popular uprisings. Since communal strife intensified enmity
among the three regional groups, generally only the people
whose mainland ancestral prefectures were identical with those
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TABLE 5–2.
Social Organization and Social Disorder in Ch’ing Taiwan
Social Disorder
Social Organization Banditry Communal
Strife
Popular
Uprising
Sworn brotherhood A A & C A
Secret society A A & C A
Religious society C A & C
Communal protection
society (i-min)
A A & C C
Commercial guild C A & C C
A = attacks on people or government; C = counterattacks.
of the rebel leader joined uprisings; the others would organize
themselves under the name of righteous volunteers to fight
against the rebels. These volunteers waged counterrevolts
simply because the insurgents were their foes; they paid al-
legiance to their own groups, not to the government. Under
other circumstances they too might revolt, and the former
rebels might become righteous volunteers. This vicious circle
of revenge not only spurred, intensified, and prolonged popular
uprisings but, more seriously, sapped the rebels’ strength and
disrupted their unity.
Besides preventing the rebels from forming a united front,
the frontier situation also affected popular uprisings in two
other ways. First, with the social organizations, the members’
overemphasis on regional concerns and mutual aid led them to
neglect class interests; and outside the organizations, tenant
peasants cooperated with their landlords for the sake of se-
curity, thus weakening their class consciousness. Second, many
voluntary associations were established for defense against out-
siders and aborigines. The aborigines, from whom the settlers
wrested land, chose to help the government put down Chinese
revolts. Furthermore, during the popular uprisings, rural
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dwellers invariably organized community protection associa-
tions to attack the rebels and the commercial guilds financed
militia to reinforce local defense.
Although voluntary organizations on Taiwan increased the
frequency and raised the scale of social disorder, they also has-
tened the defeat of revolts. After the mid-nineteenth century,
however, with the frontier disappearing, popular uprisings
became less common and communal strife between the
southern Fukienese and Hakka did not occur on the west coast
of Taiwan. It appears that the Chinese on Taiwan about this time
became more willing to cooperate in developing the island. In
this regard, the proliferation of voluntary associations after the
mid-nineteenth century facilitated Chinese social integration on
the island.
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6
Sequent Occupance and
Place Names
CHIAO-MIN HSIEH
During the historical period, the significance of Taiwan’s lo-
cation has shifted dramatically. The island’s physical proximity
to the coastal mainland, for example, belies its anonymity
throughout much of Chinese history, yet in recent centuries
Taiwan has been a crossroads of European and Asian interests
to a large degree because of its critical location. European com-
mercial excursions into the western Pacific region during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not only brought a Eu-
ropean presence to the island but set in motion the movement
of Chinese pioneers across the straits and Taiwan’s eventual in-
corporation into cultural and political China. The chronology of
this successive occupation is undertaken in other chapters of
this volume.
Sequent occupance, however, is more than chronological
occupation. It is both a pattern and a process of superimposition
and replacement. It is recognition of the characteristic occu-
pance traits of a given period. Contesting aboriginal dominance,
Dutch, Spanish, Japanese, and discrete waves of Chinese
brought overlaying patterns to the landscape of the subtropical
island. Agricultural organization, cropping systems, and tech-
nology, for example, varied with each sequent occupance, as did
settlement forms, house types, and a multiplicity of other con-
crete expressions of culture. There are many observable rem-
nants of sequent occupance in Taiwan today that offer glimpses
of the island’s checkered past. I have dealt with Taiwan’s se-
quent occupance and its various manifestations in an earlier
work and will not reiterate the details here.1 In this chapter,
I have isolated one manifestation—place names—for exami-
nation. Although seemingly less tangible than cropping systems,
house types, or other commonly highlighted cultural indices,
contemporary place names fossilize the past and endure to a re-
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markable degree. Thus they offer much to our understanding of
Taiwan’s historical geography and clarify one aspect of sequent
occupance.
With a contemporary map in hand, the curious observer
often has difficulty interpreting the place names.2 Place names
represent a complex yet incomplete summation of past influ-
ences. In aggregate, they express the multiplicity of factors
that give rise to the naming of places—characteristics of local
topography and biota, aspirations of pioneer settlers, reminis-
cences of earlier homes, character of current settlement. When
taken individually, each place name has a history that cannot
always be traced precisely. This difficulty is compounded when
one is using romanized transliterations of Chinese place names,
but it exists nonetheless even when one is confronted with
Chinese characters. Underlying this problem is the fact that
early place names persist out of the past as fossils, the modern-
day reading of which often rings unfamiliar and without ap-
parent meaning. Moreover, certain names that had their origin
in the language of one cultural group are frequently unintelli-
gible to another. Several scholars have made excursions into the
convoluted world of Chinese toponymy, but as yet there is no
comprehensive treatment of Chinese place names and their role
as a cultural index.3
Before we consider local place names, a few words should
be said about the names “Formosa” and “Taiwan,” which are
often used interchangeably. Formosa, as is well known, is a
shortened form of Ilha Formosa (“Beautiful Island”), a name
given by the Portuguese in the early 1540s as they passed along
the island’s west coast. Although the Portuguese never occupied
the island, the name Formosa has persisted to the present as
one of the few western-language names used to identify places
in China. Searching for the derivation of the name Taiwan is
more difficult. As Wen-hsiung Hsu discusses in the first chapter
of this volume, the early Chinese nomenclature for the island
is vague and often contradictory. Even though the name Taiwan
has had currency for more than three centuries, there is no
unanimity as to its origin. It is frequently claimed that the
name is a descriptive one meaning “big or great bay.” Some
scholars believe that “Taiwan” is a corruption of “Ta-hui” or
“Tayouan,” early aboriginal names for the southwestern section
of the island.4
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PLACE NAMES OF ABORIGINAL ORIGIN
As Chinese settlement extended north and south from the core
area of southwestern Taiwan, Chinese peasant colonizers came
into contact with an unspecified number of aboriginal settle-
ments (she), many of which were identified on early Chinese
gazetteer (fang-chih) maps. Subsequently, under the pressure
of continuing Chinese migration, the aborigines were displaced
from these sites; but the sounds of the aboriginal names were
often retained in corrupted form in Chinese characters.
Seventy-one such names were noted in the gazetteer of T’ai-
wan-fu. In other cases, the Chinese settlers named places by
using characters that reflected an aboriginal presence: more
than a score of place names use the character fan, meaning
“aboriginal” or “barbarian.” Other names incorporate a ref-
erence to nearby she, such as She-ch’ien (“in front of the abo-
riginal village”) and She-hou (“in back of the aboriginal
village”).
One sure way to spot that a contemporary place name is
of aboriginal provenance is to discover that the characters in
the name have no meaning when linked. Such attempts have
produced crude Chinese homonyms. One encounters difficulty
in reproducing the aboriginal sounds for such names, however,
because of the uncertainty of whether the names were origi-
nally rendered according to a Min-nan (southern Fukien), K’o-
chia (Hakka), or some other dialectical pronunciation. Examples
are Tun-hsia in Miao-li hsien, pronounced Tun-cio in the Min-
nan dialect, and Pei-t’ou, pronounced Pak-tao in Min-nan. It may
be assumed that most of these aboriginal names originally had
meanings which have become obscured in the transformation;
other examples are Pa-yao-wan and Lang-wai-chi in P’ing-tung
hsien, Chia-lu-lan and Chia-li-meng Kai in T’ai-tung hsien, and
Ma-lin and Li-tzu-chien in I-lan hsien.
It may well be that those contemporary place names which
reveal the natural vegetation or animals commonly found
during the seventeenth century stem from aboriginal names.
The abundance of deer is expressed in the following names:
Lu-ch’ang (“deer fields”), Lu-liao (“small house for storing the
hunted deer”), and Lu-man-shan (“hill where the deer are plen-
tiful”).
Chapter 6
107
PLACE NAMES OF EUROPEAN ORIGIN
One writer has noted that Chinese place names “almost never
indicate a cultural influence from other parts of the world (as do
the names Canton, Ohio; Cairo, Illinois; New Hampshire; New
Jersey).”5 Given the early and persistent European interest in
Taiwan, it may not be surprising, then, to see toponymic relicts
of European colonization on contemporary maps of the island to
a greater degree than in other parts of China. Although most
of the early Dutch and Spanish names, such as Rio Quero near
Hua-lien, have been dropped, a small number of others like San-
tiao-chiao—a transliteration of the Spanish Santiago—have con-
tinued. Fu-kuei-chiao, located at the northern tip of the island,
is a Min-nan dialect transliteration for the Dutch words meaning
small peninsula.
Several western-language names from the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries have been retained to the present on
English-language maps of the island. The P’eng-hu islands, for
example, located midway between Taiwan and the mainland,
are still often called the Pescadores, the Spanish word for fish-
ermen. A less frequently seen English-language rendering for
Jih-yueh T’an (Sun Moon Lake) is Lake Candidius, named for
the first Dutch missionary, Rev. Georgius Candidius, who served
on Taiwan from 1627 to 1631. Mt. Morrison, named after a
nineteenth-century missionary, is located in the central
mountain ranges and is also known as Yu-shan. It was commonly
found on maps up through World War II.
Other names characterize the nature of Dutch colonization.
From 1624 to 1662, all of the land was claimed by the Dutch
East India Company as wang-t’ien (“crown fields”). Wang-t’ien
in the northwest section of the Taichung basin is a reminder
of this period. Under Dutch rule the unit for measuring land in
Taiwan was called kah by the Fukienese migrants to Taiwan.
Kah is a linguistic vestige of the Dutch akker measure. When
the Chinese and Japanese came to the island, attempts were
made to change the land measure from kah to the Chinese mou
or the Japanese cho. Its long-standing use, however, worked
against such change, and it is still used on the island as a
basic land measure. Some of the early names which incorpo-
rated this unit measure are the following places: Shih-erh-chia
(“twelve kah”), Chiu-chia (“nice kah”), Liu-chia (“six kah”), and
Wu-shih-erh-chia (“fifty-two kah”). In the Dutch land surveying
system used in Taiwan, five kah was called a li, meaning plow in
Chinese. Gradually this land surveying system became popular
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for place names. Among the places encountered are Shih-wu-
chang-li (“fifteen pieces of li”), located in Chang-hua hsien. San-
chang-li (“three pieces of li”) and Liu-chang-li (“six pieces of li”)
are located in Taipei hsien.
A half dozen places in Taiwan use the characters pro-
nounced hung-mao in their names—hung-mao (“red hair”) was
the term used by seventeenth-century Chinese settlers to de-
scribe the Dutch. Hung-mao-lou was the common Chinese name
for Fort Provintia, located in the present city of Tainan. All
the existing places identified as hung-mao are located in Chia-
i, Yun-lin, Kaohsiung, or Tai-chung hsien. Examples are Hung-
mao-ching (“red hair’s well”), Hung-mao-kang (“red hair’s
harbor”), and Hung-mao-liao (“red hair’s village”).
PLACE NAMES FROM THE CHENG PERIOD
Cheng Ch’eng-kung, his son, and his grandson provided a
21-year interlude between Dutch rule and the incorporation of
Taiwan into the Ch’ing empire. During this period, immigration
was encouraged and significant expansion of arable land oc-
curred. The Dutch wang-t’ien became kuan-t’ien (“government
land”). An innovation was the colonization plan in which military
units were required to reclaim and till the land surrounding
their encampments in an attempt to be self-sufficient. Most
of these encampments and their associated fields (t’un-t’ien)
were located on the Chia-nan plain or along the coastal plain
near Kaohsiung, although five were strategically sited along the
coastal plain north of the Cho-shui River. The noun ying was
used in the names of a majority of these encampments. In the
Tainan area today one can locate more than a dozen places
with names like Hsia-ying (“lower camp”), Ying-hou (“behind
the camp”) and Liu-ying (“willow camp”). North of Kaohsiung
city is Tso-ying (“left camp”), today an important naval base.
PLACE NAMES FROM THE CHINESE PERIOD
Most of Taiwan’s place names naturally reflect the imprint of
Chinese settlement. Some names, too numerous to list, were
brought from the home communities of the migrants. Yet, con-
trary to the common pattern in America where the word “new”
often precedes such names as New York and New London,
the character hsin (“new”) was seldom used in transferring a
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mainland name to Taiwan. On the other hand, hsin (“new”), like
the characters ta (“big”) and hsia (“below”), were commonly
used in general descriptive names.
Some place names were related to the early immigrants
themselves. Although many frontier communities were made up
of migrants from the same region and adopted a name which
reflects a common origin, still others were established by in-
dividuals related by blood. Thus one finds a number of places
which include common Chinese surnames—such as Sung-wu
(“Sung family house”) in T’ao-yuan hsien and Hsieh-ts’o-liao
(“Hsieh village”) in Tainan. In the case of these two settlements,
the Sung and Hsieh families still are dominant today. The use
of ts’o or wu in a place name enables the careful observer
to determine whether the original settlers were from southern
Fukien (Min-nan speakers) or from Kwangtung province (Hakka
speakers). Ts’o, which usually denotes a hut or cottage, is used
by southern Fukienese to refer to their dwellings whereas wu is
the common form for other Chinese.
A good many of the place names originating in the century
and half after 1683 relate to Chinese attempts to deal with the
aborigines. Most of the place names in this category are lo-
cated in the foothill—the zone separating the mountain abo-
rigines and the sedentary Chinese. Chang-chou migrants came
to Heng-ch’un and built a settlement, surrounding it with a wall
of firewood in order to defend themselves against the native
tribes. They called the settlement Ch’ai-ch’eng (“firewood
city”).
In some places the Chinese immigrants built earthen walls
around their settlements, and several places are called T’u-
ch’eng (“earth city”). Some towns were surrounded by walls
made of brick and so the towns are called T’u-wei (“earth en-
closure”). Others are called tu (“fort”)—such as Ting-tu (“first
fort”), Erh-tu (“second fort”), and San-tu (“third fort”) in I-lan
hsien. Others with similar names are located in the Taipei area.
At the time, these fortifications were outposts of immigrant set-
tlement. Other places similarly express defense: Mu-sha (“wood
fence”), T’ung-kuei (“mortar gun case”), Ying-k’ou (“strategic
pass”), Ying-liao (“the small house at the pass”).
As skirmishes between aborigines and Chinese intensified,
the Chinese authorities implemented a boundary policy that led
to the construction of a demarcated line to separate the two
groups. Termed t’u-niu-kou, it took the form of a linear ridge
of earth. From a distance the dirt ridge (t’u) presumably re-
sembled a basking water buffalo (niu). Most of the guardhouse
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settlements related to this system are gone, but a few settle-
ments still hint at this early system, such as T’u-niu villages in
Taichung and Miao-li hsien.
Chinese land reclamation took several forms. Some land was
opened by corporate groups of shareholders, and this fact is
reflected in a large number of place names. Ku (“shares”) or
fen (“subdivisions of shares”) are components of some place
names—for instance, Liu-ku (“six shares”) or Shih-san-fen
(“thirteen divisions”) in T’ao-yuan hsien. Many additional place
names used the numerical character to specify the number of
persons who pooled resources for the purpose of reclamation.
Under the Ch’ing dynasty there were several uprisings on
the island. After they were quelled, imperial decisions some-
times conferred names of new hope for towns. An example of
this is Chia-i, where chia means “good” and i means “fitting
or proper.” Originally the city was called Chu-lo-shan, which
approximates the pronunciation of the aboriginal name for a
village the Dutch called Tilaossen. Other examples include Pao-
chung-miao (“temple of loyalty”) and Chung-yi-ting (“pavilion of
loyalty and prosperity”).
The Ch’ing empire also attempted to extend its influence by
renaming villages in praise of the regime. Pan-hsien (“half line”)
was the aboriginal name for a settlement in central Taiwan.
After the place became a hsien (county) seat, it was renamed
Chang-hua, which means “manifest the influence of the
empire,” and this is what it is called today. Kan-en originally
was called Nin-ma-she by the aborigines, but it subsequently
became Kan-en (“thanks for the mercy”). Other place names
which expressed praise are Yung-nin (“peaceful forever”), Kuei-
jen (“return to the benevolent”), and Yen-ch’ang (“prosperous
forever”).
PLACE NAMES FROM THE JAPANESE PERIOD
Japanese immigrants to Taiwan lived principally in the cities,
and it is there that many vestiges of their occupation may be
seen. Except in eastern Taiwan, few rural place names were
added by the Japanese, although the original Chinese char-
acters were usually rendered and romanized according to
Japanese pronunciation. In Taipei city today some districts, such
as the Hsi-men district, are still popularly referred to as ding,
the Japanese term, rather than ch’u, the Chinese term.
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Still other places retain names introduced by the Japanese
but pronounced and romanized according to the Chinese lan-
guage. Sung-shan, originally Matsuyama, and Tien-chung, orig-
inally Tanaka, are but two examples of this type. T’ien-mu,
located north of Taipei city, was named Tenbo by the Japanese
to commemorate a deity. Names such as these have for the
most part been detached from their origin in common usage, al-
though Lin Heng-tao has written that “these place names of the
occupation period must be changed back to the original Chinese
as soon as possible”6 He makes no comment on those names
which are the legacy of the distant Dutch and Spanish occupa-
tions.
SUMMARY
The sequent occupance of Taiwan has left a palimpsest of cu-
rious and complex inscriptions of past patterns whose traces
can be viewed today by the careful observer. Buildings, road
patterns, characteristics of agriculture and industry—all reflect
influences that came to the island at different times from dif-
ferent groups. Some vestiges of early occupance stand as mute
reminders of lost or vague origins; others, such as the temple
commemorating Cheng Ch’eng-kung in Tainan, the Spanish fort
at Tan-shui, or the large number of Japanese-style houses in
Taipei, speak loudly of a past now transformed. Although con-
temporary place names are often less bold in suggesting their
patrimony, examination of them can yield illuminating vignettes
of the island’s past.
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Part Two
URBANIZATION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

7
Walled Cities and Towns in
Taiwan
TAO-CHANG CHIANG
The significance of the wall is a common topic in the study of
cities in most parts of the world.1 This is particularly the case
in China where the association between the wall and the city
has been so intimate that the same character ch’eng is used
for both.2 The walled city in China was a phenomenon found
early in history and subsequently in numbers that exceeded
those elsewhere in the world. The presence of a walled city
was clear evidence of Chinese penetration and settlement and,
in a frontier area, served as an outpost of imperial authori-
ty. As Chinese peasants moved to Taiwan in the seventeenth
through nineteenth centuries, and transformed the island into a
rural analog of Fukien and Kwangtung, urban centers emerged
as well to serve administrative, social, and economic purposes.
Distinct differences promoted the development of individual
walled cities as Harry J. Lamley has so well pointed out for
Taipei, Hsin-chu, and I-lan.3 Viewing the broader context of
Taiwan’s urbanization, this chapter examines the origin and
spread of walled urban centers on the island and identifies as-
pects of their sites and distribution, their size and shape, and
their function.
EARLY FORTRESSES
Chinese historical records indicate that at the end of the thir-
teenth century there were about 1,600 Chinese pioneers on the
Pescadores (P’eng-hu), but no walled town was built there until
1563 when a Ming general erected a walled town at An-ao for
defense against the pirates in the Taiwan Straits.4 One record
shows that this walled town was devastated at least as early as
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1694.5 Although there is no way to know in detail about this
walled town, it is certain that it was not much more than a small
military fortification.6
The Dutch visited the Pescadores in 1622–1624 and secured
a toehold on the island of Taiwan in 1624. Two years later the
Spaniards landed at its northern end, but they were driven away
by the Dutch in 1642. At the end of four decades, the Dutch
themselves were forced to surrender to the Ming loyalist Cheng
Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga), and as a result Taiwan emerged as an
active Chinese frontier. From 1622 to 1653 the Dutch erected
several forts on the Pescadores and in southern Taiwan, while
the Spaniards built forts at the northern end of Taiwan. Best
known among these forts were Fort Zeelandia and Fort Prov-
intia built by the Dutch near present-day Tainan, Fort San Sal-
vador at Chi-lung (Keelung) erected by the Spaniards in 1626,
and Fort Santo Domingo at Tan-shui built by the Spaniards in
1629.7
Fort Zeelandia was expanded several times and by 1632
was an imposing fortification on a sand spit off the southwest
coast (Figure 7-1). The site chosen for Fort Zeelandia illustrates
the fact that the Dutch viewed the facility as essentially a de-
fensible factory or emporium oriented outward rather than as
a node from which to promote the development of the island:
“The builders of this Castle paid more attention to the conve-
nience of loading and unloading vessels than to the situation
of the place”8 Initially the fortress was nothing but a wooden
palisade, but it was rebuilt in 1630 using bricks shipped to
Taiwan from Batavia. Split into two parts, the fortress was con-
structed atop an elevated earthen mound.9 Limited room for
expansion and the need to secure access to sources of water
and food prompted the Dutch to build another fort, called Prov-
intia, on the mainland only several hundred yards across a
shallow inlet to the east. From these two bases, the Dutch East
India Company carried out triangular trade between China,
Japan, Holland, and Dutch possessions. Dutch commercial in-
terests were aborted when Cheng Ch’eng-kung laid siege to the
fortresses in 1661; after holding out for nine months, the re-
maining Dutch forces exchanged safe passage to Batavia for
471,000 guilders and the fortifications. Remnants of these
Dutch forts are observable today as is the Spanish fortress at
Tan-shui.
In 1673 Koxinga sent his men to a garrison at Keelung (Chi-
lung). Ten years later they erected at the site of the Spaniards’
Fort San Salvador a new fort known as Chi-lung Ch’eng. This
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Figure 7–1. Fort Zeelandia.
was the first known wall built by Chinese on the island, but it
did not survive long.10 No true Chinese walled town appeared
on Taiwan until the beginning of the eighteenth century.
During the Dutch occupation of southwestern Taiwan and
the Cheng family interlude which followed, Chinese migration
from the coastal areas of Kwangtung and Fukien increased
greatly, so that the population was at least 120,000 by 1680.
After a little more than twenty years of Cheng family domi-
nation, Ch’ing military forces brought the island within political
China in 1683. In the following year the island was made a
prefecture of Fukien province, consisting of three hsien: T’ai-
wan, Feng-shan, and Chu-lo. As a signature of imperial authority
and following practices on the mainland, walls should have
encircled the local administrative centers of these hsien. Two
decades passed before the first of these centers was encircled,
and then only by a wooden palisade.11 It was Chu-lo rather than
T’ai-wan-fu (now Tainan) which was encircled first, probably be-
cause T’ai-wan-fu was more secure than Chu-lo and was sit-
uated in an area well occupied by Chinese whereas Chu-lo was
not. Later palisades of wood or thorny bamboo were used to
ring other centers. Eighteen years later, in 1722, an earthen
wall with an encircling moat was constructed for the capital of
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Feng-shan hsien. With the wall were governmental buildings,
barracks, and temples with stores lining the streets.12 The local
gazetteer of Feng-shan hsien, completed in 1764, has the fol-
lowing passage describing the construction of the wall (Figure
7-2):
The wall of the county seat at Hsing-lung-chuang was built in
1722 under the direction of its Magistrate, Liu Kuang-sze. The
wall, one and three-tenths chang [about 4.7 meters] high, has
a circumference of eight hundred and ten chang [about 2,900
meters]. It is situated between Kwei-shan [a hill] at the left and
She-shan [also a hill] at the right. A moat encircling the wall was
dug. The moat is one chang [about 3.6 meters] in width and eight-
tenths chang [about 2.9 meters] deep.13
Whether built by Chinese or by Europeans, these seven-
teenth and eighteenth-century walled centers were for the most
part fortresses or protective enclosures. At a larger scale than
the palisaded peasant villages, they provided security from ma-
rauding aborigines and local banditry. Their bureaucratic
function was limited. In this regard they differed significantly
from eighteenth and nineteenth-century walled towns whose
genesis owed more to administration and marketing than to de-
fense.14
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
During the early decades after 1683, the Ch’ing court displayed
an indifferent attitude toward Taiwan and even considered
abandoning the island. As an appendage of Fukien, Taiwan re-
ceived only periodic visitations by mainland officials. For fear
of reemergent alliances of anti-Ch’ing elements, migration from
southeastern China to Taiwan was officially interdicted.
Nonetheless, the Chinese population on the island increased
dramatically through the clandestine movement of peasants
across the straits. Many of these peasant pioneers then traveled
from the southwestern settled core to virgin areas in the cen-
tral and northern sections of the coastal plain. The rapidity
with which this settlement occurred is suggested by comparing
the observations of Yu Yung-ho, who traveled south to north in
1697 and noted extensive vacant areas, and Huang Shu-ching,
who journeyed in the same area in 1722 and commented on
the extent of the fields under cultivation by Chinese peasants.15
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Figure 7–2. The walled city of Feng-shan ca. 1764. [From Feng-shan
hsien-chih.]
Frontier conditions promoted conflict and in early 1721 an up-
rising led by Chu I-kuei focused imperial interest in the island.
Administrative reorganization in 1723, the first year of the reign
of the Yung-cheng emperor, brought about a new district called
Chang-hua and a marine district called Tan-shui; both were
formed by dividing the Chu-lo district into three parts. With
the addition of Ko-ma-lan (present-day I-lan), this new structure
lasted until 1875. Meanwhile immigration continued apace, es-
pecially with the lifting of official restrictions in 1760. A second
uprising in 1788 led the Ch’ien-lung emperor to call for an
examination of the need to build or strengthen walls around
existing towns.16 Chinese records indicate that the immigrant
population had swelled to 2 million by 1811, distributed as
shown in Table 7-1.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries three
characteristic periods of wall-building activity can be recog-
nized. Each lasted, on average, forty-five years. The first period
Chapter 7
119
TABLE 7–1
The Chinese Population on Taiwan: 1811
Hsien and T’ing Population Percentage
Chia-i hsien 816,659 40.8
Chang-hua hsien 342,166 17.1
T’ai-wan hsien 341,624 17.1
Tan-shui t’ing 214,833 10.7
Feng-shan hsien 184,551 9.2
P’eng-hu t’ing 59,128 3.0
Ko-ma-lan t’ing 42,900 2.1
TOTAL 2,001,861a 100.0
a The original source indicates that the total population is
2,003,861, which does not correspond with the sum (2,001,861)
of the seven hsien and t’ing figures.
SOURCE: Lien Heng, T’ai-wan t’ung-shih [A history of Taiwan]
(Taipei: Chung-hua ts’ung-shu wei-yuan-hui, 1958), pp.
123-124.
started at the beginning and ended in the middle of the eigh-
teenth century and saw the construction of walls around several
major administrative centers: Feng-shan (Figure 7-2),17 Chu-lo
(Figure 7-3),18 T’ai-wan (Figures 7-4 to 7-6),19 Chang-hua,20 and
Tan-shui. T’ai-wan-fu was the capital of T’ai-wan prefecture; the
rest were hsien capitals. A secondary wall was erected for the
Taiwan garrison within the wall of T’ai-wan.21 In addition, an
earthen wall was built at Pa-li-fen.22 All, except Pali-fen, were
located in southern Taiwan. Official arguments went against the
construction of heavy walls for fear such enclosures might fall
into the hands of rebels and become redoubts against imperial
control. For the most part, they served as protective enclosures
and as tacit statements of Ch’ing presence.
Wall-building activities came to a halt at mid-century and
then were revived as a result of the Lin Shuang-wen uprising
in 1788. At Chu-lo (renamed Chia-i) and at T’ai-wan-fu, stone
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Figure 7–3. Chia-i (formerly Chu-lo) in 1901.
and brick were authorized to strengthen the existing walls.
The second period beginning in the early and ending in the
middle nineteenth century marks the most active wall-building
years in the history of Taiwan. Four major walls and twelve
minor ones were constructed. The four major walled towns were
Ko-ma-lan (I-lan),23 Chu-ch’ien (Hsin-chu) (Figure 7-7),24 T’ao-
yuan,25 and Feng-shan.26 The twelve secondary walled towns
were Yen-shui,27 Ta-chia,28 Wu-ch’uan-ch’eng,29 Hou-lung,30 A-
hou,31 Chung-li,32 Fang-li,33 Chung-kang,34 Fang-ch’iao,35 Ta-
k’o-k’an,36 T’u-ch’eng,37 and Ch’e-ch’eng.38 The majority of
these sites are located in northern Taiwan. During this peri-
od some of the walls passed through a metamorphosis that re-
sulted in increasingly more substantial enclosures. Chu-ch’ien
(Hsin-chu) was ringed by thorny bamboo until 1813 when this
was replaced by an earthen wall; in 1827 stone was used to
face the wall.39 Major reconstruction occurred at Chang-hua
and Feng-shan. At Chang-hua from 1811 to 1815, local capital
enabled the construction of brick and stone walls, moats, gates,
and ancillary buildings.40 Self-protection from the fighting be-
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Figure 7–4. Palisaded T’ai-wan-fu ca. 1752. [From Ch’ung-hsiu T’ai-
wan hsien-chih.]
tween rival communities in northern Taiwan was an important
reason for some of these wall-building activities. Walls were also
built for protection against aborigines and local bandits.
The third period, which began in 1862 and ended in 1908,
resulted in the building of seven town walls. These walled towns
were all administrative centers, either hsien or t’ing seats. They
were located in all regions except eastern Taiwan and include
Heng-ch’un (Figure 7-8),41 P’u-li (Figure 7-9),42 Taipei (Figure
7-10),43 Ma-kung (Figure 7-11),44 Taichung (Figure 7-12),45
Chu-shan,46 and Tou-liu.47 Their completion symbolized the con-
clusion of Chinese colonization on the fertile lowlands of
Taiwan.
The development of Chinese settlements on Taiwan started
in the Pescadores and spread to the island of Taiwan itself.
On Taiwan, the southwestern part was opened up first and
settlement then expanded gradually toward the north along
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Figure 7–5. T’ai-wan-fu ca. 1807. [From Hsu-hsiu T’ai-wan hsien-chih.]
the coastal plain; eastern Taiwan was settled last. The walled
towns appeared accordingly. Older walled towns were found in
southern Taiwan, newer ones in the north.
Chinese walled towns may be viewed as symbols of Chinese
penetration and successful habitation of a frontier area. In most
cases such construction was preceded by peasant land recla-
mation and the development of incipient markets. The sequence
of these walled sites established on the lowlands of Taiwan indi-
cates the temporal process of agricultural colonization there by
Chinese who migrated from Fukien and Kwangtung. The three
distinctive periods of wall building reveal different geographical
patterns and significantly varied motivations. Twelve adminis-
trative centers as well as more than a score of other towns were
walled in one form or another on Taiwan during the frontier
period.
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Figure 7–6. Tainan (formerly T’ai-wan-fu) at the turn of
the twentieth century.
SITE AND DISTRIBUTION
The western fortresses built before the Ch’ing occupation of
Taiwan were all on the coastline. Such locations served entrepôt
functions and provided defense against attack from the sea.
Moreover, they permitted exchange with the aborigines and the
early Chinese pioneers on the coastal lowlands.48 On the other
hand, few Chinese walled towns erected during the Ch’ing dy-
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Figure 7–7. Chu-ch’ien ca. 1871. [From Tan-shui t’ing-chih.]
nasty were situated on the coast, mainly because Chinese settle-
ments had already penetrated deeply into the coastal lowlands
where reclamation and settlement were directed away from the
sea.
Chinese walled towns, unlike many medieval European, an-
cient Near Eastern, and Japanese daimyo towns, were almost
exclusively lowland-oriented. The overwhelming majority of the
Chinese population had been concentrated in lowland areas
while upland, marginal areas remained largely unsettled, espe-
cially when compared with Europe. Arising in agricultural low-
lands, Chinese walled towns served the economic, political, and
social needs of the rural population in their tributary areas.
To function as administrative center, local market, and social
focus, a walled town was often located at the heart of the area it
served. Taipei, for example, is at the center of the Taipei basin,
as is I-lan (Ko-ma-lan) in the I-lan plain, T’ao-yuan in the T’ao-
yuan tableland, Taichung in the Taichung basin, and Chang-hua
in the Chang-hua plain. All the walled towns were located below
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Figure 7–8. Heng-ch’un in 1951.
500 meters elevation. Most were below 250 meters, as only low-
lands had enough arable land to sustain a population that could
support a walled town (Figure 7-13).
Sen-dou Chang has observed that “water was the most im-
portant factor influencing the site selection of walled cities,
since it figured in transportation, defense, water supply, and (in-
directly, through irrigation) food supply. As can be seen from de-
tailed maps of every region in China, the most favored place for
a walled city was on a river-bank.”49 Taiwan’s walled towns and
cities were an exception to this mainland rule. Not only were
most rivers on the island short and swift with an irregular sea-
sonal flow and thus not navigable, but many of the riverbanks
were subject to dangerous floods during the typhoon season.
Hence place names on Taiwan rarely denote a riverine site as
is the frequent case on the mainland. As Chiao-min Hsieh indi-
cates in an earlier chapter, it is only ports at the mouths of short
streams that incorporate a river location in their names.
Walled towns tended to be somewhat evenly distributed
on the western coastal lowlands. This is particularly so for
the fifteen major walled towns; five of them are in southern
Taiwan, five in central Taiwan, and four in northern Taiwan.50
The Pescadores have one and eastern Taiwan none (Table 7-2).
On the average, major walled towns were roughly 40 kilometers
away from one another. In a nearest-neighbor analysis of the lo-
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Figure 7–9. P’u-li in 1914.
cation of the major walled towns on the lowlands of northern,
central, and southern Taiwan, R = 1.86 is obtained. In other
words, their distribution tends to be regular.51
SIZE AND SHAPE
Town walls built before the Ch’ing dynasty were very small.
None had a circumference of more than half a kilometer, and
even the palisades were considered not worthy of the term
ch’eng (“wall”) by some writers. Commenting on towns in early
eighteenth-century Taiwan, a prominent Chinese mandarin
wrote:
There are no walls and moats for towns in Taiwan. Therefore, they
cannot be defended in emergencies and insurgencies. It is ex-
pensive and complicated to build a city wall made of compressed
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Figure 7–10. Taipei in the early twentieth century.
Figure 7–11 Ma-kung in 1930.
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Figure 7–12. The Liu Ming-ch’uan plan for Ta-tun Chieh
(Taichung), planned capital of Taiwan province, 1888. [From
Clifton W. Pannell, T’ai- chung, T’ai-wan: Structure and
Function.]
earth faced by bricks and cut stones. Funds cannot be appro-
priated from local land tax. One way to solve this problem is to
plant bamboos forming a palisade.52
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TABLE 7–2.
Distribution of Walled Towns
Region Number of Major
Walled Townsa
Number of Secondary
Walled Towns
Total
Pescadores 1 — 1
Southern
Taiwan
5 4 9
Central
Taiwan
5 1 6
Northern
Taiwan
4 8 12
Eastern
Taiwan
— 1 1
TOTAL 15 14 29
a A major walled town is one whose wall is 600 chang
(equivalent to about 2,150 meters) or longer in circumference.
Due to the difficult financial situation on the frontier, town
walls built in the Ch’ing dynasty were also small.53 The original
palisades encircling a number of towns were usually larger
than the subsequent earthen walls with or without brick or
stony facing. The earthen wall of Chu-ch’ien (Hsin-chu), for ex-
ample, had a circumference of 4,130 meters, but its subsequent
earthen wall with stony facing was only 2,600 meters long.54
The latter was less than two-thirds of the former. Both Miao-li
and Hou-lung were located in the Miao-li hills and only 7 kilo-
meters apart. The bamboo palisade of the former had a circum-
ference of 4,621 meters; the earthen wall at the latter was only
1,155 meters around.55 The circumference of the earthen wall
was only one-fourth that of the bamboo palisade. The average
circumference of the eleven major walled towns was 3.55 kilo-
meters. Indeed, they were very small (Table 7-3).
Prefectural capitals were larger than hsien capitals. The two
largest walled towns, T’ai-wan-fu and Taipei, were both prefec-
tural capitals. The former had a walled area of 3.1 square kilo-
meters, the latter 1.4 square kilometers. The walled areas of
hsien capitals ranged from 0.22 to 0.80 square kilometers. The
varying sizes of the walled areas of prefectural and hsien cap-
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Figure 7–13. Walled cities of Taiwan.
itals reflect their economic, administrative, and military impor-
tance at the time the walls were built. Taiwan’s walled towns
were smaller than those on the mainland. The average size of
the walled area for nine hsien capitals in Taiwan was less than
half a square kilometer; the average size for 157 selected hsien
capitals on the mainland was more than a square kilometer,56 In
general, the size of walled towns in Taiwan was comparable to
that of walled towns in peripheral areas of China Proper.
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TABLE 7–3
Size of Major Walled Towns
Town Status Circumference
of
Wall (Meters)a
Walled Area
(Square
Kilometers)b
T’ai-wan-fu Prefectural
capital
9,674 3.1048
Taipei Prefectural
capital
5,800 1.3935
Feng-shanc hsien capital 4,155 0.7984
Heng-ch’un hsien capital 3,755 0.5099
Chang-hua hsien capital 3,551 0.5368
Feng-shand hsien capital 3,327 0.4911
Hsin-chu hsien capital 4,130 0.5523
Chia-i hsien capital 3,062 0.4026
Ma-kung hsien capital 3,038 0.2592
Taichung hsien capital 2,503 0.2177
Ko-ma-lan hsien capital 2,465 0.3768
a All figures were originally in chang. One chang normally
equals 3.581 meters, although its length may vary slightly from
place to place.
b The size of walled areas was measured by the author from
maps. Both the dot grid and the polar planimetric methods were
used. When different results were obtained, this column gives
the average.
c At P’i-t’ou.
d At Hsing-lung-chuang.
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To a historical geographer the shape of walls constitutes a
fascinating topic of analysis. Scholars of sinology often write
that the shape of the Chinese city was a perfect square or rec-
tangle.57 In fact, except for prominent imperial capitals, there
was great deviation from such a norm. Misunderstanding has
come about because of emphasis on the study of imperial cap-
itals such as Peking, Loyang, and Sian which indeed have
square or rectangular walls. Although it is not clear exactly how
many walled towns or cities have been built in China, and very
little research has been done on this aspect, it is estimated that
it might have been more than ten thousand. A sample of 196
walled cities on the mainland shows that only 22 (11 percent
of the total) were square in shape, 18 (9 percent) were rectan-
gular, and 157 (80 percent) had various other shapes.58
Only several of Taiwan’s seventeen town walls are close to
a rectangle in shape (Figure 7-14). The reasons for this are not
clear. Topographical irregularities did not normally necessitate
an irregular shape, since most walled towns were built in flat
lowland settings. Perhaps the irregular shapes reflect the rela-
tively late date of urban development and great temporal dis-
tance from the square prototypes. Chang has suggested that
“since circular walls require fewer construction materials per
unit of enclosed area than rectangular walls, it may have been
considerations of economy that encouraged departure from the
cosmological ideal.”59
FUNCTION
Two types of walled town, each having a different function, can
be identified. The first type includes those that were neither
hsien nor prefectural capitals but central markets for sur-
rounding rural areas. Their commercial function is easily iden-
tified by their name suffixed by the generic term chieh, which
means street or market in Chinese. Walled towns of the second
type were administrative headquarters, central markets, and
cultural centers. All were fu, hsien, or t’ing capitals. As a rule,
if a settlement was chosen to be the capital ofa fu, hsien, chou,
or t’ing, a wall would eventually be built. In the late nineteenth
century, Taiwan province had three fu, one chou, eleven hsien,
and six t’ing.60 Fifteen of the twenty-one capitals of these civil
administrative divisions were walled towns (Table 7-4).
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Figure 7–14. Shapes of selected walled cities in Taiwan.
During the Ch’ing dynasty, every central market town was
a walled town.61 Situated at the central place from where it
was easy to reach all corners of its umland, the walled town
attracted trade from the umland. On Taiwan during the early
eighteenth century, for instance, there were four major walled
towns: Chang-hua, Chia-i, T’aiwan, and Feng-shan. They were
about 40 to 70 kilometers apart.62 In other words, the radius
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of each umland was 20 to 35 kilometers. This, then, was the
longest distance the most disadvantaged peasant had to travel
and return to his village by foot.
According to local gazetteers, a major walled town, in fact,
had more streets than any settlement around it. This suggests
that a major walled town had more volume of trade than minor
market centers. Zones of different functions were well de-
veloped. In Tainan in the early nineteenth century, for example,
one would have found a noodle street, a cooking oil store street,
a blacksmith street, a silversmith street, a shoe street, and a
cap street.63 Obviously, these streets responded to the needs of
the surrounding rural areas. A major walled town not only sold
staples but also supplied various services such as treatment by
traditional Chinese herbalists.
A major walled town was also the cultural center of the area
it served. The gentry of a hsien usually lived in its capital town
even before its wall was erected. Perhaps the best index to show
that major walled towns were cultural centers is the distribution
of Confucian temples and traditional academies in Taiwan. Of
the eleven Confucian temples, all were within or just outside
the major walled towns (Table 7-5).64 Before the Japanese in-
troduced a modern educational system, students on the island,
like those on the mainland, usually studied Chinese classics at
home under a tutor. This tutoring system was found in towns as
well as in rural areas. Traditional academics, in which groups
of students studied Chinese classics under learned scholars, on
the other hand, were found mainly in the major walled towns.
Eighteen of the twenty-three academies (Table 7-5) were found
in the major walled towns on the island during the Ch’ing dy-
nasty.65
IMPACT ON THE TOWNSCAPE
Almost all former walled towns have developed as contem-
porary towns or cities. Today half of Taiwan’s towns and cities
with over 100,000 population were former walled towns. Among
the fourteen largest cities with over 150,000 population, only
three (Kaohsiung, Chilung, and San-chung) were not former
walled towns. This continuity reflects the fact that the original
walled towns often were located at strategic points and nor-
mally occupied major nodes in the emerging transportation
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TABLE 7–4
Administrative Divisions and Walled Towns
Administrative
Division
Year
Established
Seat Year Town
Wall Built
T’ai-pei Fu T’ai-pei 1879
Tan-shui hsien 1875 Meng-chia not built
Hsin-chu hsien 1875 Chu-ch’ien 1825
I-lan hsien 1810 Wu-wei 1810
Chi-lung t’ing 1875 Chi-lung not built
Nan-ya t’ing 1894 Nan-tzu ca. 1855
T’ai-wan Fu T’ai-chung (see T’ai-wan hsien)
T’ai-wan hsien 1886 T’ai-chung 1888
Chang-hua hsien 1723 Pan-hsien 1728
Yun-lin hsien 1886 Tou-liu-mena 1893
Miao-li hsien 1886 Miao-li not builtb
P’u-li-she t’ing 1875 P’u-li 1878
T’ai-nan Fu T’ai-nan 1723
An-p’ing hsien 1886 An-p’ing not built
Feng-shan hsien 1684 Feng-shanc 1854
Chia-i hsien 1684 Chia-i 1704
Heng-ch’un hsien 1875 Lang-ch’iao 1875
P’eng-hu t’ing 1727 Ma-kung 1887
T’ai-tung Chou
P’i-nan t’ing 1886 P’i-nan not built
Hua-lien-kang t’ing 1886 Hua-lien-kang not built
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a It was originally at Lin-i-pu and later moved to Tou-liu-men in
1893.
b Only a palisade was erected in 1890.
c Originally, it was at Hsing-lung-chuang, whose wall was built
in 1722.
SOURCE: Chiang Tao-chang, “T’ai-wan te ku-ch’eng” [Walled
towns of Taiwan], Ti-li-hseuh yen-chiu [Geographical studies]
1(1966):72.
TABLE 7–5
Distribution of Traditional Academies and Confucius Temples
Major
Walled Towns
Number of
Traditional Academies
Number of
Confucius Temples
Ko-ma-lan 1 1
Taipei 3 1
T’ao-yuan 0 0
Hsin-chu 1 1
Taichung 1 1
Chang-hua 1 1
Tou-liu 1 0
Chia-i 1 1
Tainan 7 2
Feng-shan 1 1
Heng-ch’un 0 1
Ma-kung 1 1
TOTAL 18 11
SOURCE: Lien Heng, T’ai-wan t’ung-shih [A history of Taiwan]
(Taipei: 1958). pp. 196–209‚ 218–221.
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Figure 7–15. Heng-ch’un.
network. Chapter 9 of this book analyzes the changing accessi-
bility and connectivity of urban centers as the road and rail net-
works expanded.
If a place had a wall, it would grow faster than neighboring
settlements which had no protection. When the walled space
was filled with buildings, though, the wall itself often limited
further growth. In the subsequent development of a town, the
wall affected the shape of its built-up area and the pattern
of gates determined the direction of main streets, secondary
streets, and lanes. Thus the wall and its gates determined the
town’s street pattern; and when a town expanded beyond its
wall, the new street pattern started at the gates.66 This evo-
lution still can be observed at Heng-ch’un, whose town wall is
the best preserved on the island (Figure 7-15).67
Most of the major town walls in Taiwan were torn down
during the Japanese occupation. The former sites of these walls
in I-lan and Taipei provide broad encircling boulevards quite
unlike the maze of internal streets. In most cases, the gates
which were preserved became traffic circles and form islands
of safety in the streets. Such gates stand in several of Taiwan’s
cities, among them Taipei, Hsin-chu, and Tso-ying, where they
are impressive landmarks of times gone by.
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Although the first Chinese landed in Taiwan in very early
times, then, it was not until the eighteenth century, after
Chinese agricultural colonization had become well established,
that serious wall building was undertaken in towns and cities.
This activity then continued well into the late nineteenth
century. Walled towns formed foci which spread Chinese culture
throughout the island and symbolized the passage of the
Chinese frontier.
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8
Lu-kang: A City and Its
Trading System
DONALD R. DEGLOPPER
The city of Lu-kang, halfway down the west coast of Taiwan in
Chang-hua hsien (county), is today an out-of-the-way small city
of about 28,000 people.1 Yet for more than a hundred years,
from the mid-eighteenth century to the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, Lu-kang was Taiwan’s second largest city, the
home of wealthy merchants and degree holders. Both its rise
and its precipitous decline in the first decade of the twentieth
century were consequences of its location and its function as
the node of a large-scale trading system that linked central
Taiwan with southern Fukien. Any attempt to understand Lu-
kang’s history requires examination of factors common to all of
Taiwan and Taiwan’s relations with the Chinese mainland. In
the last analysis Lu-kang’s prosperity and indeed its very exis-
tence depended on a trading system that exchanged the rice,
sugar, and fiber (hemp, ramie) of central Taiwan for the cloth,
crockery, and other manufactured goods of southern Fukien.
THE MAKING OF A PORT
From the earliest substantial Chinese settlement of the island
under the Dutch East India Company until the end of the nine-
teenth century, Taiwan may be considered an agricultural
colony of Fukien. Fukien was importing rice by the end of the
eleventh century; by the seventeenth, it was a province with a
chronic rice deficit.2 Its people increasingly turned to the pro-
duction of such high-value commercial crops as sugar, oranges,
and tea, to the manufacture of textiles and ships, and to foreign
trade and sojourning outside the province.3 The attraction of
Taiwan, so close offshore, is obvious, and the surprising thing
is that the island was not colonized and settled earlier than it
was. From its beginning under the Dutch, Chinese agriculture
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on the island was commercial and export oriented. Land on
Taiwan was commonly opened up by development companies
who brought in tenant farmers, and the capital for land devel-
opment and the construction of irrigation systems often came
from the merchants of southern Fukien. By the mid-eighteenth
century the imperial garrisons in Fukien were fed largely on Tai-
wanese rice, and each county on the island had an annual quota
of rice that went to the mainland both to feed the army and to
stock the official granaries.
There were, however, many obstacles to the trade, and the
regional trading system linking central Taiwan with southern
Fukien depended on a number of factors, the most important
of which were the efficiency and relative cost of land transport
in Taiwan and water transport across the Taiwan Straits. When
these changed around the turn of the twentieth century, the
system collapsed, and with it went the foundation of Lu-kang’s
economy.
Although with a fair wind junks could cross the Taiwan
Straits in a day or a day and a half, navigation in the straits
was difficult and hazardous.4 The straits are shallow; they are
subject to gales in winter and typhoons in summer; and strong
currents run through them. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries they were haunted by pirates and the shoal coasts
were lined with wrecks.5 An edition of the T’ai-wan hsien-chih
from the Tao-kuang period (1821–1850) reports that if lookouts
on ships sailing from Amoy did not sight the Pescadores Islands
at the expected time, the junk would turn about and return
to Amoy, fearful that it might be off course and in danger of
missing Taiwan entirely.6 An article in the Chinese Repository of
1834 noted of the junk trade in the Taiwan Straits that:
The currents in the channel are very strong, so that unless the
wind be fair, Chinese vessels cannot bear up to regain their
course; and in passing from Fukheen to Formosa they have often
been driven so far to the south that they could not reach their des-
tination, when not infrequently they bring up at Cochin China or
Siam, there to wait a change of the monsoon.7
The 1937 edition of the China Sea Pilot advises ships sailing off
the southwest coast of Taiwan to “exercise the utmost caution
when navigating this channel.” (The channel between the shoals
off the Pescadores and the shoals off the coast of Taiwan is only
9 miles wide.) It goes on to warn ships to avoid the mouth of
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the Cho-shui River, Taiwan’s largest. “Although the entrance to
this river is about one mile broad, it is impossible for even small
boats at high tide to pass over the flats off its mouth.”8
There are no natural harbors along Taiwan’s west coast be-
tween Tamsui (Tan-shui) in the extreme north and Kaohsiung
in the south. The coast is low, flat, and bounded by tidal flats,
sandbars, and ephemeral islands that extend several kilometers
out to sea. The coastline moves out each year as rains wash
silt down from the central mountains, and at the mouth of the
Cho-shui in central Taiwan the coast moves out several meters
a year.9 The mouths of most rivers are blocked by sandbars, and
the configuration of offshore mud flats, sandbars, and islands
changes from year to year. Shipwrecks have been frequent, and
Davidson’s The Island of Formosa (1903) provides a long list of
foreign vessels that met their end along this shore.
A western traveler in nineteenth-century China watching
cargo being transshipped and hauled up the rapids of mountain
streams remarked that Chinese commonly shipped goods on
waters that no European would consider navigable, and one
might add shipping along Taiwan’s west coast as another ex-
ample. Cargo was carried across the straits on small ships of
very shallow draft, whose fitness for their task was aided by the
flat bottom and retractable rudder common to all Chinese junks.
The British merchant and consular official W. A. Pickering, who
spent much of the 1860s sailing along the west coast of Taiwan
in small craft, mentions tracking and poling small ships along a
channel between the sandbanks, and the procedure appears to
have been a routine response to adverse winds.10 Davidson re-
ports that during the French blockade of Taiwan in 1885 junks
crossed the straits at night and then sailed along the channels
between the offshore sandbanks and islands where the French
gunboats could not follow.11 In both the anchorages and the
channels approaching them junks frequently grounded at low
tide, and extensive use was made of bamboo rafts for trans-
porting both people and cargo along the coast.12
Inland transport was even more difficult. As in the rest
of South China, roads and wheeled transport were poorly de-
veloped; the most common means of transport was the human
carrier, with ox carts serving in some areas. Taiwan differed
from South China in that its rivers were nearly all unnavigable.
The rivers that meander across the southwestern coastal plain
are shallow and swift with wide stony beds, and their volume of
water fluctuates wildly with rainfall. Before they were confined
by massive dikes, they frequently flooded whole sections of the
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plain and changed their courses, making new beds and flowing
into the sea miles away from their old mouth. Furthermore, the
many rivers that cross the plain made movement of goods to the
north or south arduous indeed. Banditry and endemic subethnic
strife made the roads dangerous as well as hard to travel.
In the late nineteenth century one road, maintained for
administrative purposes and known to Europeans as the Man-
darin Track, ran from the port of Tamsui in the north to Tainan,
the island’s capital. Colquhoun and Stewart-Lockhardt de-
scribed it in their “Sketch of Formosa” (1885):
A track, made for military and administrative purposes, runs from
north to south on the western side of the island. The distance from
Tamsui to Tainan, some 200 miles, takes in ordinarily fair weather
ten days on foot, while in bad weather it is impassable. The “road”
passes along paths a foot or less broad, through paddy fields,
following here and there a local cart track, and then leaving it
again. These cart tracks become during the rainy seasons water
channels draining the surrounding country. To cross them the foot
passenger has often to wade up to the waist…. The least time
in which an official answer can be received in Tamsui from the
capital in the south is fourteen days, while it often takes several
weeks.13
Takekoshi, a native of a country never famous for the quality
of its roads, complains that when the Japanese occupied Taiwan
in 1895:
It was impossible to find anything like a state or government road
from town to town…. Even the country roads which ran from
village to village were not like those of Japan, but were rather
boundary lines around the farms, being in most cases little more
than a foot wide…. Our army experienced so much difficulty from
the absence of roads that they were compelled to widen them
wherever they passed.14
Under these circumstances, the best thing to do with goods
was to get them to the coast as directly as possible, whence
they could be moved by bamboo raft or small boat to some spot
where it was possible for a junk to approach at high tide. Al-
though virtually all of Taiwan’s major walled towns were lo-
cated on inland sites, the coast itself was lined with port and
market towns sited wherever a tidal lagoon or small river mouth
afforded relatively safe anchorage for some part of the year.
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Each port and market town had its own marketing territory
stretching back to the hills and overlapping to only a limited
degree with that of other towns. Rather than the overlapping,
nested hexagons that G. W. Skinner employs as a model of the
marketing structure and city trading systems of much of the
Chinese mainland, one might describe the west coast of Taiwan
before 1900 with a segmentary model.15 To some extent it re-
sembles the pattern Skinner describes for the upper reaches
of rivers, as in western Szechuan, where the cities were not
located in the geographic center of their trading system but
were offset or even sited at the edge.16 In economic and social
terms, though not in an administrative sense, the Taiwan of that
period might be thought of not as a single island but as an archi-
pelago—an aggregation of similar regions, each of which had
more contact with Amoy (Hsia-men) and Ch’uan-chou across
the straits than with the other Taiwanese segments. The ear-
liest settlers and officials commented not on how small the
island was, but on how vast it was, and they consistently over-
estimated its size. Settlers in one region looked back to the
mainland and their native places rather than to other parts of
Taiwan. In fact, the general use of the term “island” for the
place and “islander” or ‘Taiwanese” for the inhabitants dates
only from the Japanese period.17 One can question whether
Taiwan had a central place in any but the administrative sense
before the Japanese built a road network and the railroad. (The
railroad running from Chi-lung to Kaohsiung was completed in
1908.)
A SURGE OF GROWTH
Such was the context in which Lu-kang grew and prospered. As
seaports go, it was never very good. Lu-kang was used for two
centuries only because there was no better way to move goods
out of and into the Chang-hua plain. Built on the northern bank
of one of the many small streams that cross the plain, Lu-kang
provided a sheltered anchorage. The Chang-hua plain, bounded
by the Ta-tu River on the north and the Cho-shui River on the
south, has some of the best soil on the island, a more reliable
water supply than the plain farther south, and a longer growing
season than northern Taiwan. Today it produces two rice crops
a year, with an additional winter crop of wheat, flax, or veg-
etables. Since its settlement in the early eighteenth century it
has been one of Taiwan’s major rice-producing areas.
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Lu-kang lies in a narrow littoral strip that receives less rain
than anywhere else on the island. The soil around the city is for
the most part fertile enough, but low rainfall and high winds
make agriculture and especially rice cultivation a difficult task.
Rice cultivation along the entire coastal plain must rely on irri-
gation for dependable yields, but the problems are most acute
along the dry and windblown coast. Rice can be grown with
least effort further inland, along the edge of the hills, where
rainfall is higher and the wind, which damages standing crops
and increases evaporation, is less strong. Even today the area
along the coast, and especially that to the south of Lu-kang, re-
mains one of relatively sparse population and low living stan-
dards: sweet potatoes are the staple and people eat rice only
on special occasions. Lu-kang’s immediate hinterland is thus a
poor, thinly settled, and relatively unproductive region (Figure
8-1).
At the beginning of the eighteenth century Lu-kang was a
minor river mouth port on the northern fringes of Chinese set-
tlement. The Chu-lo hsien-chih, compiled in 1717, records that
a coast guard post was established at Lu-kang in 1685, soon
after the Ch’ing authorities occupied the island. The troops
were coast guards and their duties were to deny pirate ships the
use of the harbor and watch for corsairs and commercial ships
making unauthorized and untaxed voyages across the straits.18
The Chu-lo hsien-chih fails to include Lu-kang in its list of towns
and villages, but the gazetteer does note that: “At Lu-kang Port
there is a large fishing platform which can contain sixty or
seventy men. In the winter they net fish. Merchant ships come
and carry off fiber [ma], grain, and beans.”19 The port of Pen-
kang (the present Pei-kang),60 kilometers south and close to the
hsien capital (the present city of Chia-i) is described as a flour-
ishing commercial center.
The subsequent growth of Lu-kang and its trade until it far
surpassed Pen-kang took place in the fifty-year period between
1730 and 1780. The fundamental reason for that growth was
the settlement of the Chang-hua plain and the production of
an exportable surplus of rice and sugar. This process began in
the early 1700s and was greatly aided by the construction of
the massive Pa-pao irrigation system, which was completed in
1719. This system, which took water from the Cho-shui and irri-
gated eight of the thirteen pao (sub-hsien administrative units)
of Chang-hua hsien, was built as a private venture by a Ch’uan-
chou merchant.20 In 1723 Chang-hua hsien was formally estab-
lished, taking in the northern portion of the existing hsien of
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Figure 8–1 Lu-kang and its hinterland.
Chu-lo—an administrative response to the growing population
and prosperity of the area. The hsien seat was placed 12 kilo-
meters inland from Lu-kang at the site of a military post on the
road to the north.
When the Chu-lo hsien-chih was compiled in 1717, Lu-kang’s
harbor was narrow and choked with silt and the main coast
guard station had been moved 20 kilometers south to San-lin-
kang. During the Yung-cheng period (1723–1736), large ships
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could enter the channel leading to Lu-kang only at high tide,
and even then they could not reach the city. The outer channel
through the sandbanks was 40 li in length (assuming 1 li to
equal about one-third of a mile, then 13 miles or 22 kilometers),
and if one did not know the channel’s course, one did not dare
enter.21 By about 1740, however, all the other ports of central
Taiwan were so badly blocked by silt as to be useless whereas
Lu-kang harbor had become broad and deep. Consequently, it
became the major port for all of central Taiwan and maintained
this position for over a century in spite of later silting and
blockage.
In 1729 the hsien government established an official granary
at Lu-kang to store the tax grain that was to be sent to Fukien.
In 1731 the authorities of Fukien province declared Lu-kang
to be a port legally open for trade along the coast of Taiwan
and posted a minor official to supervise that trade.22 In 1742
the T’ai-wan fu-chih recorded that “Lu-kang has docks and is a
grain exporting center” The 1763 edition noted laconically that
“small ships of the island trade at Lu-kang” In 1774, when the
city’s trade and population had grown considerably, Chu Ching-
ying’s Record of the Eastern Sea said: “Lu-kang is a port where
many small ships come and go to trade. It has several thousand
households; sails and masts crowd together; brokers and whole-
salers are settled there.”23
The entrance to the channel that led through the offshore
sandbanks to Lu-kang was 15 or 20 kilometers south of the city,
near the settlements of Fan-wa or Wang-kung. The course of
the channel changed from year to year, as did its depth. From
the early nineteenth century on, Lu-kang struggled with the silt
that blocked the channel and the harbor. The Chang-hua hsien-
chih, compiled in 1832, says that Lu-kang harbor was blocked
with sand but the obstruction was not constant. “Sometimes it is
deep, sometimes it is shallow. When it is deep, large ships enter;
when it is shallow, only small ships dare enter”24 The channel
could only be entered if ships had a favorable wind; from late
October through March, when gales howl down the straits from
the north, the port was closed. During the 1860s the Cho-shui
repeatedly flooded and changed its course and, before long, one
of the main channels flowed into the sea only 7 kilometers south
of Lu-kang. A small delta appeared in what had been called Lu-
kang Bay, and silt choked all the channels leading to the ci-
ty from the south. A new anchorage was developed in a creek
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mouth 6 kilometers north of Lu-kang, but it was shallow in the
extreme and could only be reached at high tide. The China Sea
Directory of 1884 describes the approach to Lu-kang:
From Quang-wa [Fan-wa] to Lo-kiang [Lu-kang], a distance of ten
miles, the coast continues low. This uninteresting seaboard be-
comes even more dreary at low water, when the mud and sand
flats uncover for miles‚ outside of which again is shallow water
with three, four, and five fathoms. Ships should not approach this
coast in less than ten fathoms, for the currents are very strong….
To the westward of the town of Lo-kiang and distant a little less
than four miles is a small outlet marked by two bamboo beacons;
in this creek a great number of junks find anchorage and shelter,
but most of them ground at low water. They communicate with
Lo-kiang, which is a large, straggling town, by boats and land.25
The Japanese Report on Economic Conditions, published in
1905, substantially repeats this description, adding that ships
carrying up to 300 shih (300 piculs, about 20 tons) could enter
at high tide with difficulty; low tide there was no water at all.
Goods went to and from Lu-kang on bamboo rafts.26 Such was
the premier port of central Taiwan.
THE PORT IN ITS PRIME
The trade across the straits was also subject to official control
and regulation, and Ch’ing administrative policy had a direct
and significant effect on Lu-kang’s commerce and general pros-
perity. In order to discourage piracy, restrict overseas trade,
and prevent illegal emigration, the government in the early
eighteenth century attempted to limit the size of ships and their
numbers constructed in Fukien. Each ship was to be licensed
by the authorities; all crew members were to be registered. In
the eighteenth century there were prohibitions on the shipment
of certain articles between Taiwan and the mainland. Iron was
not to be imported to Taiwan lest the inhabitants use it to make
weapons. Ships leaving Taiwan were forbidden to carry more
than 60 shih of rice, so that the island’s inhabitants could be as-
sured of a sufficient supply. It is doubtful that the regulations
were actually obeyed, but their existence and the threat of en-
forcement gave officials an excuse to extort bribes from mer-
chants and shipowners as well as an incentive to keep track of
ships.27
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The officials attempted to control sea traffic not only by li-
censing ships and their crews but by permitting trade only at
certain ports and allowing voyages only between certain points.
Ocean trade was to be reduced to fixed routes like canal traffic.
Thus in the early eighteenth century there was only one legal
route between Taiwan and the mainland: from Tainan (An-p’ing)
to Amoy. Military and civil officials at both ends inspected ships,
passengers, and cargo and placed their seals on the appro-
priate certificates and manifests.28 To ship rice from Lu-kang to
Ch’uan-chou, for example, it was necessary to load the rice on
a coasting vessel at Lu-kang and sail down to Tainan. There the
rice would be inspected, certified, and perhaps be transshipped
to a larger vessel. It would sail to Amoy, there go through
customs, and then be shipped up the coast to Ch’uan-chou.
There was a temptation to avoid such fuss and expense and to
sail directly to one’s ultimate destination without going through
official channels. Such voyages were “illegal crossings.” As the
Chinese frontier moved northward in Taiwan during the eigh-
teenth century, illegal crossings became more and more fre-
quent. A series of apparently ineffective edicts command offi-
cials in Taiwan and Fukien to enforce the rules and denounce
the corruption that permitted the flourishing illegal trade.29 One
of the early eighteenth-century editions of the T’ai-wan fu-chih
says:
Various small craft set out from such northern ports as Pen-kang
and Lu-kang, and, taking advantage of the south wind, cross over
to Amoy and Ch’uan-chou. Going from west to east they cross di-
rectly to the north of the Pescadores. This is called the passage
to the west. It is most strictly forbidden, but they flock to danger
like ducks to the water.30
A thriving and technically illegal sea traffic between
southern Fukien and the recently settled areas of central
Taiwan grew up in the course of the eighteenth century. The re-
striction of sea traffic to the route between Tainan and Amoy, a
reasonable arrangement in the 1680s and 1690s when Chinese
settlement was limited to the area around Tainan, became in-
creasingly irrational as the rest of the island was settled. The re-
quirement that everything be shipped from Tainan to Amoy not
only inconvenienced merchants and caused higher prices for
legal grain and goods in Fukien and Taiwan; it also interfered
with the army’s grain supply. The policy could only be changed
by the central administration in Peking, and it is likely that the
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officials on both sides of the straits who were profiting from the
squeeze on the direct trade opposed any change in the regula-
tions.
As early as 1758 the governor of Fukien requested per-
mission from Peking to open a legal route between Foochow
and Tamsui. He cited the transport cost of the rice ration, but
his request was turned down.31 In 1784 the commander-in-
chief of the forces in Fukien suggested that Lu-kang be made a
legal port for sea trade linked with the port of Han-chiang on
Ch’uan-chou Bay. He wanted to put the stamp of legality on ex-
isting practices, eliminate corruption, provide a new source of
revenue, and reduce the cost of shipping rice. He argued:
Fukien’s Ch’uan-chou and Chang-chou are short of rice, and
depend on rice from Taiwan. Merchant ships go from Amoy to
Tainan and back, being inspected by the subprefects in charge of
ocean traffic. But many make illegal crossings from other ports.
Last year the Fukien Commander-in-Chief exerted himself to ap-
prehend the criminals who make illegal crossings. Most of them
came from Han-chiang in Ch’uan-chou, there being over twenty
ships from there captured. The legal route is the southern one
from Amoy to Tainan, but a northern route from Lu-kang directly
over to Han-chiang also exists, and is much more convenient.
So, many merchants are making great profits on illegal voyages
over the northern route. I suggest that, taking the southern route
from Amoy to Tainan as an example, a legal route be established
between Lu-kang and Han-chiang and officials be posted to su-
pervise it. This would benefit the common people; men would not
be led into crime; and crafty men would no longer benefit from
corrupt practices.32
His suggestion was accepted by the court, and Lu-kang and
Han-chiang were made legal ports for direct trade, as were
Tamsui and Foochow in the north. A yamen was built in Lu-kang
for the subprefect (t’ung-chih) who was posted to the city to
oversee the trade. Lu-kang, which had been prospering on the
illegal trade, now boomed on legal commerce. The sixty-year
period from 1790 to 1850 was its golden age and the peak of
its prosperity. During that period it was the second city of the
island and the economic center for all of central Taiwan.
In 1787 the great Lin Shuang-wen uprising broke out in
Chang-hua hsien. It was finally put down when Fu K’ang-an, a
high-ranking Manchu general who had previously quelled rebel-
lions in Mongolia and Nepal, landed a large army at Lu-kang.
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After the rebellion was put down the governor-general of Fukien
suggested to the imperial court that the seat of Chang-hua hsien
be moved to Lu-kang. He pointed out the strategic value of Lu-
kang, which, having no wall, could be easily captured by rebels
who could then deny the port to mainland armies. “Fortunately
Lin Shuang-wen and his fellows were all mountain brigands
who, though they knew enough to attack walled cities, were not
smart enough to seize the seaports. Therefore our officials were
able to set sail and land on Taiwan.” The governor-general goes
on to denigrate the hsien seat (the present Chang-hua City):
The present seat of Chang-hua hsien is twenty li distant from Lu-
kang. It does not border the mountains; there are no water com-
munications to it; it is really not at all the sort of place to establish
a hsien city. If the seat of the county were moved to Lu-kang and
high civil and military officials stationed there, then in times of
peace they could command the areas to the north and south, and
information could be easily gathered. In times of disturbance the
port could be guarded and held to ensure access to the interior.
Lu-kang and Lu-er-men [the port of Tainan] would thus serve as
pivots to the door, that is, as key points for the control of Taiwan.33
The suggestion, which was to be revived again and again during
the nineteenth century, was turned down by the court. Lu-kang
remained a commercial city without a wall. But the court does
seem to have responded to the military arguments, for in 1789 it
stationed a battalion (ying) with a paper strength of 708 troops
in a mud-walled fort overlooking the harbor.
By 1789 Lu-kang, while not the walled county seat, was
the residence of three imperial officials, two civil and one mil-
itary, all of whom were stationed there because of its impor-
tance as a commercial center and strategic value as the main
seaport of central Taiwan. The resident officials collaborated
with the city’s mercantile elite, who were organized into the
Eight Guilds, and it is likely that Lu-kang’s official status as
a legal port and the vested interests of its officials and mer-
chants played some part in maintaining its preeminent position
throughout the nineteenth century in spite of its progressive
deterioration as a seaport.34 While the site of the region’s main
seaport in the early and mid-1700s was determined entirely by
topographical and economic considerations, once a legal and
administrative structure was involved it acted along with the
vested interests of the city’s elite to inhibit the development
of a new port at some more suitable site. In fact as late as
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1887, when the harbor was seriously blocked by silt and Lu-
kang’s trade and prosperity were already declining, twenty-two
members of the Lu-kang gentry, including one chih-shih who
had served as a district magistrate in Kwangtung, submitted a
petition to Governor Liu Ming-ch’uan urging him to choose Lu-
kang as the site for the capital of the newly established Province
of Taiwan. Governor Liu was not impressed by the petition and
rejected it, replying that Lu-kang’s altitude was too low and its
harbor too shallow. The petitioners, he said, were acting with
the selfish commercial interests of Lu-kang in mind, rather than
the best interests of the government of Taiwan. Finally, as a ge-
omantic site Lu-kang was clearly not suitable for a provincial
capital.35 Instead, he decided to build his new capital on open
ground on the site of the present city of Tai-chung, but lack of
funds forced him to retain the seat of government at Taipei.
In the nineteenth century Lu-kang’s population was most
probably somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 people. The
first accurate figures on its population are those collected by
the Japanese after their occupation of Taiwan in 1895. The
Report on Economic Conditions gives figures on Lu-kang’s pop-
ulation from 1896 to 1902. In 1896 it was 20,420. This figure
dropped to 17,334 in 1897 but from then on it increased until
there were 19,165 people in the city in 1902. In 1896 it was
Taiwan’s fourth largest city, ranking after Taipei, Tainan, and
Chia-i.36 In its prime it was a compact huddle of brick and tile
houses interspersed with large yamens and elaborate temples,
all rather arbitrarily set down among the sweet potato fields and
mud and thatch villages of the windswept Chang-hua coast.
LU-KANG’S MAIN TRADING SYSTEM
It is useful to think of Lu-kang’s economic functions in terms
of three related but distinct trading systems. The first, and
most important, was the large-scale system embracing central
Taiwan and southern coastal Fukien. Ultimately this system
depended on Fukien’s demand for Taiwan’s surplus rice, on
Taiwan’s demand for Fukien’s timber and manufactured goods,
and on the inefficiency of land transport in both central Taiwan
and coastal Fukien. The Chang-hua hsien-chih says of Lu-kang’s
trade that:
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Chang-hua and Ch’uan-chou are opposite each other. Lu-kang is
the most important place for the commerce of the Ch’uan-chou
and Amoy Guilds. The ships from Ch’uan-chou and Amoy come
to carry rice, sugar, oil, and miscellaneous other goods to Han-
chiang and Amoy. Lately small ships from Shen-hu and T’a-k’u
[small ports on Ch’uan-chou Bay] have been coming to Lu-kang to
buy rice, wheat, cattle bones, and such things. They carry them to
Kwangtung, Macao, Che-lin, and other ports. They buy the mixed
goods of Kwangtung along with salted and dried fish and bring
them back to Lu-kang. These are called the “south ships.”37
A later section of the hsien-chih adds that ships came from the
Pescadores with salt fish and seafood and returned thence with
rice, oil, and melons. Some ships carried sugar to Shanghai and
Tientsin, but there were not as many of these “sugar ships” as
there were sailing from Tainan. The section of the hsien-chih on
sea routes notes that Lu-kang had no North Guild. Moreover,
few ships from Lu-kang went up to the coast of central or
northern China and Lu-kang’s subprefect asked the ships of
the Ch’uan-chou and Amoy Guilds to carry rice to Tientsin.
They were rewarded by being allowed to carry cargo back
without paying taxes on it. Such distant journeys remained rare,
however. The bulk of Lu-kang’s trade was the direct transport
of rice to Ch’uan-chou, one day’s sail across the straits.
European travelers of the early nineteenth century note the
importance of the Taiwan trade for Amoy and Ch’uan-chou.
Hugh Lindsay, an agent of the British East India Company who
voyaged up the coast of China in 1832 to ascertain the
prospects for trade, remarked of Amoy: “The district in which
this flourishing town is situated is one of the most barren in
all China, and consequently yields nothing for export. It is de-
pendent, even for the necessities of life, on the neighbouring
island of Formosa, which is most aptly described as the granary
of the eastern coast of China.”38 The Reverend Charles Gutzlaff,
a missionary who had learned Hokkien dialect in Thailand, ac-
companied Lindsay and says of Amoy: “In proportion as the ad-
jacent island, Formosa, has been colonized and yielded export
produce, sugar, rice, and camphor, Amoy has increased in
wealth and importance…. Without Formosa the population here-
about would be starved; for the greater part of the supplies
of rice come from that island.”39 An anonymous report in the
Chinese Repository of January 1838 says: “Many parts of the op-
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posite shore of Fukheen are so barren that without the aid of
the oil cakes from Formosa, used in manuring the sandy hills,
even the sweet potato could not be produced.”40
The ships that came to Lu-kang were fairly small junks, car-
rying about a hundred tons of cargo. The largest ships came
from Amoy; those from the ports around the shallow Ch’uan-
chou Bay were smaller.41 The information I have been able to
find on the junk trade in the Taiwan Straits is far from com-
plete, but it seems that most of the ships were built in Fukien
and were owned by wealthy mainlanders. J. D. Clark, a British
employee of the Chinese Maritime Customs, reported that most
of the junks coming to the treaty ports of An-p’ing and Tamsui
in the 1880s and 1890s averaged about a thousand shih (66.5
tons) in capacity. He notes that: “Owing to the scarcity of wood
and the high price of labor here [An-p’ing], the vessels are built
on the mainland, where the owners dwell”42
In the second half of the nineteenth century Lu-kang’s total
share of Taiwan’s trade and its relative importance in the
island’s economy had begun to decline. This was not so much
the result of an absolute decline in the volume of trade at the
city, though that may have been the case, as of the economic
growth of the northern part of the island and changes in
Fukien’s rice trade. The last quarter of the century saw the
development of the tea industry in northern Taiwan. Foreign
firms, primarily British, set up establishments in Taipei, and the
Japanese began exporting such manufactured goods as textiles
and matches to Taiwan. Taipei grew rapidly, and labor in the
northern third of the island was so scarce that tea pickers had
to be brought in from Fukien each year.
Lu-kang’s primary export had always been rice, but the rice
trade appears to have fallen off by the end of the nineteenth
century. As Taiwan’s population grew, more rice was consumed
at home by the city dwellers, tea pickers, and coal miners of
the north. Fukien did not suffer, for it was able to import rice
from Southeast Asia at a lower price. Colquhoun and Stewart-
Lockhart, writing in 1885, note that: “The export of rice from
the island has dwindled down until it has almost ceased…. Rice
can be brought cheaper from Indo-China.” They also reported:
‘The native junk trade has in some measure decreased, owing
to the introduction of the foreign steamer. The greater portion
of the junk trade is with Chinchew [Ch’uan-chou], a port sit-
uated a short distance north of Amoy.”43 H. B. Morse, commis-
sioner of customs at Tamsui, reported in 1892 that rice had
actually been imported to Taiwan from 1882 to 1891. “Rice
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was in former years exported from Formosa in large quantities,
mainly of course by junk. Even now the movement inward or
outward of this bulky commodity is effected to a large degree in
native craft.”44
Since no steamship of even moderate size could get any-
where near Lu-kang or safely enter the shallow Ch’uan-chou
Bay, the junks sailing in and out of Lu-kang were not directly
threatened. But Lu-kang’s trade with the mainland was chal-
lenged indirectly when large steamships were able to bring rice
from Southeast Asia more cheaply than it could be shipped
over from Taiwan in small junks. And any improvement of land
transport, even in Fukien, directly threatened Lu-kang. The city
functioned as a port—in spite of silt, tidal flats, the necessity
of employing gangs of porters and longshoremen to load every-
thing into small ships by hand, and the danger of shoals and
storms in the straits—only because there was no better way to
move things into and out of the Chang-hua plain.
The only available figures on Lu-kang’s trade and population
are those published by the Japanese colonial government, and
it is not clear whether the city the Japanese found in 1895 had
declined or changed in any major way since the middle of the
nineteenth century. The only figure I have found is a statement,
most likely quoted from a Japanese source, that in the early
years of the Hsien-feng period (1851–1862), just before the long
decline began, over 3,500 ships came to Lu-kang each year.45
In 1896 the Japanese customs authorities counted 1,051 ships
coming to Lu-kang, though that number declined to 515 in 1897
and 229 in 1900.46 This looks like quite a drop in the last half
of the century. But the Japanese totals probably do not include
the coastal trade; the Japanese customs levies and the less cor-
ruptible Japanese civil service encouraged smuggling. Accord-
ing to residents of Lu-kang today, the city used to be a major
center for opium smuggling, and it is likely that many ships
landed goods, especially opium, near Lu-kang without being
counted.
By the end of the nineteenth century the trading system
linking central Taiwan and Ch’uan-chou and Amoy was already
declining, as the rice trade dwindled and Japanese imports
began to replace Fukienese cloth. Under the Japanese the com-
merce between Taiwan and Fukien dwindled yet further, and the
trade of Lu-kang, by then only a minor junk port, was practi-
cally extinguished. The Japanese built roads and the railroad,
and hence made it possible to move goods into and out of
the Chang-hua plain more cheaply than they could be shipped
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through Lu-kang’s silt-choked harbor. The colonial government
developed Chi-lung (Keelung) and Kaohsiung (then known as
Takao) as modern, deep-water ports, served by direct rail lines
and equipped to load large steamships, while Lu-kang remained
a haven for small junks. Since the Japanese pursued a policy
of integrating Taiwan’s economy with that of their own country,
most of the island’s trade was with Japan. Direct trade between
Taiwan and southeastern China was discouraged by tariff bar-
riers, preferential treatment for Japanese companies, and mo-
nopolies of essential consumer goods by the colonial gov-
ernment. Taiwanese farmers sent their rice and sugar to Osaka
and Tokyo by Japanese steamships that sailed from Chi-lung and
Kaohsiung and bought cloth and hardware that came from the
factories of Japan rather than the small workshops of Fukien.
The entire pattern of trade shifted. Lu-kang was bypassed and
left high and dry in not only a metaphorical sense.
The number of ships coming to Lu-kang fell off from 1,051
in 1896 to 220 in 1900; by 1910 the number had dropped to 61.
In 1897, 5.4 percent of Taiwan’s trade by value went through
Lu-kang; in 1900, 2.5 percent went through Lu-kang; in 1910,
only 0.3 percent. In 1900, 2,413 junks came to Taiwan, 229 of
them to Lu-kang; in 1910, 1,100 junks came, 61 of them to Lu-
kang. Half the junk trade went through Tamsui, An-p’ing, and
Chi-lung, which took more than half the tonnage, indicating that
the larger junks traded there. The rest of the junk trade was
mainly with Kaohsiung and the five minor ports of the west
coast: Chiu-kang, near Hsin-chu; Hou-lung, near Miao-li; Wu-
ch’i, near Taichung (the site of the present Taichung Port); Lu-
kang; and Tung-shih Kang, near Chia-i. In 1900, 35 percent of
Taiwan’s imports arrived by junk, with 7 percent of the total
junk tonnage landing at Lu-kang. In 1910, only 5.7 percent of
Taiwan’s imports came by junk, and only 4 percent of that junk
tonnage landed at Lu-kang. In the fourteen years from 1896 to
1910 Lu-kang’s trade with Fukien dropped precipitously, there-
after remaining at the same low level until it dropped off once
again in the 1930s and ceased entirely with the outbreak of war
between China and Japan in 1937.47
During the nineteenth century Lu-kang’s main export was
rice and the main import was cloth. The cloth was dyed in Lu-
kang, and the city had both a cloth guild and a dyer’s guild.
The Japanese colonial government’s annual returns of trade
provide exhaustive lists of all goods exported and imported
through Lu-kang. Between 1900 and 1920 the main export was
ramie, sometimes called China grass, a plant whose fibers can
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be used to make a light and sturdy cloth. Rice was also ex-
ported, though the amounts fluctuated widely from year to year.
Lu-kang also exported, in small quantities, such agricultural
produce as linseed, dried fruit, turmeric, indigo, wheat, oil
cakes, cut rattan, and rice paper. The main imports were, in
order: cloth made of cotton mixed with ramie; worship paper
(mock money, made of paper and tinfoil, used extensively in
Chinese ritual); oil cakes (used as fodder and fertilizer); cotton
cloth; ramie cloth; and hemp sacking. Small quantities of such
Chinese goods as ginseng; herbs and medicines, cloth shoes,
tiles, incense, pottery, and fireworks were also imported.48
LU-KANG’S SECOND TRADING SYSTEM
The second trading system was along the coast of Taiwan and
inland from Lu-kang—an area embracing the present Chang-
hua hsien, most of the present Nan-t’ou hsien, and the northern
third of Yun-lin hsien, the area along the southernmost branch
of the Cho-shui, known as the Hu-wei River. The coastal trade
was carried out in small ships and bamboo rafts, while
somewhat larger ships, able to carry 50 shih (6.3 tons), traded
between Lu-kang and the larger ports of the island such as
Tamsui, An-p’ing, and Hou-lung. Lu-kang received Japanese or
foreign goods from Tamsui, An-p’ing, or Wu-ch’i, the next port
up the coast, and distributed them in smaller lots either to
minor ports to the south or to the inland market towns. It also
collected and concentrated the agricultural produce from the
same lower-level centers, sending it either to Tamsui or across
the straits. Since the coastal trade was not foreign trade, it was
not reported with the stastistics on foreign trade or customs re-
ceipts and hence it is difficult to judge its volume. Figures on
the coastal trade from 1920–1923 and from 1930 show, on the
one hand, that many more vessels engaged in the coastal trade
came to Lu-kang than did those trading from Fukien; but on the
other hand, the tonnage and cash value of the coastal trade was
less than that with Fukien.49
The Report on Economic Conditions of the Temporary
Commission for the Investigation of Taiwanese Customary Prac-
tices, published by the governor-general of Taiwan in 1905,
gives a list of items traded through Lu-kang and cites their
source or destination. It describes the pattern of coastal and re-
gional trade centered on Lu-kang at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century before the railroad was completed or the road
Chapter 8
157
network substantially improved. Goods came and went from
such inland market centers as Chang-hua city, Yuan-lin, Pei-tou,
Nan-t’ou, Hsi-lo, Erh-lin, Mai-liao, and T’u-k’u, and occasionally
from the hill towns of Chi-chi and P’u-li. The most common
method of transport was by human carrier. Oxcarts were used
between Lu-kang and the settlements directly to the south in
the dry coastal belt. Between Lu-kang and Pei-tou, it was pos-
sible to use bamboo rafts coming down a main channel of the
Cho-shui. Rafts were also used along the southernmost channel
of the Cho-shui, the Hu-wei, the rafts proceeding up the coast
to Lu-kang. This could only be done during the summer months.
Transport by raft was, of course, cheaper than by human
porter, and the Report on Economic Conditions lists the relative
cost of all means of transport. It cost about four times as much
to move goods by porter as it did by raft; and, rather surpris-
ingly, oxcarts appear to have cost about as much as rafts, al-
though the distance for the oxcarts was relatively short. It cost
50 Taiwanese cents to move 1 shih (133 pounds) from Pei-tou to
Lu-kang by porter, but only 14 cents by raft. It cost 36 cents to
send 1 shih by porter from the minor harbor of Fan-wa, south
of Lu-kang, while by raft it cost 8 cents and by oxcart 7.5 cents.
Many goods went overland to Pei-tou, where they were trans-
ferred to rafts for the journey to Lu-kang. Pei-tou thus served as
a major marketing center for the southern portion of the Chang-
hua plain. With a population of 5,134 in 1911 it was the third
largest settlement on the Chang-hua plain, after Lu-kang with
19,153 and Chang-hua city with 15,545.
Bringing things down from the mountains was, of course,
the most expensive of all—1 shih from P’u-li cost $1.68 Tai-
wanese if carried by porter to Lu-kang and $1.58 Taiwanese
if carried by porter to Pei-tou, by way of Chi-chi, and then to
Lu-kang by raft. It was this easternmost area, the Nan-t’ou
plateau and the hill basins, that first slipped out of Lu-kang’s
marketing zone. The Report on Economic Conditions notes that
in 1903–1904 goods from Nan-t’ou were being shipped down
the railroad to the south rather than to Lu-kang. By 1904 the
railroad had reached Chang-hua from the south, connecting it
with Tainan and Kaohsiung. The segment crossing the Ta-chia
River and tunneling through the hills to its north was completed
last. In Chang-hua the railroad ran along the eastern edge of the
plain, through Yuan-lin and Chang-hua city, but came nowhere
close to Lu-kang, which was eventually linked with Chang-hua
city and then with Yuan-lin by a narrow-gauge rail line com-
pleted around 1912. From the market towns inland Lu-kang col-
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lected such local specialties as indigo, fruit, and ramie, along
with the staples of rice, sugar, and beans. To them it distributed
timber, paper, dried fish, kerosene, cotton cloth, wine, matches,
tobacco, and salt.50
During the nineteenth century Lu-kang was a city of whole-
salers and middlemen, with many large firms devoted to trade
in rice, sugar, cloth, timber, pottery, fish, and other com-
modities. Oxcarts and gangs of porters moved through its
narrow streets, and hundreds of workers loaded and unloaded
the bamboo rafts and small boats that were rowed or poled into
its shallow inner harbor. The merchants lived in solid, multi-
story houses, the very bricks and tiles of which had been im-
ported from Fukien. The immediate environs of the city were
the site of many small and relatively poor villages, their houses
constructed of mud brick and thatch, and their inhabitants oc-
casionally walking into Lu-kang for shopping or entertainment.
LU-KANG’S THIRD TRADING SYSTEM
The third level of Lu-kang’s economy was that of local market
town serving the rural population within easy walking distance.
It provided retail shops, some craftsmen, rice mills and peanut
presses, agents who bought the farmers’ produce, and pur-
veyors of such specialized services as dentists, scribes, and
Taoist practitioners. In terms of G. William Skinner’s hierarchy
of Chinese cities, Lu-kang was in the nineteenth century one
of Taiwan’s two “Greater Cities” (step four from the top in an
eight-step hierarchy), the other being Meng-chia, the core of
the present Taipei.51 But, like all cities, it also served the func-
tions of lower-order centers as well. In the pre-Japanese period,
the local marketing aspect of the city’s economy was the least
profitable and important. Lu-kang’s merchants made their for-
tunes on long-distance trade; they did not prosper by selling
cheap cloth or hoes to the local rustics, and much of the agri-
cultural land they owned or donated to temples and charitable
trusts was in the productive inland zone along the edge of the
hills rather than on the immediate periphery of the city.
Today handicraft work of all sorts is a major component of
Lu-kang’s economy, and it has a reputation for high quality, es-
pecially in cabinet making and woodcarving. I have been able
to find no documentary material on this aspect of the city’s
economy in the past, and it is not clear whether it represents
a direct legacy from the past or a response to the distress
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caused by the collapse of trade with Ch’uan-chou. Arguments
for both positions are plausible. I would guess that an original
core of skilled craftsmen existed to serve the local elite, and
that this occupational specialization then increased in relative
importance during the Japanese and Republican periods. The
two oldest and largest furniture making establishments in 1968
were founded at least as early as 1912; one incense making firm
claimed to date back to about 1900. Early Japanese statistical
summaries and lists of local factories do mention a few firms in
the early 1900s, but it is not clear what the criteria of inclusion
were. Many craftsmen such as blacksmiths, coffin makers, and
cabinetmakers must have existed but are never mentioned. The
“factories” that are listed were very small (almost all of them
employed fewer than five people) and most of them were noodle
makers or peanut presses or producers of dye-stuff made from
the indigo grown inland.52
LU-KANG IN DECLINE
The changes in Lu-kang’s economy during the past century can
be summed up as the withering away of the first two levels
of its trading system as the large-scale system linking central
Taiwan with Ch’uan-chou collapsed and the Chang-hua plain
became part of an integrated, island-wide economy. By 1910 Lu-
kang’s position as main seaport for the trade with Fukien, hub
of the coastal trade, and center of a regional trading system was
clearly doomed. All that was left for the merchants of Lu-kang
was selling cloth and hoes to the local farmers who had little
money to spend in the city anyway. Lu-kang was thus left with a
commercial population far too large to support itself by meeting
the modest needs of the villagers. In the usual Chinese fashion
many of the wealthy merchants had diversified and bought land,
and some of them simply became landlords. But others, recog-
nizing that they could not beat the modern transport technology
that had doomed the city’s commerce, chose to join it and took
the train for Taipei or the booming port of Kaohsiung. The first
decade of this century saw massive emigration from Lu-kang.
By the end of the nineteenth century some Lu-kang busi-
nessmen had already established themselves in the thriving
commercial quarter of Taipei, where they organized a Lu-kang
guild. They were soon joined by crowds of their fellow
townsmen who sought opportunities in the growing cities along
the railroad and in such frontier regions as the P’u-li basin and
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the east coast. As Lu-kang slipped from its position of preemi-
nence, many of its natives left for the cities that were moving
up the hierarchy. In the Taiwan of the early Japanese period, an
overwhelmingly agricultural society undergoing rapid economic
development and urban growth, the Lu-kang emigrants with
their urban background, literacy, and commercial skills had an
edge over ordinary Taiwanese who moved to the cities from the
countryside. Furthermore, the emigrants from Lu-kang did not
go to Taipei or Kaohsiung or Taichung as isolated individuals.
They went with introductions to other Lu-kang men who were
already established and joined the Lu-kang associations which
existed in all Taiwan’s major cities.
Today it is claimed that one reason for the commercial
success of Lu-kang émigrés was their solidarity and willingness
to help each other. In doing this they were following the familiar
Chinese strategy of sojourning, in the same way that their an-
cestors had left southern Fukien.53 Sojourners, of whom the
best-known examples are the Chinese migrants to Southeast
Asia and California, were men who left their native places to
seek their fortunes elsewhere but retained membership in the
home community and regarded their stay abroad as a tem-
porary expedient. The Lu-kang migrants were usually men who
left their families in Lu-kang; they sent regular remittances and
returned home as often as they could, most getting back at least
for the Ch’ing Ming festival in the spring. They demonstrated
their continuing identification with their old home by contrib-
uting large sums of money to Lu-kang temples and charitable
funds. Under the Japanese, and to some extent to this day, Lu-
kang came to resemble the emigrant districts of southeastern
China.54 Like those communities or the Hong Kong emigrant
village of San Tin, Lu-kang has come to have a reputation for
cultural conservatism and xenophobia.55
Elsewhere I have described Lu-kang as I found it in 1967
and 1968—presenting the rather odd spectacle of an industrial
city of 28,000 people, with extensive economic and personal ties
with the rest of the island, whose inhabitants describe it as if it
were a closed corporate community.56 This aspect of the present
city can only be understood when one takes into account the
many thousands of Lu-kang people scattered throughout the
rest of Taiwan and comes to appreciate the importance for the
city of maintaining links with the emigrants and keeping some
hold on their loyalties. While I have no concrete information on
the topic, I think it very likely that Lu-kang’s present prosperity,
which is based at least in part on its 500-odd small and very di-
Chapter 8
161
versified factories, depends on links with successful emigrants
who provide capital and, perhaps more important, information
and contacts. Just as much as a century or two centuries ago,
the present city of Lu-kang cannot be understood in isolation
but must be seen as part of a far-flung economic network.
Robert Redfield remarks that accounts of particular com-
munities usually carry our minds outside the place that is de-
scribed. Every study of a community, he points out, has at least
by implication a comparative aspect.57 I have found it impos-
sible to describe Lu-kang or understand its past without car-
rying my mind outside it. Because of its functions as a port
and trading city Lu-kang was much more dependent on the eco-
nomic system linking Taiwan and Fukien than was a village,
which depended primarily on the sweet potatoes it grew in the
soil surrounding it. And it was impossible to understand Lu-
kang without forming, if only dimly, some sort of picture of what
Taiwan in general was like in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and this in turn proved impossible without under-
standing Taiwan’s relations with Fukien. The picture of Taiwan
one or two hundred years ago which emerges is in some ways
curiously familiar. It is that of an island whose economy is de-
pendent on foreign trade and outside capital, whose people are
ruled by self-appointed outsiders, and where the lives of or-
dinary people in villages and towns are subtly but very definitely
affected by events in far-off places. For the past 350 years this
has been so even in the most bucolic depths of the countryside,
but it comes more clearly to mind if one stands in one of the el-
egant old streets of Lu-kang and wonders why that street and
those beautiful buildings are there at all.
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The Development and
Structure of Transportation
Networks in Taiwan:
1600–1972
YI-RONG ANN HSU
CLIFTON W. PANNELL
JAMES O. WHEELER
Historical studies of transportation networks, although not
common, have become more popular in recent years. The basis
for such studies is not new, and scholars other than geographers
have acknowledged the universality of the development of
transportation and communication systems in the economic, po-
litical, and social growth of states.1 More recently, geographers
have begun to recognize the significance and value of studying
transportation network growth, change, and function for the
light such studies shed on other aspects of economic, social,
and political change.2 Among topics related to transportation
and communication, the structure of transport networks and
the flows on such networks have increasingly become accepted
as objects for study as a fundamental theme of geographic in-
quiry—a component of the spatial analysis approach.3
Compact and locationally discrete, Taiwan presents an un-
common but good choice for the study of the development
of land surface transportation systems and their association
with national development. The availability of quantitative data
heightens the island’s suitability for analysis and theory for-
mulation and testing.4 Learning more about Taiwan’s develop-
mental experience and the role that transportation played in it
perhaps can provide valuable insights into the nature of China’s
national development.
One assumption held throughout this study is that much of
the responsibility for Taiwan’s economic growth belongs to the
organizational capacity and decisions of various administrations
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during the last century which tunneled capital out of the coun-
tryside (the agricultural sector), thus providing funds for capital
improvements in nonagricultural areas. One objective of this
study is to highlight the transport sector as a major beneficiary
of this capital investment. Another objective is to determine the
extent to which growth and improvement in the transportation
network have been associated with the general economic trans-
formation underway in Taiwan since the late nineteenth century.
A number of arguments have been advanced to explain this
economic transformation, but none has identified the evolution
of the transportation system as remarkable or of special im-
portance.5 If the findings presented here have something to
contribute to the development literature on Taiwan, it may be
to demonstrate that rapid growth in the urban and transpor-
tation systems took place in step with the transformation of
traditional agriculture. Although Taiwan is small and compact,
transport systems were expensive to construct because of the
rough physiography. Nonetheless, payoffs from the crowded
rural environments were rapid. Traffic demand for goods and
passengers almost always was present and grew swiftly. Thus
investments yielded quick returns for other projects and raised
the confidence of decision makers in the wisdom of investment
in transportation and cities. The extent to which capital was
transferred out of the agricultural sector into transport or urban
projects may not have been great, but the transfer process
did extend for a long period of time. The agricultural sector,
moreover, was a prime user of the evolving transport network,
and the commercialization of agriculture appears to have been
closely tied to the expansion of the transport network. The
growth of towns and cities is more difficult to link to agriculture
and transport, but the functions of towns and cities as market
centers and processing points for agricultural commodities
from the expanding rural sector suggest an influence on them
as well.
THE EVOLVING TRANSPORT NETWORK
Studies of Taiwan’s political and economic history have com-
monly identified several periods of primary significance: an
early western colonial period (1624–1662); a period of Chinese
control (1662–1895); a Japanese colonial period (1895–1945);
and restoration to China and the Nationalist exile (1945 to
the present). All four of these historical stages have witnessed
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special contributions to settlement, transport network ex-
pansion, and economic growth. The period since 1900, however,
has been most significant in the speed and nature of social, eco-
nomic, and political change. The main developmental events in
transportation are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Aside from establishing a few centers of trade and pro-
tection in the southwestern plains, the Dutch did little to de-
velop an internal system of transportation, even in a rudi-
mentary form. Dutch stimulation of Chinese migration to the
island ultimately resulted in the expansion of Chinese agri-
culture and rural settlement which in time stimulated the de-
velopment of an incipient urban system and associated surface
linkages. Although the Spanish interlude was more limited in
time and space than that of the Dutch, they did build two roads
in northern Taiwan to link their settlements at Keelung and Tan-
shui.
Two centuries of Chinese rule, despite erratic policies on mi-
gration to the island, brought Taiwan’s population from 100,000
in 1680 to over 3 million in 1890. Surface transportation be-
tween Chinese settlements, concentrated in the alluvial plains
and basins in the western third of the island, was possible on a
series of trails and traces as early as the latter part of the sev-
enteenth century. Such tracks were usually short and frequently
interrupted because of physical obstacles. Short streams, with
broad cobble-strewn floodplains and enormous variations in dis-
charge volume, were among the most serious impediments to
north-south travel. Bridges were costly and hard to build; fords
were unreliable and sometimes dangerous. In the context of
such a rough landscape, overland transport was slow, arduous,
and expensive. Even where conditions were good, as in the
Chia-nan plain in the southwest. 10 miles was probably the
maximum distance that could be covered in a day. Much of the
north-south transportation flow was coastal, and small ships
plied their trade between the small towns and ports of the
coast and their adjacent interior centers. By 1850, it was pos-
sible, with the exception of the interior, high mountains, to go
overland almost anywhere on the island by following a crude
network of local routes which were tied to trunk lines.
Two able Chinese administrators in the latter part of the
nineteenth century initiated important development projects,
including major improvements in land transport that led Taiwan
into the modern period. Shen Pao-chen in 1874 had three roads
constructed to link eastern Taiwan with the west. Liu Ming-
ch’uan, Taiwan’s first governor when the island was elevated
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to provincial status, established a postal system and initiated a
railway project in northern Taiwan. In April 1887, with material
from the dismantled Woosung-Shanghai Railway and capital
from mainland and overseas Chinese merchants, construction
was begun on the section from Taipei to Keelung. This section
of 28.6 kilometers (17.17 miles) was completed in 1891. In
1888, construction was begun on a second section from Taipei
to Hsin-chu totaling 78.1 kilometers (48.53 miles); this section
was completed in 1893.6 Because of shortages of working cap-
ital, there were only four locomotives. Stations were unpreten-
tious. At that time, the Keelung River was still deep enough
for Chinese junks, and river transportation was cheaper and
more widely used. The Taipei basin was only partially developed
and generated little freight traffic. Passenger traffic did not
meet the expectations of the administrators, and the initial six
daily runs were subsequently reduced to four. Governor Liu, in-
tending to continue the route to the south, sent German en-
gineers to survey two large streams, Ta-an Ch’i and Ta-chia
Ch’i, for railway bridges. He was unable to continue the project
not only because of lack of funds but also because conserva-
tive officials at court opposed the railway. Such opposition is
reminiscent of that found on the China mainland where modern-
ization similarly proved difficult. After Liu’s resignation as gov-
ernor in 1891, his successor recommended that construction be
stopped. The proposed North-South Main Railway thus termi-
nated at Hsin-chu, less than 80 kilometers from Taipei.
Nonetheless, this railway signaled a new transport era for
Taiwan. By the end of the nineteenth century, increasing pop-
ulation densities and agricultural productivity were nurturing
a yet to be realized integrated commercial stage of evolution.
Markets, moreover, remained fragmented. Their integration
awaited a more systematic elaboration of transport routes. No
new Chinese administrative initiatives spurred further
transport developments as the century came to a close. War be-
tween China and Japan culminated in the cession of Taiwan to
Japan in 1895. Chinese efforts bequeathed the focal points of a
transportation network, but it was left to the Japanese to articu-
late the details of a modern development strategy that would tie
them increasingly together.
Japanese colonial administrators in the years immediately
after takeover faced the military conquest of insurrectionary
Taiwanese forces as well as the pacification of the aboriginal
inhabitants in the mountains. To accomplish these two goals,
the Japanese focused initially on constructing an integrated
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north-south highway system with feeder routes to penetrate the
central mountain range. The main settlements and population
centers were linked, and the outline of the system which exists
today was completed by 1906.7
Prewar Road Construction
Four hundred and twenty-eight kilometers (266 miles) of
roadway had been constructed by 1896, but the quality of these
roads was poor. In 1896 and 1897, roads connecting Keelung
and Su-ao, Kee-lung and Taipei, Taipei and Hsin-tien, Taipei and
Tan-shui, Hsin-chu and Taichung, Tung-chiang and Heng-ch’un,
and Fang-liao and T’ai-tung were also completed—a total of 920
kilometers (572 miles) of Japanese built roadway. In 1897, road
construction was delegated to local administrators and from
1897 to 1910 about 200 kilometers of local roadway was fin-
ished.8
Significant improvements in the highway system began
when the Japanese turned to economic exploitation of the island
in 1906. Between 1916 and 1925, the military road connecting
the north and south that had been initiated during the pacifi-
cation period was widened, improved, and renamed the Longi-
tudinal Highway (Figure 9-1). Running from Keelung to Kaoh-
siung and P’ing-tung, it was 15.54 meters (47.69 feet) wide
in areas of level land but narrowed to 10.91 meters (35.78
feet) in mountainous areas. Bridges varied in width over the
425-kilometer (264.1-mile) stretch, the narrowest width being
5.54 meters (18.17 feet).9
In 1916, the Japanese began constructing a road between
Hua-lien and Su-ao that was completed in 1924. This highway
was 119.9 kilometers (74.50 miles) long and was used initially
by the police and army to go into the mountainous areas in-
habited by aborigines. In 1927 the Japanese began improving
the road to accommodate automobile traffic, subsequently be-
coming the bridge road connecting the separate road systems
of east and west.
To link the southern and eastern portions of the island, the
Japanese constructed a highway from Kaohsiung through Feng-
chiang to T’ai-tung that was completed in 1939 and named the
Nan-hwei Highway (around the southern tip of the island).10
To shorten the distance between the Taipei basin and the I-lan
plain in the north, a highway 4 meters wide was built between
Hsin-tien and Chiao-ch’i in 1936; it was widened to 6 meters
in 1945. Across the southern portion of the Central Mountain
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Figure 9–1. Transport network during the Japanese oc-
cupancy ca. 1925.
Range, a highway was built from P’ing-tung to T’ai-tung in
1927–1928; this road was improved in 1937. Construction was
begun on an east-west highway from Hsin-kao in Taichung hsien
to T’ung-men in Hua-lien hsien in 1941, but only 10 kilometers
was completed by 1945 when shortages halted it.11
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Prewar Railway Construction
Except for the early push car lines, railway construction under
Japanese colonial aegis was motivated primarily by commercial
expectations. Seeing the benefits of the system envisioned by
Liu Ming-ch’uan, Japanese administrators enlisted army engi-
neers to repair the original line from Keelung to Hsin-chu. Some
parts of this line were relaid, and work began on laying the line
southward from Hsin-chu. By 1908, the road reached central
Taiwan.12 Because demand outstripped the capacity of sections
of the rail line, there were improvements. Between 1912 and
1919, the Keelung to Taipei section was double-tracked. Con-
struction of a coastal branch from Chu-nan to Chang-hua was
begun in 1919 because the steepness of the railway gradient
in the original line had limited the movement of freight; since
1922, when this branch was completed, this alternate route
has been termed the Coastal Line. Double track was laid be-
tween Taipei and Chu-nan and between Tainan and Kaohsiung
by 1935.
Other lines became valuable economic, political, and mil-
itary additions to the island network. The T’ai-tung Line, con-
necting Hua-lien and T’ai-tung on the east coast, was built in
sections between 1910 and 1922. In 1924, the I-lan Line from
Pa-tu to I-lan and Su-ao was completed, opening up markets
for the surplus agricultural products of the I-lan plain and the
lumber of the surrounding hill slopes. The P’ing-ch’i (Pinchi)
Line, extending 12.9 kilometers (8.02 miles) from San-tiao-lin
to Ching-tung-k’eng, was initially constructed by a private
company as a coal carrier but was acquired by the Chinese
government in 1952. The Chi-chi Line from Erh-shui to Wai-
ch’e-ch’eng, constructed to haul equipment to Taiwan Electric
Company plants in the mountainous areas, began operations in
1921 and was bought by the government in 1927. The P’ing-
tung Line, begun in 1907 but not completed until 1923, passed
through the productive southern plains of Taiwan; Chao-chou,
midway on this line, had highway linkages with Heng-ch’un at
the southern tip of the island. Other objectives may have been
served, but the crucial motives in constructing these lines and
a number of branches were to move people and goods around
cheaply and quickly and hence support economic growth and
modernization.
Supplementary narrow-gauge rail lines were built in the
plains and basins and in some cases into the mountains; they
were of two basic types. Daisha (t’ai-ch’e) or push car lines for
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goods and people were primitive and often built to serve places
isolated or neglected by the rest of the transport network.
Daisha, although slow and crude, were relatively cheap to con-
struct and maintain. Their role in Taiwan’s development is de-
scribed in the following chapter. Other narrow-gauge lines were
either owned by a corporation or operated by the railway ad-
ministration. Principally owned by the Taiwan Sugar Corpo-
ration on the Chia-nan plain in the southwest, some of these
lines operated regularly scheduled passenger service among
small towns and villages not serviced by the main system.
Narrow-gauge lines also penetrated the Central Mountain
Range—the line to A-li Shan is today more famous for its tourist
trade than its heavy cartage of saw timber.
Japan’s contribution to Taiwan’s long-run success as a
development model has been downgraded by some. George
Barclay, for example, has noted that the Japanese were inter-
ested in exploitation to serve their own needs on the home is-
lands.13 No doubt this is true, but it in no way diminishes the
contribution to economic growth on the island as a whole. One
of the crucial elements in the Japanese strategy for colonial
exploitation was an improved transport system, a fundamental
precondition to any kind of success. Indeed, Japanese success in
getting a good return from their southern colony reflects their
sound economic approach to planning, financing, and building
an integrated multimodal surface transportation system in the
early decades of their colonial administration. The system
worked well and largely survived World War II. Most of it con-
tinues in use today.
Postwar Highway Construction
After the destructive aerial bombing of Taiwan in the latter
stages of World War II, only 40 percent of the highways and
roads remained in operation.14 Only the main lines were re-
paired in the early years because of shortages of capital and
expertise. Most roads were left to the care of local authorities
until 1949 when the Provincial Highway Bureau assumed this
responsibility.
The main road left by the Japanese, the Longitudinal
Highway which ran the length of the west coast, had paved sur-
faces only on the sections from Keelung to T’ao-yuan and Tainan
to Kaohsiung; the remainder was surfaced with gravel. With
assistance from the United States government, resurfacing of
its entire length was completed in 1954. A supplementary line
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was constructed between Chung-li and Feng-yuan; in 1951 this
route had been no more than a trail. Building on the earlier
Japanese surveys, an east-west line was built over the moun-
tains in the late 1950s. Completed in 1960 and named the East-
West Cross-Island Highway, this road (including a branch from
Li-shan to I-lan) ran 348.1 kilometers (216.3 miles) from Tung-
shih in Taichung hsien to Taroko Gorge where it joined the Su-
ao to Hua-lien Highway. Under the Nationalists, gaps in the
Hua-lien to T’ai-tung road were completed by 1958.
An especially important project was finished in 1964 with
the completion of a high-speed highway between Taipei and its
major port at Keelung. Without traffic lights and with an av-
erage speed limit of 40 miles per hour, this route was Taiwan’s
first expressway. Work began in April 1963 on a Northern Cross-
Island Highway between Ta-ch’i in T’ao-yuan hsien and Li-shan,
a distance of 166.6 kilometers (103.5 miles). This road connects
with the northern branch of the East-West Cross-Island
Highway at Chi-lan (I-lan hsien) and was put into service in April
1966.15 A Southern Cross-Island Highway was begun in the
middle of 1968 and completed in 1972; it runs 182.6 kilometers
(113.5 miles) from Yu-ching in Tainan hsien to Ch’ih-shang in
T’ai-tung hsien. Figure 9-2 shows the state of the transportation
network in 1972.
The rich western plains have more than 70 percent of the
island’s population and most of its commercial and industrial ac-
tivities. Within eight years, from 1954 to 1961, the total amount
of freight tonnage of the western highway system doubled.
From 1962 to 1965, it doubled again. Then, from 1966 to 1967,
the amount yet doubled again.16 To alleviate transportation bot-
tlenecks, the government began plans in 1969 to build a north-
south expressway. Construction was begun in July 1971 and was
completed in 1978. Connecting the international ports at op-
posite ends of the island, the American-style expressway runs
373.4 kilometers (232 miles). Most of its route parallels the ex-
isting Longitudinal Highway. One spur connects with the new
international airport in T’ao-yuan hsien; another reaches to the
Wu-ch’i Port which is under construction in Taichung hsien.
Construction was begun in October 1979 on the extension
southward from Kaohsiung to P’ing-tung.
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Postwar Railway Construction
Railways suffered from American bombing in much the same
way as roadways, but their rehabilitation was technically more
difficult and slower. Several new lines were constructed by the
Chinese. The line from Lin-pien to Fang-liao with two branch
lines (the Nei-wan Line and the Tung-shih Line) was completed
by March 1958 and has spurred the development of the hilly
portions of Hsin-chu hsien. The 30-kilometer (18.6-mile) Pei-
hwei Line between Su-ao and Hsin-ch’eng, completed in 1978,
links the east and west coasts via a heavily tunneled and costly
line along the northeastern coast. Of special significance to
Taiwan’s railroad history is the current electrification of the
main north-south line.
The Spatial Context
Before 1874, roads on Taiwan served merely to connect neigh-
boring settlements. The inhabited plains and basins may be
termed archipe-lagic in relation to one another. Subsequently,
with Shen Pao-chen’s decision to build roads over the Central
Mountain Range, the development of the island’s transportation
systems moved to a stage of connecting regions. Liu Ming-
ch’uan‘s later efforts to modernize Taiwan’s transport were but
a beginning that was superseded by the construction of north-
south road and rail trunk lines during the Japanese occupation.
Postwar Chinese efforts improved these developments, adding
branches and making alterations that enabled the handling of
increased traffic.
The preceding paragraphs have supplied some of the in-
formation we need for exploring the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and the general evolution of transportation
systems. In the pages which follow, it will become clear that
local variations in the pace and nature of economic growth influ-
enced the development of spatial linkages. Although there was
no strong correlation in Taiwan between the degree of connec-
tivity of a particular place and its size or growth rate, we will
find that failure to achieve a rudimentary level of accessibility
led to stagnation. For most of Taiwan’s cities and larger towns,
increased access has come to mean in recent years increased
growth potential.
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Figure 9–2. The transport network in 1972.
CONNECTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT
It is widely accepted that the development of a transportation
network is deeply influenced by the level of regional devel-
opment.17 In this section, we use a connectivity index to
measure transportation development and relate it to economic
development on Taiwan.
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A transportation network can be defined as a set of urban
centers interconnected by a system of routes.18 By using graph
theory, one can simplify a complex transportation network into a
set of vertices (nodes) and edges (routes). Mathematical theory
then can be used to examine the relationship between nodes
and routes. In this study, the vertices refer to selected Tai-
wanese urban places within the transportation networks and
the edges refer to either highway or railway routes.
The connectivity index expresses the degree of direct
linkage from one location to other locations on a transport
network. It can be written as:
where V is the number of vertices or nodes in the network and e
is the number of linkages.19 Maximum connectivity is calculated
as
and minimum connectivity is V – 1. The value of the connectivity
index varies between unity and half the total number of V. If the
network is fully connected, the index is equal to 1:
If the network is the least connected, the index can be as large
as V/2.20 The minimum connectivity ratio is
Since the networks in different time periods have different
numbers of vertices, the connectivity values are transformed
into percentages to facilitate temporal comparison. Thus if V =
9 and e = 11, the maximum number of connections is 36; the
minimum connectivity ratio is 4.5; and the maximum connec-
tivity ratio is 36/36 = 1.0. The actual connectivity ratio is 36/
11 = 3.27. To transform this ratio to percentage of maximum
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connectivity, one sets the minimum ratio, 4.5, equal to zero.
The maximum ratio is already 1.0 or 100 percent. By dividing
the minimum ratio into the actual and subtracting from unity,
one obtains the percentage of maximum connectivity. In our ex-
ample, the calculations are
1 – (3.27/4.5) = 0.27 or 27 percent.
Since agriculture, mining, fishing, forestry, and manufac-
turing are major occupations on the island, the productivity
of these activities is a reasonable indicator of Taiwanese eco-
nomic development. Several different periods from the Ch’ing
dynasty through Japanese occupancy to the present will be ex-
amined as we compare these economic activities with the de-
velopment of the transportation network. The monetary units
of the different periods have been converted into United States
dollars to facilitate comparison. A stepwise multiple regression
program was used to estimate the relation between the connec-
tivity of the networks (dependent variable) and the production
of these five sectors of the Taiwanese economy (independent
variables). A sixth independent variable, population, was added
to the analysis. Consumption is assumed to be proportional to
population; therefore population growth can be treated as an in-
direct estimator of commercial activity.
Highway Connectivity and Economic Growth
Table 9-1 lists the highways completed on Taiwan between 1925
and 1972. A connectivity index was calculated for every year a
new highway was connected to the Longitudinal Highway—the
trunk line of the Taiwanese highway system. Ten connectivity
indices were used in the stepwise regression analysis. Overall,
the connectivity indices of the system increased from the 1920s
to the 1970s with the growth and development of the highway
network (Table 9-2).
Four variables—population, agriculture, industry, fishing
and forestry—were significantly involved in the analysis of
highway connectivity (Table 9-3); population was by far the
most important as it alone accounted for 96.5 percent. Although
gross agricultural production was the second most important
variable, it increased the coefficient of determination only
slightly. Industrial production, furthermore, increased the coef-
ficient of determination only 0.88 percent. Fishing and forestry
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TABLE 9–1
Highways Completed between 1925 and 1972
Highway Origin Destination Year of
Completion
Length
(Miles)
Longitudinal Highway Keelung P’ing-tung 1925 264.09
P’ing-tung to T’ai-tung P’ing-tung T’ai-tung 1928 55.30
Su-ao to Hua-lien Su-ao Hua-lien 1932 74.50
Hsin-tien to Chiao-ch’i Hsin-tien Chiao-ch’i 1936 39.15
Nan-hwei Kaohsiung T’ai-tung 1939 120.74
Chung-li to Feng-yuan Chung-li Feng-yuan 1950 90.72
Hua-lien to T’ai-tung Hua-lien T’ai-tung 1958 117.44
East-West Cross Island Tung-shih Taroko I960 120.67
Taipei to Keelung Taipei Keelung 1964 14.54
Northern Cross Island Ta-ch’i Li-shan 1966 103.52
Southern Cross Island Yu-ching Chih-shang 1972 113.47
SOURCE: Republic of China, Taiwan Provincial Cultural Affairs
Committee, T’ai-wan-sheng t’ung-chih [Gazetteer of Taiwan
Province] (Taipei: Taiwan Provincial Government Press, 1969),
sec. 4, pp. 22–23, 32–38; Republic of China, Taiwan Provincial
Government, Department of Information, Kung-fu Erh-wu Nien
[The twenty-fifth restoration anniversary] (Taichung: Taiwan
Provincial Government Press, 1970), sec. 12, p. 7.
was the fourth leading variable. The dominance of population
probably reflects the significance of bus and automobile traffic
and the relative unimportance of trucking.
The connectivity index increased along with the growing
internal connection of the network and decreased with the
network’s outward expansion. Negative residuals suggest that
the system is poorly connected. Positive residuals indicate that
it is better connected than expected, given a particular eco-
nomic development pattern. All the residuals, except for 1939,
are within positive one and negative one standard error of es-
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TABLE 9–2
Connectivity Indices of the Highway Network and Standardized
Residuals
Year Connectivity Index Standardized Residual
1925 1.00 –0.21
1928 1.00 –0.12
1936 1.00 –0.92
1939 6.60 1.78
1950 6.60 –0.49
1958 11.76 –0.53
1960 16.69 0.26
1964 20.08 0.52
1966 22.32 –0.20
1972 24.28 –0.11
TABLE 9–3
Cumulative Multiple Coefficient of Determination of Highway
Connectivity
Dependent
Variable
Population
Index
Agriculture
Index
Industry
Index
Fishing and
Forestry Index
R2 96.46% 96.73% 97.61% 97.91%
timate (Table 9-2). After 1904, the revenue of the Governor-
General of Taiwan was no longer subsidized by Japan.21 To
strengthen control and exploit the island, therefore, the military
road which was built at the beginning of Japanese occupancy
was improved and widened between 1916 and 1925. At that
time, the island was served by a relatively complex railway
network. In 1928, there was a small negative residual for con-
nectivity. This residual suggests that highway development
lagged behind population growth in that year. The lag in con-
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struction was probably influenced by the island’s decline in
production due to the impact of economic depression in Japan
proper from 1928. In 1936, there was a high negative residual
in connectivity, suggesting less connection than expected within
the network. In the 1930s, preparations for war stimulated
the expansion of the economy and the transport network. The
completion of the Hsin-tien to Chiao-ch’i Highway connected
the Su-ao to Hua-lien Highway with the Longitudinal Highway
system. It extended the network but did not increase the
network’s internal connection. The index had a positive residual
in 1939, suggesting a better-connected network. To isolate
China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which broke out
in 1937, the Japanese blockaded the coast of China. There is
no doubt that ports in southern Taiwan were important bases
at that time. The Nan-hwei Highway, from Kaohsiung through
P’ing-tung and Feng-kang (Fengchiang) southward to T’ai-tung,
not only expanded the whole network southward but also in-
creased connection between the southern and eastern cities.
The negative residual for connectivity shown for 1950 indi-
cates that the network was less well connected than expected.
The damage to economic facilities during World War II had not
been overcome by 1950. The P’ing-tung to T’ai-tung Highway
was blocked by landslides during the war and was not repaired.
Although the construction of the Chung-li to Feng-yuan
Highway increased internal connection, the network as a whole
was expanded more than the variables predict. Since the late
1950s economic development of the island has been extremely
rapid. The residuals for connectivity changed from negative in
1958 to positive in 1960 and 1964 because the connectivity of
the whole highway network improved as a result of the com-
pletion of the East-West Cross-Island Highway. In 1972 the
network seemed to fit the needs of the population and major
economic activities closely.
Railway Connectivity and Economic Growth
There are at present eleven rail lines on Taiwan (Table 9-4).22
Inasmuch as the T’ai-tung Line is isolated from the others, the
railway network in this analysis consists of only the ten con-
nected railways. When a rail line was completed and opened
to the public, the index for that year was calculated up until
the completion of the North-South Main Railway in 1908. After
1908, only new railways which were connected to or expanded
from the North-South Main Railway are included in the analysis.
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No new rail lines were added after 1958. In all, eleven connec-
tivity indices were involved in the stepwise regression analysis.
The connectivity index remained unchanged after 1958
(Table 9-5). Tremendous changes in economy and population,
however, occurred after that year. To measure the relationship
between the connectivity index and the economic and demo-
graphic situation in 1972, a new regression Indentline involving
twelve time periods was generated. Data for the twelfth time
period were combined with the 1958 dependent variable and
the 1972 independent variables. The result showed that the in-
fluence of the 1972 economic and demographic variables was so
strong in determining the relationship between the dependent
and independent variables—that is, the position of the re-
gression line—that the relationships before 1972 were ob-
scured. Therefore the overall analysis of railway connectivity is
based on these results involving only the eleven time periods.
The relationship including the 1972 time period is reported only
as appropriate.
Over 44 percent of the total variation in railway connectivity
is explained by four variables (Table 9-6). Industrial production
is the most important variable, explaining 24.49 percent of the
variation. Mining, the next most significant variable, increased
the coefficient of determination by 15.25 percent. Fishing and
forestry and agriculture are the next two most important vari-
ables. Population was not statistically significant as an inde-
pendent variable.
Except for the Coastal Line, none of the rail lines was built
to strengthen the connection between existing nodes on the
network. Because of the extension of the network rather than its
growth in connectivity, the index for the network remains low
and actually decreases except for 1922. Topography hinders the
construction of direct rail lines between major cities in the west
and eastern cities. Therefore this regression analysis only par-
tially explains the variation in network connectivity. If the 1972
data were involved in this analysis the coefficient of determi-
nation would decrease from over 44 percent to 14 percent.
Most of the residuals, as seen in Table 9-5, fall within pos-
itive one and negative one standard error of estimate except
for 1908, 1922, and 1927. The residual for connectivity was
negative in 1893. After the mid-nineteenth century, the lowland
areas of Taiwan were rapidly settled. The social and economic
situation on Taiwan probably justified a better transportation
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TABLE 9–4
Railways Completed between 1893 and 1958
Railway Origin Destination Year of
Completion
Length
(Miles)
North Section
of
North-South
Main
Railway
Keelung Hsin-chu 1893 66.30
Tan-shui Line Taipei Tan-shui 1901 13.15
South Section
of
North-South
Main
Railway
Hsin-chu Kaohsiung 1908 184.03
Coastal Line Chu-nan Chang-hua 1922 56.67
P’ing-tung Line Kaohsiung Lin-pingTung-kang
1923 39.09
I-lan Line Pa-tu I-lan 1924 59.00
T’ai-tung Line Hua-lien T’ai-tung 1926 107.50
Chi-chi Line Erh-shui Wai-ch’e-ch’eng 1927 18.46
Nei-wan Line Hsin-chu Nei-wan 1951 17.36
P’ing-ch’i Linea
San-tiao Ching-t’ung-k’eng 1952 8.03
Lin-pien Line Lin-pien Fang-liao 1953 6.88
Tung-shih Line Feng-yuan Tung-shih 1958 8.70
a The P’ing-ch’i (Pinchi) Line, completed in 1929, was initially
constructed by the T’ai-yuan Mineral Company as a coal carrier;
the Chinese government bought it to serve the public in 1952.
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SOURCE: Republic of China, Taiwan Provincial Cultural Affairs
Committee, T’ai-wan-sheng t’ung-chih [Gazetteer of Taiwan
Province] (Taipei: Taiwan Provincial Government Press, 1969),
sec. 4, p. 139.
TABLE 9–5
Connectivity Indices of the Railway Network and Standardized
Residuals
Year Connectivity
Index
Standardized
Residual
1893 1.00 -0.47
1901 1.00 -0.54
1908 1.00 -1.19
1922 7.07 1.25
1923 5.21 0.17
1924 4.50 -0.28
1927 4.30 1.42
1951 4.13 0.10
1952 3.96 0.17
1953 3.81 -0.60
1958 3.67 -0.03
network during this time. Backward government officials,
however, delayed the development of a modern transportation
network until Governor Liu took charge of the island in 1884.
There were negative residuals for connectivity in 1901 and
1908. Since Taiwan was ceded to Japan, the Japanese were de-
termined to control the island and extended the railway network
toward the interior of the island. In the 1920s, the expansion
of the empire stimulated the development of the island. During
this decade both outward expansion and internal connections
were strengthened; therefore positive residuals for connectivity
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TABLE 9–6
Cumulative Multiple Coefficient of Determination of Railway
Connectivity
Dependent
Variable
Industry
Index
Mining
Index
Fishing and
Forestry Index
Agriculture
Index
R2 24.49% 39.74% 43.85% 44.54%
are found in association with the strengthening of internal con-
nections. The opposite is true for years when expansion was oc-
curring.
In 1951 the residuals were positive. The economy, because
of bombing destruction during World War II, lagged behind
the rail system which had been constructed before the war
as Japanese influence had expanded. After the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950, U.S. aid helped in the restoration of the
economy. A negative residual for connectivity in 1953 suggests
that a better-connected network was needed. In 1958, the
network was well adjusted to the level of development. If one
extends this regression line to 1972, the residual for the con-
nectivity index is –8.05 standard errors of estimate. When the
1972 data are added, the residuals for each time period deviate
much more from the actual values.
Summary
There is little doubt about the important role of agriculture
in the Taiwanese economy during the Japanese regime and
the early stage of restoration. Population growth, industrial-
ization, and agricultural development strengthened the internal
connection of the network, and these three elements show up
strongly in the analysis of highway and railway connectivity.
The five independent variables used in this analysis were
strongly related to highway connectivity. By contrast, topog-
raphy increased the difficulty of constructing new rail lines
to improve the internal connection of the railway network.
Moreover, government policy has been to increase the number
of train runs instead of building new lines.23 Railway connec-
tivity, unlike highway connectivity, has not been strongly related
to economic growth.
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NODAL ACCESSIBILITY AND CONNECTIVITY
With the extension of a transportation network, the nodes on
the network may change their levels of accessibility and con-
nectivity.24 Graph theory, a branch of topology, provides a math-
ematical tool to simplify the complex properties of actual net-
works so that one may study their basic structure. By applying
graph theory, two indices, nodal accessibility and connectivity,
can be used to examine the geometric structure of the
network—that is, the network as a set of points and lines on a
two-dimensional plane. According to graph theory, the center
of the network will have the highest accessibility and connec-
tivity index values. In the present analysis, these two indices are
used to determine whether the structural centers of networks
of different times are coincident with the actual economic or po-
litical centers. Our research covers the period from 1893 to the
present for both the highway and railway networks.
If a transportation network is treated as a set of points
and lines on a two-dimensional plane, an array of numbers—a
matrix—can be constructed to describe the entire network. The
matrix is known as a connectivity matrix: the rows are ordered
as the origins and the columns as the destinations of the
network. Unity is entered in the cell if there is a direct con-
nection between origin and destination; otherwise a zero is
entered. The connectivity matrix records only the direct con-
nections between nodal pairs. But since the linkages of large
urban centers always pass through intermediate centers, the
indirect connections are also important in measuring the ac-
cessibility and connectivity of individual nodes. To involve all
the indirect connections between nodal pairs, the connectivity
matrix is powered by matrix multiplication. The nodal connec-
tivity index is defined as the summation of rows of the connec-
tivity matrix powered to the diameter number of the network.
The accessibility matrix is defined as the summation of the re-
spective cells in the connectivity matrix at the first order (1s
and 0s) and at each subsequent power up to and including the
diameter power. Nodal accessibility is defined as the summation
of rows of this accessibility.25
Duane F. Marble has developed a computer program, called
NODAC, to calculate the nodal accessibility index for transpor-
tation networks based on the definition of Shimbel and Katz.26 It
is available for networks with up to sixty-four nodes. The basic
input is the connectivity matrix of the network. The program as-
sumes that a place is connected to itself—that is, 1 rather than
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0 will be entered in the diagonal of the matrix. Since this as-
sumption differs from the ordinary definition,27 minor changes
were made to calculate connectivity and accessibility indices for
this study in order to satisfy the usual definition of zeros in the
principal diagonal.
The Highway Network
The highway network to be examined is the network formed
by the Longitudinal Highway and all the highways connected
with it. Whenever the network was expanded, a connectivity
matrix for that time was constructed. These matrices became
the inputs to the NODAC program. The nodal accessibility and
connectivity indices for the nodes were generated for the fol-
lowing ten years: 1925, 1928, 1936, 1939, 1950, 1958,
1960,1964, 1966, and 1972.
The nodes for this analysis were the major urban centers lo-
cated on the network in the year examined.28 The number of
nodes changed with the expansion of the network—from nine
nodes in 1925 to twenty-five in 1972 (Figure 9-3). The index
value of a node corresponds to the diameter number of the
network for that year, as the diameter changes with the ex-
pansion of the network. Therefore the absolute index values of
the same node at different times are not meaningful for com-
parison between different years. To measure the relative acces-
sibility and connectivity of the nodes through time, we obtained
the percentage values of these indices.
During Japanese occupancy the highway network of Taiwan
grew rapidly from 1925 to 1939 but remained unchanged from
1939 to 1945. From 1925, the date of the completion of the Lon-
gitudinal Highway, to 1939, the date of the completion of the
Nan-hwei Highway, both the high accessibility and connectivity
values underwent a shift from nodes in the center of Taiwan
toward nodes first in the north and then in the south (Tables
9-7 and 9-8). In 1925, the Longitudinal Highway itself consti-
tuted the highway network. The center of the network—the
urban center with the highest percentage values on both ac-
cessibility and connectivity indices—was Feng-yuan. The com-
pletion of the P’ing-tung to T’ai-tung Highway in 1928 did not
greatly change the indices of accessibility and connectivity of
the nodes. Taichung and Feng-yuan were the best connected as
well as the most accessible urban centers.
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Figure 9–3. Topological map of the highway
network.
The completion of the Hsin-tien to Chiao-ch’i Highway in
1936 connected the isolated Su-ao to Hua-lien Highway with the
Longitudinal Highway. Taipei, the conjunctional point of these
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TABLE 9–7
Nodal Accessibility Indices of Taiwan’s Highways
Node 1925 1928 1936 1939 1950 1958 1960 1964 1966 1972
1. Keelung 5.11 4.20 6.67 2.90 5.04 4.30 2.27 8.26 7.21 6.57
2. Taipei 9.42 8.05 13.27 5.83 12.15 10.56 6.00 12.24 10.84 9.31
3. Hsin-tien 10.73 4.64 6.57 5.97 3.47 5.39 4.69 4.29
4. Chiao-ch’i 8.05 3.46 3.58 3.88 3.21 3.47 3.09 2.79
5. I-lan 6.37 2.73 2.05 2.80 4.64 3.69 3.92 3.69
6. Su-ao 4.54 1.94 1.18 2.39 3.72 2.76 2.45 2.50
7. Taroko 3.08 1.31 0.67 2.18 4.85 3.44 2.71 2.90
8. Hua-lien 1.50 0.64 0.30 2.13 2.59 1.82 1.35 1.97
9. Chung-li 12.93 10.89 11.04 5.03 17.89 14.98 9.65 10.56 11.59 10.66
10. Ta-ch’i 5.98 5.32
11. Hsin-chu 14.73 12.97 8.69 4.39 14.39 11.98 8.03 7.63 7.45 6.75
12. Feng-yuan 15.64 13.89 7.40 4.51 17.01 14.30 11.59 10.48 9.90 9.01
13. Tung-shih 6.85 5.53 5.16 4.89
14. Li-shan 6.67 4.96 4.99 4.64
15. Chi-lan 4.34 3.25 5.25 4.96
16. Kuan-yuan 5.27 3.77 3.26 3.32
17. Wu-she 2.18 1.54 1.24 1.22
18. Taichung 14.73 13.89 5.99 5.14 9.03 7.77 5.38 4.49 4.00 4.24
19. Tainan 12.93 12.97 4.96 6.86 4.82 4.66 2.77 2.17 1.76 2.71
20. Yu-ching 1.89
21. Kaohsiung 9.42 10.89 3.79 10.04 2.65 3.13 1.54 1.13 0.85 1.45
22. P’ing-tung 5.11 8.05 2.62 15.59 1.46 2.50 1.12 0.79 0.55 0.92
23. Feng-kang 12.50 0.79 2.22 1.00 0.70 0.47 0.87
24. T’ai-tung 4.20 1.33 12.50 0.35 2.14 1.14 0.80 0.53 1.20
25. Ch’ih-shang 2.11 1.63 1.13 0.78 1.94
highways, became the most connective and accessible center.
The population of this city increased from 233,744 in 1928 to
310,320 in 1936.29 Moreover, the urban centers in northern
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TABLE 9–8
Nodal Connectivity Indices of Taiwan’s Highways
Node 1925 1928 1936 1939 1950 1958 1960 1964 1966 1972
1. Keelung 5.11 4.05 6.99 2.88 5.09 4.34 2.27 8.20 7.23 6.68
2. Taipei 9.12 8.07 12.93 5.41 12.13 10.94 6.15 12.96 11.21 9.36
3. Hsin-tien 11.19 4.58 6.60 5.94 3.57 5.34 4.68 4.45
4. Chiao-ch’i 7.81 3.18 3.51 3.87 3.15 3.52 3.11 2.77
5. I-lan 6.53 2.64 2.01 2.60 4.67 3.63 3.82 3.62
6. Su-ao 4.37 1.76 1.11 2.20 3.56 2.61 2.36 2.44
7. Taroko 3.08 1.24 0.63 1.93 4.85 3.35 2.61 2.73
8. Hua-lien 1.44 0.58 0.27 1.88 2.44 1.67 1.25 1.89
9. Chung-li 13.40 10.73 11.52 5.00 18.12 15.37 9.79 10.59 11.65 11.02
10. Ta-ch’i 6.10 5.33
11. Hsin-chu 14.60 13.14 8.46 4.18 14.47 12.41 8.19 7.82 7.59 6.88
12. Feng-yuan 16.06 14.01 7.57 4.51 17.07 14.83 11.99 10.84 10.10 9.08
13. Tung-shih 6.82 5.46 5.13 4.99
14. Li-shan 6.84 4.99 4.98 4.55
15. Chi-lan 4.21 3.12 5.17 5.00
16. Kuan-yuan 5.09 3.55 3.14 3.27
17. Wu-she 2.21 1.52 1.20 1.16
18. Taichung 14.60 14.01 5.79 5.14 9.08 7.91 5.38 4.46 4.00 4.33
19. Tainan 13.14 13.14 4.91 6.97 4.80 4.71 2.83 2.21 1.76 2.56
20. Yu-ching 1.84
21. Kaohsiung 9.12 10.73 3.63 10.27 2.62 3.00 1.46 1.05 0.80 1.41
22. P’ing-tung 5.11 8.07 2.52 15.98 1.41 2.34 1.04 0.73 0.49 0.83
23. Feng-kang 12.84 0.76 1.99 0.90 0.61 0.40 0.77
24. T’ai-tung 0.45 1.27 12.84 0.33 1.89 1.03 0.70 0.46 1.11
25. Ch’ih-shang 1.85 1.55 1.05 0.71 1.74
Taiwan, such as Hsin-tien and Chung-li, became more acces-
sible and connected than other urban centers. In 1939, with
the completion of the Nan-hwei Highway, cities south of Tainan
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became better connected and had higher accessibility indices
than cities in the rest of the island. Kaohsiung became the geo-
metric center of the network of that time.
The shift of centers with high indices as the network ex-
panded may reflect Japan’s governing policy toward Taiwan.
The Japanese regime may be separated into two components:
the military and the civil administrations. Both viewed Taiwan
as a potential base for southward expansion of the Japanese
empire.
In 1898, the year that Lieutenant-General Kodama Gentaro
was appointed governor-general of Taiwan, the military admin-
istration and civil administration were divided. The construction
of highways after 1898 was to benefit both the island’s economy
and its defense. Therefore the military roads which the
Japanese completed at the beginning of their occupancy were
improved and renamed the Longitudinal Highway. This highway
not only connected north and south but also passed through
the agriculturally productive plains along the western coast.
The center with the highest index values in 1925 was Feng-
yuan, a small community between the interior foothills and the
coastal plain in the middle part of Taiwan. During the end of
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries,
the political center of the island was at Taipei in the north;
the economic center was south around the city of Tainan. The
network gradually expanded with political and economic devel-
opments on the island. The completion of the Hsin-tien to Chiao-
ch’i Highway in 1936 shifted the highest accessibility center to
Taipei; and the completion of the Nan-hwei Highway in 1939
shifted the center to Kaohsiung, the heavy industrial center of
that time.
After the return of Taiwan to China, the centers with highest
accessibility and connectivity shifted northward. The com-
pletion of the Chung-li to Feng-yuan Highway in 1950 made the
northern cities more accessible and interconnected than those
in the south. Chung-li, at the origin of this highway, became
the geometric center of the network; Feng-yuan, the terminus,
had the second highest accessibility and connectivity indices.
Hsin-chu, connecting Chung-li on one side and Feng-yuan on
the other, was the third most connected and accessible center.
Taipei ranked fourth, on each index.
The around-the-island highway system was completed in
1958 with the construction of the Hua-lien to T’ai-tung Highway.
The importance of the Chung-li to Feng-yuan Highway con-
tinued to influence the entire network significantly. As a result,
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Chung-li, Feng-yuan, Hsin-chu, and Taipei all became better
connected and had easier access to other cities. The nodes
in the middle part of Taiwan became more connected and im-
proved their accessibility with the completion of the East-West
Cross-Island Highway in 1960. Feng-yuan, the intersection of
the Longitudinal Highway and the East-West Cross-Island
Highway, became the center of the network at that time.
By 1964 the completion of the Taipei to Keelung Highway
shifted the geometric center to Taipei. Major nodes, such as
Keelung and Hsin-chu, Chung-li and Feng-yuan, had signifi-
cantly higher accessibility and connectivity indices with this
network change. The completion of the Northern Cross-Island
Highway in 1966 and the Southern Cross-Island Highway in
1972 did not greatly change the nodal accessibility and con-
nectivity indices. Keelung, Taipei, Chung-li, Hsin-chu, and Feng-
yuan had significantly higher indices; furthermore, Chung-li
became the geometric center of the networks in both 1966 and
1972.
Since 1945, the year that Taiwan was returned to China,
the emphasis on the area of highway construction has shifted
from south to north. Now that Taiwan is no longer a colony, the
island’s economic development has become more independent.
In 1949, the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan due to
political changes on the China mainland. To promote economic
self-sufficiency, the government paid considerable attention to
agricultural as well as industrial development. Industrial devel-
opment was heavily dependent on foreign countries to supply
raw materials. Northern Taiwan, despite few natural resources,
has dominated the industrial activity of the island since the
1950s—especially Taipei, the political and financial center, and
Keelung, one of the best natural harbors on the island. Despite
the rapid growth of Kaohsiung, five of the six major industrial
zones are in northern Taiwan: The Ting-kau Industrial District
in Taipei hsien, the Kuei-shan Industrial District in T’ao-yuan
hsien, the First and Second T’ou-fen Industrial Districts in Miao-
li hsien, and the Liu-tu Industrial District in Keelung City. Even
three of the four developing industrial parks are also in the
north: The Second Kuei-shan Industrial District and Nei-li In-
dustrial District in T’ao-yuan hsien and the Third T’ou-fen Indus-
trial District in Miao-li hsien. Therefore the construction of the
highway network was coincident with the development of the
north.
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During the Japanese occupancy, then, all of the nodes—Kao-
hsiung, P’ing-tung, Feng-kang, and T’ai-tung—with both
accessibility and connectivity indices within the first quintile
(highest 20 percent) were in southern and southeastern Taiwan
(Figure 9-4). But in 1972, four of the five nodes in the first
quintile were in the north and the fifth was in the middle part
of Taiwan. It seems that this shift of geometric centers in the
network between Japanese occupancy and the return to China
is a good indicator of political and economic changes.
The Railway Network
The railway network to be examined is the network formed by
the North-South Main Railway and all the lines extending from
it. The procedure used to calculate the nodal accessibility and
connectivity indices of the highway network is repeated here for
the railways. In all, the railway network has expanded eleven
times: 1893, 1901, 1908, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1927, 1951, 1952,
1953, and 1958.
The nodes to be considered in this analysis are the special
municipality (yuan-hsia-shih), all provincial cities (sheng-hsia-
shih), all prefectural cities (hsien-hsia-shih), and communities of
prefectural administration of present-day Taiwan which the rail
lines pass through.30 The nodes at the intersection of the North-
South Main Railway and the new lines, as well as the destina-
tions of the new lines, are involved as well. The number of nodes
changed from four in 1893 to twenty-nine in 1958 (Figure 9-5).
Examining both the nodal accessibility and the connectivity
indices shown in Tables 9-9 and 9-10, we can see that the
shift of the geometric center of the railway network has been
from northern to middle Taiwan. Taipei and T’ao-yuan were the
centers of the network in 1893 when only the northern section
of the North-South Main Railway line was completed. When the
Tan-shui Line was completed in 1901, Taipei became the undis-
puted geometric center of the system.
In 1908 the North-South Main Railway line was completed,
and the center of the network shifted to T’ao-yuan. All the
nodes from T’ao-yuan to Yun-lin had significantly higher indices.
Earlier, the coastal plains between Hsin-chu and Chang-hua had
been difficult to defend, especially during the Sino-French War
in 1885, because of the lack of bridges in an area of complex
drainage. Governor Liu, moreover, predicted in 1886 that the
completion of the North-South Main Railway would strengthen
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Figure 9–4. Nodal accessibility and connectivity
of Taiwan’s highways: 1939 and 1972.
Chinese control of this area if the army could be quickly dis-
patched by rail. The Japanese believed this as well and began
construction in 1899 with a budget of 28.8 million yen.
The completion of the Coastal Line, from Chu-nan to Chang-
hua in 1922, increased the accessibility and connectivity indices
of nodes between Hsin-chu and Erh-shui and shifted the center
from T’ao-yuan to Chang-hua and Chu-nan. New lines were
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Figure 9–5. Topological map of the railway
network.
added to the North-South Main Railway during the Japanese
regime and after the return to China: the P’ing-tung Line in
1923, the I-lan Line in 1924, the Chi-chi Line in 1927, the
Nei-wan Line in 1951, the P’ing-ch’i (Pinchi) Line in 1952, the
Lin-pien Line in 1953, and the Tung-shih Line in 1958. Never-
theless, all the nodes from Hsin-chu to Erh-shui had very high
values on both indices. The geometric center of the network
from 1922 to 1958 remained at the same places, Chang-hua and
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Chu-nan, both of which had similarly high values. Neither the
political center, Taipei, nor the principal nodes in major eco-
nomic areas, the southern plains during the Japanese regime
and northern Taiwan after the return to China, have had signifi-
cantly high index values since 1922.
Individual nodes with high accessibility and connectivity in-
dices have not changed greatly since 1922 (Figure 9-6). Most of
the new lines added to the North-South Main Railway line were
merely short branches. There was no railway corresponding to
the East-West Cross-Island Highway to connect the east and
west sides of the island. The Central Mountain Range has acted
as a major barrier to the development of the railway network.
The T’ai-tung Line, the main north-south railway of eastern
Taiwan, was isolated from the rest of the network until late 1979
when Hua-lien was linked with Su-ao. As part of Taiwan’s ten
major construction projects for the 1970s, this 88 kilometer line
through rugged terrain cost US$140 million. Twelve new capital
construction projects for the 1980s include the completion of
the round-the-island railway network with the construction of
a link between T’ai-tung and P’ing-tung by mid-1980. Such
lines will increase the accessibility and connectivity indices for
centers east of San-tiao and south of Chia-i.
In summary, then, the urban centers in the northern and
central parts of Taiwan have higher accessibility indices on
both highway and railway networks than the rest of the island.
Centers such as Chung-li, Hsin-chu, Chu-nan, Miao-li, and Feng-
yuan have relatively high accessibility and connectivity indices,
but they were more important militarily than economically in
the past. They are located between the rolling hills in northern
Taiwan and the western coastal plains and between the interior
foothills and the western coastal plains. Military considerations
influenced the location of transportation routes on the island.
Nevertheless, the improvements in accessibility and connec-
tivity in transportation attracted enterprising capitalists to
locate their plants in these centers during the 1960s when the
space around Taipei City was saturated. One finds an endless
strip of factories along the Longitudinal Highway and the North-
South Main Railway as one travels from suburban Taipei City to
Chung-li in T’ao-yuan hsien.
The nodes in southern Taiwan are less connected and ac-
cessible to both the highway and railway networks, especially
Kaohsiung. Since the 1950s Kaohsiung has been the biggest in-
ternational harbor on the island in terms of volume of cargo
handled. It became more important to the island’s economic de-
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TABLE 9–9
Nodal Accessibility Indices of Taiwan’s Railways
Node 1893 1901 1908 1922 1923 1924 1927 1951 1952 1953 1958
1. Keelung 18.75 15.38 4.35 1.95 1.63 2.79 2.71 2.31 2.85 2.57 2.27
2. San-tiao 1.64 1.26 1.26 2.06 2.09 1.72
3. Ching-t’ung-k’eng 0.95 0.86 0.71
4. I-lan 0.95 0.71 0.69 1.18 1.07 0.87
5. Su-ao 0.42 0.31 0.19 0.49 0.49 0.40
6. Taipei 31.25 32.69 8.15 4.48 3.76 4.52 3.67 4.03 4.30 4.37 3.79
7. Tan-shui 15.38 4.35 1.95 1.63 2.03 1.60 1.75 1.90 1.80 1.56
8. T’ao-yuan 31.25 23.08 8.55 5.73 5.09 5.55 4.67 5.60 5.66 5.48 4.97
9. Hsin-chu 18.75 13.46 8.00 8.77 8.06 8.01 7.20 9.02 8.78 8.88 8.31
10. Nei-wan 3.84 3.76 3.68 3.41
11. Chu-nan 8.21 14.03 13.17 12.98 12.06 12.20 11.76 11.61 11.38
12. Miao-li 7.78 9.79 9.26 8.97 8.23 7.84 7.51 7.57 8.07
13. Feng-yuan 7.82 8.42 8.00 7.76 7.16 6.58 6.29 6.28 8.00
14. Tung-shih 3.31
15. Taichung 7.48 9.68 9.18 8.91 8.54 7.80 7.45 7.42 7.95
16. Chang-hua 7.32 14.05 13.23 12.71 12.99 11.93 11.40 11.49 11.27
17. Erh-shui 6.86 8.35 7.83 7.53 9.59 8.55 8.17 8.10 7.68
18. Wai-ch’e-ch’eng 4.14 3.58 3.41 3.43 3.21
19. Yun-lin 6.35 5.22 4.86 4.50 5.54 4.72 4.49 4.50 4.17
20. Chia-i 5.50 3.34 3.16 2.82 3.20 2.68 2.55 2.53 2.28
21. Hsin-ying 4.48 2.20 2.24 1.88 2.00 1.59 1.51 1.49 1.31
22. Tainan 3.13 1.37 1.79 1.35 1.28 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.81
23. Kaohsiung 1.64 0.66 1.52 1.10 0.96 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.56
24. Feng-shan 1.47 0.94 0.75 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.47
25. P’ing-tung 1.36 0.91 0.69 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.43
26. She-pien 1.42 0.84 0.62 0.45 0.43 0.59 0.46
27. Tung-kang 0.67 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.22
28. Lin-pien 0.67 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.36 0.28
29. Fang-liao 0.18 0.14
velopment after the completion of the Export Processing Zone
around the harbor area in the mid-1960s. Its accessibility to
other nodes on the highway network, however, is less than that
of Su-ao, one of the fishing centers in northeastern Taiwan. Its
accessibility to other nodes on the railway network is lower than
that of I-lan, a hsien (county) seat in the northeastern part.
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TABLE 9–10
Nodal Connectivity Indices of Taiwan’s Railways
Node 1893 1901 1908 1922 1923 1924 1927 1951 1952 1953 1958
1. Keelung 18.75 14.29 4.63 1.83 1.59 2.79 2.14 2.33 2.90 2.56 2.18
2. San-tiao 1.58 1.22 1.21 1.93 2.12 1.74
3. Ching-t’ung-k’eng 0.96 0.81 0.67
4. I-lan 0.95 0.69 0.70 1.20 1.00 0.82
5. Su-ao 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.45 0.50 0.40
6. Taipei 31.25 35.71 7.65 4.51 3.83 4.43 3.63 3.94 4.16 4.45 3.84
7. Tan-shui 14.29 4.63 1.82 1.59 2.04 1.59 1.77 1.94 1.75 1.51
8. T’ao-yuan 31.25 21.43 9.05 5.56 5.06 5.61 4.65 5.66 5.76 5.40 4.90
9. Hsin-chu 18.75 14.29 7.65 8.93 8.22 8.01 7.26 8.97 8.70 9.04 8.42
10. Nei-wan 3.89 3.82 3.65 3.39
11. Chu-nan 8.57 14.06 13.25 13.15 12.08 12.33 11.93 11.60 11.38
12. Miao-li 7.60 9.97 9.43 9.03 8.31 7.85 7.51 7.68 8.16
13. Feng-yuan 8.02 8.55 8.11 7.84 7.23 6.63 6.35 6.32 8.06
14. Tung-shih 3.34
15. Taichung 7.38 9.77 9.28 9.03 8.57 7.86 7.53 7.46 7.99
16. Chang-hua 7.38 14.30 13.48 12.78 12.16 11.95 11.41 11.64 11.40
17. Erh-shui 6.75 8.34 7.87 7.62 9.57 8.62 8.25 8.12 7.69
18. Wai-ch’e-ch’eng 4.20 3.59 3.41 3.47 3.24
19. Yun-lin 6.32 5.20 4.90 4.50 5.62 4.73 4.49 4.54 4.20
20. Chia-i 5.34 3.23 3.12 2.81 3.15 2.67 2.54 2.53 2.27
21. Hsin-ying 4.41 2.07 2.17 1.85 2.00 1.58 1.50 1.48 1.29
22. Tainan 3.01 1.26 1.72 1.28 1.22 0.96 0.91 0.94 0.79
23. Kaohsiung 1.60 0.59 1.37 1.06 0.94 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.53
24. Feng-shan 1.39 0.83 0.66 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.44
25. P’ing-tung 1.16 0.87 0.66 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.37
26. She-pien 1.35 0.72 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.55 0.42
27. Tung-kang 0.56 0.42 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.18
28. Lin-pien 0.56 0.42 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.24
29. Fang-liao 0.17 0.31
At present, northern Taiwan is becoming saturated with in-
dustrial development. In central and southern Taiwan, by con-
trast, one can find isolated factories surrounded by farmland
along transportation arteries. Hence it is likely that the flat
central and southern parts of the island will be the areas for
future development. The southern part of Taiwan was highly
developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
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Figure 9–6. Nodal accessibility and connectivity
of Taiwan’s railways: 1927 and 1958.
turies and still supplies most of the island’s food. Yet the mathe-
matical analysis in this study shows that the nodes in the south
are poorly connected to the rest of the island. To meet the needs
of future development, the existing transportation network will
need some adjustments such as those now being carried out as
part of Taiwan’s major capital construction projects.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This study has focused on three aspects of Taiwan’s transpor-
tation system. We began by examining the salient temporal
changes in the highway and rail transportation networks from
the 1600s to the present. Then we analyzed the connectivity
of the highway and rail networks in this century and investi-
gated the relationship between network connectivity and the
level of regional economic development. Finally, we analyzed
the accessibility and connectivity of urban centers, or nodes, on
the highway and rail networks to examine in greater detail the
spatial relationships between nodal location on a network and
the level of economic growth at the urban center.
This research is set within a broad literature treating the
interdependencies between transport and regional growth. It
adds an empirical dimension to that literature by analyzing and
interpreting the changing structure of Taiwan’s transportation
system. Some brief concluding comments are offered here to
place these empirical findings within a conceptual framework.
The analysis and interpretation of transportation investment
and development in Taiwan reveal parallels with the country’s
regional growth. It has not been possible at this level of study
to establish the exact causal links between transport change
and economic growth. It is nevertheless clear—whether for the
Taiwan road and rail networks as a whole or for spatial variation
within those networks on Taiwan—that expansion of transpor-
tation is associated with changing economic conditions on the
island, especially in urban areas. The relationships, however,
are not so invariant as to permit precise statistical prediction.
Based on historical-geographical evaluation and quantitative
analysis, this study demonstrates both where and why transpor-
tation development has taken place in Taiwan.
Since the late nineteenth century the transportation sector
in Taiwan has been a major beneficiary of an investment pattern
of capital improvement. Since the investments tended to be at
nodal points, transportation could be said to have stimulated
development because locations with high connectivity and ac-
cessibility were seen as more attractive. At the same time,
investments at nodal points generated demands for improve-
ments in transportation services and facilities. With the trans-
formation from an agricultural to a commercialized economic
system, transport not only served the urban nodes in their ex-
change patterns with one another. Agriculture also benefited.
As market access for agricultural products was increased, agri-
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culture underwent certain changes and agricultural materials
were more easily transported. Rural market centers began to
flourish and in turn became more closely integrated economi-
cally and linked by transport to bigger cities. Although the de-
velopment of transportation on Taiwan has been complex, this
sector has interacted with other economic sectors in both a
push and pull fashion. It comes as no surprise, then, that the
structure of the transportation network at any given time has
been a reflection of the interplay of economic, administrative,
and social forces in a specific geographical setting.
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Push Car Railways and
Taiwan’s Development
RONALD G. KNAPP
Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan in 1895 linked an island of sub-
stantial economic potential to a fledgling colonial empire. By
almost any measure, considerable economic development took
place throughout the following fifty years of Japanese occu-
pation. During this period an economy that had been frag-
mented and largely subsistence oriented was transformed into
one which was increasingly integrated and produced a con-
siderable export surplus. Although industrial development oc-
curred, Japanese colonial policy principally stimulated agri-
culture, orienting this sector to serve domestic needs on the
home islands. The infusion of Japanese capital—in human and
material terms—resulted in time in a modernized transportation
system and communications system, a pervasive educational
system, and a highly productive agricultural system based on
technological and institutional improvements that were the
envy of other colonial powers. The story of this achievement is
well known and need not be elaborated here.1
At the core of the Japanese development program was the
creation of a transport network that would permit the perme-
ation of colonial military and civilian control to the local level
and, as well, facilitate the outward movement of agricultural
goods. The Japanese inherited a skeletal transport system that
had evolved during more than two hundred years of Chinese
occupance of the island, a topic described in the preceding
chapter. The overall sequence of Taiwan’s network development
was essentially similar to that documented elsewhere in the
colonial and then developing world.2 Indeed, James Wheeler
and Clifton Pannell have suggested the Taiwan example as
having specific utility in verifying the generalized Taaffe model.3
Ports, roads, and steam railway lines were universal compo-
nents of these network sequences. In the case of Taiwan, these
elements were supplemented by a distinctive and imaginative
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transport innovation: the push car railway. This important and
short-lived form of intermediate technology has been ignored
by most writers as a factor which stimulated the agricultural
sector to produce a marketable surplus. Although it is not pos-
sible to measure the role played by push car railways, it seems
certain that the small farm-holding system could not have been
so quickly articulated without them.
Narrow gauge push car railways were introduced to the
island in the months immediately after Taiwan was ceded to
the Japanese. Over the next fifty years, they brought quasi-
modern freight and passenger service to rural and urban set-
tlements throughout the coastal plains which rim Taiwan. In
most cases, this innovation preceded roads into rural areas and
provided feeder service to the north-south trunk steam railway
which was completed during the first decade of the Japanese
occupation. With minimum capital investment and maximum
flexibility, push car railways stimulated the transformation of
an underdeveloped agricultural sector into a productive one.
Moreover, they provided an effective integrating mechanism for
administrative control. This chapter places the push car railway
in the context of transport development in Taiwan. It focuses
on the nature and extent of the lines and examines their role
in the articulation of the fragmented markets inherited by the
Japanese.
THE EQUIPMENT
Push car railways were called daisha in Japanese; because of
their significance during the Japanese period this name will be
used rather than the Chinese pronunciation of the same char-
acters, t’ai-ch’e. The name literally indicates a platform car
somewhat like the trams used in early coal and ore mines.
Unlike the pump handcar used widely on western American
railways during the late nineteenth century and to which the
daisha is a crude kin, a daisha was propelled from behind by
one or two persons who pushed on vertical poles extending
above the platform. A narrow ledge at the rear enabled the
pushers to gain a toehold respite on downhill runs. Loads of
up to 450 pounds could be transported on each platform car
(Figure 10-1). Modified with benches and a covering awning,
passenger daisha could carry up to four riders (Figures 10-2
and 10-3). Light 12-pound rails were either screwed or spiked
to small-diameter unfinished logs laid on a crude roadbed. The
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Figure 10–1. Moving freight by daisha. [From Alice Ballantine Kir-
jassoff, “Formosa the Beautiful,” National Geographic Magazine
38(March 1920).]
rail gauge was generally 18 to 20 inches. Speeds of up to 6
miles per hour could be maintained on level ground; on slopes,
speeds of over 12 miles per hour were possible. Most lines were
single-tracked. When push cars from opposite directions would
meet, one would be removed from the tracks to enable the other
to pass. Elaborate trestles and bridges were built to cross the
numerous short rivers of the western coastal plain which fre-
quently flooded (Figure 10-4).
THE INHERITED TRANSPORTATION PATTERN
In the decades prior to the Japanese arrival in 1895, north-
south travel was slow and tedious in spite of a Chinese imperial
roadway which linked the administrative subcenters and market
towns of the western coastal plain. Along this route post sta-
tions were sited to provide shelter and meals for officials in
transit as well as for couriers transmitting documents. Some in-
dication of the quality of the imperial road is suggested by the
fact that dispatch service in Taiwan was only on foot whereas
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Figure 10–2. Passenger traffic across one of Taiwan’s rubble-strewn
riverbeds. [From Yosaburo Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa (New
York: Longmans, Green, 1907).]
routes on the mainland were usually serviced by mounted
courier.4 The overland journey from Tan-shui to T’ai-wan-fu
(now Tainan), about 350 kilometers apart, took as many as nine-
teen days as one nineteenth-century English traveler noted.5
Difficulties encountered in moving bulk shipments of rice from
one part of the island to another frequently necessitated trans-
porting the staple by junk from one Taiwan port to Amoy or
Foochow on the mainland and then transshipping it back to an-
other island port.6 Within the constricted hinterlands of market
towns and ports or coastal anchorages, Chinese settlers moved
by foot along paths which followed streams or ran along narrow
embankments separating one paddy field from another. Since
the geometry of these embankments was irregular, the shortest
traveling distance between settlements was less likely a straight
line than a zigzag route enforced by plot margins. Locally, the
shoulder pole was used for carrying goods. Coolie-borne palan-
quins carried travelers from one area to another.
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Figure 10–3. Passenger daisha at Mt. Kappan (Chiao-pan-shan). [From
the collection of Professor Michael Finnegan.]
Taiwan languished fairly remote from imperial authority and
systematic development until the island was elevated to
provincial status in 1887. The appointment of an able governor
led to dramatic improvements in the modernization and eco-
nomic integration of the island.7 Prominent among his efforts
was a steam rail line that stretched southward from the port
of Keelung through Taipei to a temporary railhead at Hsin-chu.
Beset by labor and construction difficulties, this 80-kilometer
line took six years to lay. Poor land transport frustrated the
provincial government during its final years, and in 1895 the
Japanese fell heir to a fragmented economy.
Japanese judgments of turn-of-the-century transport in
Taiwan were harsh. After visiting Taiwan, one member of the
Japanese Diet wrote of
the difficulty of traveling from one part to another, there being
nothing in the island worth calling a road. There were paths
leading from village to village; there were some country roads
connecting the towns with the surrounding villages; but it was im-
possible to find anything like a State or Government road from
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Figure 10–4. Passenger traffic across a high trestle. [From Joseph Bal-
lantine, “I Lived on Formosa,” National Geographic Magazine
87(January 1945).]
town to town…. State as well as commercial relations were con-
fined within very narrow limits, the villages depending on some
small town which they had taken as their center. Even the country
roads above mentioned which ran from village to village were
not like those in Japan, but were rather boundary lines round the
farms, being in most cases little more than a foot wide. Travelers
were obliged, therefore, either to walk or go in chairs.8
Inadequate transport was both a cause and a result of the
low productivity of agriculture. “The economy,” say Chang and
Myers, “was basically subsistence oriented, made up of nu-
merous insulated markets that had little possibility of expanding
or integrating without major improvements in communications,
transport, and financing.”9 Great intraisland disparities in com-
modity prices resulted from this restricted market situation
(Table 10-1). It would be wrong to suggest that changes in com-
munications, transport, and financing alone expanded markets
and stimulated agricultural productivity. They were crucial,
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TABLE 10–1
Market Price Comparisons (in Yen): ca. 1907
Market Unhulled Rice
(5 bushels)
Sweet Potatoes
(100 chin)a
Fowl
(100 chin)
Coal
(100 chin)
Taipei 5.36 0.96 26.87 0.35
Hsin-chu 4.92 0.75 23.00 —
Miao-li 3.93 0.66 — —
Tainan 5.10 0.62 22.50 1.00
Chia-i 3.20 0.55 18.75 1.00
a 1 chin equals 0.5 kilogram.
SOURCE: Yoszbuto Tikekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa (New
York: Longmans, Green, 1907), p. 270.
however, and together with institutional and scientific improve-
ments led to rapid and sustained agricultural growth over a
three-decade period.10
JAPANESE IMPROVEMENTS
The Japanese occupation authorities acknowledged these
inadequacies and disparities, but initially they spurred trans-
portation improvements only to secure order. During the early
months of the occupation, pacification efforts were challenged
by bands of brigands roaming the island. From 1897 to 1901,
according to a Japanese visitor, “no government official or rich
man could travel any distance without police protection. Within
three or four miles of the capital travelers had to defend their
lives with swords and pistols.”11 The American consul on Taiwan
accompanied Japanese troops on some maneuvers and offered
an account of the wearisome single-file marches of infantry
who were unaccustomed to the “blazing sun and hot, damp
nights” of the subtropics.12 As insurgency turned to outright re-
bellion and general lawlessness, it became necessary to move
increasing numbers of troops and ordnance. This need spurred
the building of the first push car railway on Taiwan. Like the
ricksha, which had been introduced into Japan in the mid-nine-
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teenth century, reportedly by a western missionary, the push
car railway proved an especially suitable innovation in transport
technology.13
In December 1895, only eight months after Japan had pro-
claimed sovereignty over the island, a light push car railway
was completed between Tainan and Kaohsiung.14 By February
1898 this line had been extended northward to Hsin-chu where
it joined the steam railroad. In 1899, work was begun on re-
building the Chi-lung to Hsin-chu steam line itself, which had
suffered from poor engineering when it was originally built by
the Chinese. At this time, there were 359 kilometers of push
car railways and 97 kilometers of steam railway lines on the
island.15 Over the next four decades, steam railroad trackage in-
creased steadily to 910.7 kilometers.16 Push car railways, on the
other hand, experienced a varied pattern of punctuated growth
and decline vis-à-vis steam railways (Figure 10-5).
In most cases daisha routes preceded steam railroad lines
and improved roads, providing a relatively inexpensive and
easily constructed transportation mode. During the formative
period of modern transport development, the daisha served as
a flexible means for the articulation of fragmented markets and
enabled the immediate penetration of Japanese civil and mil-
itary authority to many inhabited areas. Along the coastal plain
the combined daisha/steam railway lines formed the backbone
of the trunk route until the com pletion of the all-steam trunk
line. Indeed, an English-language handbook for travelers com-
piled at the turn of the century recommended the “narrow-
gauge tramway … consisting of open trucks furnished with
seats and pushed by men.”17 These combined routes allowed a
traveler to make it between Taipei and Tainan in two days. The
extension of the steam railhead southward rendered a parallel
push car line obsolete and as a result the redundant light tracks
were torn up. By the time steam locomotives reached Kaohsiung
in 1905, Taiwan was firmly under Japanese control and the mil-
itary need for the push cars had lessened. Because of these
changes and consequent abandonment of routes, the remaining
short and unconnected daisha lines added up to only 267 kilo-
meters in 1909. Such a low figure was not to be seen again
until the 1950s. Steam railroad trackage, on the other hand, in-
creased meanwhile to 436 kilometers. Moreover, parallel to the
railroad “a good wide carriage road” passable in all seasons was
available, having been completed in late 1904.18
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Figure 10–5. Patterns of push car and steam railway development.
Much of the abandoned military daisha trackage and
equipment came into the hands of private entrepreneurs who
recognized the push car lines as an appropriate means to open
up the potentially productive local hinterlands of market towns
strung out along the trunk road and steam rail lines. Daisha
routes, in this way, preceded local roads and competed only
with narrow intervillage paths. Daisha as a simple transport
mode generated bulk goods traffic that would otherwise have
been carried on shoulder poles or in push or pull carts. Over
the next forty years, centripetally oriented systems of access
routes evolved which are seen today in the extant road pattern.
Such local radial systems focused on specific market centers
that were themselves interconnected by the longitudinal trunk
lines. Later in this chapter I assess the role of daisha in a local
area.
Total island-wide daisha trackage reached 1,087 kilometers
in December 1916. The daisha vehicles themselves increased
from 1,902 units in 1909 to 5,913 units in 1916; moreover, they
continued to increase to more than 7,000 in 1919. By then,
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however, total trackage had decreased—primarily because of
consolidation and the elimination of unprofitable lines. A re-
vision of government regulations regarding privately operated
daisha routes in 1922 stimulated freight and passenger traffic.
Trackage again was expanded, reaching 1,367 kilometers in
1931. Freight revenues swelled to 1,670,000 yen in 1927; by
then the annual volume of freight carried reached more than
840,000 metric tons. Passenger traffic peaked in 1928 at a
figure of more than 5,300,000.19 Subsequent declines in
trackage, units, and volume of passenger and freight traffic re-
sulted from the improvement of roads and the competition of
trucks and buses.
THE DAISHA AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1934, sixty-two regionally restricted companies operated
push car lines on the island, with company trackage varying
from 1.2 to 104 kilometers. Some companies operated with as
few as 3 daisha; one had 550. As a means of transport, the
daisha took on different meaning from one district to another
(Table 10-2). Total trackage was greatest in the Hsin-chu dis-
trict, where the coastal plain is framed on the east by nu-
merous jutting tablelands and cut by several streams which flow
westward to the Straits of Taiwan. When expressed as a ratio,
passenger per kilometer loads were highest in the Taipei dis-
trict. Freight, as well, was greatest in the Taipei district, feeding
coal to the trunk steam line and camphor and tea to the re-
fineries at the capital. The principal company in this district
carried almost half a million passengers as well as 150,000
metric tons of freight during 1934 on its 45 kilometers of light
track.20
At this point it will be useful to change the scale of the dis-
cussion and examine the role played by daisha in one part of
Hsin-chu district. On the T’ao-yuan alluvial fan it is possible to
examine the changing fortunes of the daisha companies in re-
lation to alternative transportation modes. An analysis of the
evolving network provides insights into the process of transport
improvement and its complementarity with local development.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ar-
duous reclamation by migrants from the mainland transformed
the T’ao-yuan into productive wet rice fields.21 The settlers
moved on foot and, as elsewhere on the island, narrow paths
followed shallow stream banks or ran along the narrow em-
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TABLE 10–2
Daisha Statistics for 1934
Taipei
District
Hsin-chu
District
Taichung
District
Tainan
District
Other
Number of
companies
8 17 18 14 5
Trackage (km) 147 400 365 261 72
Number of
daisha
572 1,772 1,628 767 193
Passengers 948,533 701,849 966,475 346,071 123,059
Freight
(metric
tons)
226,278 215,531 170,497 58,266 5,126
SOURCE: Tseng Wang-yang, T’ai-wan chiao-t’ung shih (Taipei:
T’ai-wan yin-hang, 1955), pp. 66–67.
bankments that separated paddy fields. The area had no im-
perial administrative capital to which economic functions could
gravitate. Agriculture was subsistence oriented and production
never in sufficient abundance to nurture long-distance trade.
Economic development during this period depended more upon
the growth of population and expanding reclamation of land
than it did upon commercialization. Stimulated by increased
world demand for tea and the existence of an open port in
northern Taiwan, European and American concerns in the latter
half of the nineteenth century encouraged the market-oriented
cultivation of tea on the acidic hillsides that framed the up-
stream areas of the T’ao-yuan plain. By 1887, some 86 percent
of the value of Taiwan’s total exports was from these northern
tea fields.22 Although camphor manufacturing had had a long
history on the island, the natural stands of camphor on hill lands
to the east of the T’ao-yuan plain were only exploited from 1887.
In that year, the governor nationalized camphor gathering and
processing, making it a government monopoly, and established
bureau headquarters at Ta-k’o-k’an (subsequently renamed Ta-
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ch’i). As an active river port, Ta-k’o-k’an grew so rapidly that by
1900 it had a population greater than that of any town on the
T’ao-yuan plain.23
By this time, however, the Tan-shui River which linked Ta-
ch’i with the Taipei basin and the ports of northern Taiwan
had increasingly become clogged with silt and was unusable
even by shallow-draft vessels. To compensate for the silting of a
primary trade route, a 14-kilometer daisha line was built from
the former river port to the steam railway station at T’ao-yuan
town.24 Meanwhile, in other areas of the island the revenue po-
tential that could be derived from tapping the surplus produce
of Taiwan’s peasants drew private capital into this transport
sector. In the decade after 1909, daisha trackage burgeoned.
Increased daisha trackage on the T’ao-yuan plain, however,
was delayed because natural rather than technological factors
conspired to retard agricultural productivity. The principal im-
pediment had been the year-to-year variability of rainfall, a con-
dition which eighteenth and nineteenth-century pioneers had
contended with by building shallow ponds and limited canals.25
Nowhere else on the island were ponds found in such numbers;
by the twentieth century some eight thousand ponds of various
sizes occupied 9 percent of the T’ao-yuan alluvial plain.26 In
spite of these efforts and careful tillage, the population-sup-
porting capacity—and therefore the potentiality of a large agri-
cultural surplus—lagged behind other areas until the water
problem could be thoroughly resolved.
A major drought in 1913 and the desire of the government to
stimulate rice production in areas closer to the colonial capital
at Taipei prompted a decision to build the T’ao-yuan irrigation
canal with funds allocated from the colonial treasury. Con-
struction began in 1916 and was completed in 1928. Water
was drawn from the Tan-shui River above Ta-ch’i and carried
through a tunnel for 16 kilometers before it was distributed by
a number of subsidiary canals.27 Simultaneously, local efforts
were encouraged to undertake improvements in the distribution
and size of ponds. The full impact of these changes occurred
at elevations below 100 meters. Irrigated acreage increased
by 28 percent overall, although in some areas it exceeded 50
percent. Double-cropping was assured. Per hectare yields be-
tween 1921 and 1925, even before the project was fully oper-
ational, increased 50 percent on the alluvial plain as a whole.
In some townships increases exceeded 100 percent.28 Mean-
while, the T’ao-yuan area was joined with the Hsin-chu area
in 1920 to form the large prefecture of Hsin-chu. Farmers’ as-
CHINA’S ISLAND FRONTIER
210
sociations were prodded by the government to increase their
investment in extension and demonstration work. In 1922, a
high-yield variety of rice, horai (p’eng-lai), especially preferred
by Japanese consumers was introduced to the peasants of Hsin-
chu through the farmers’ associations. Newfound rural pros-
perity evidenced itself in reduced tenancy, small increases in
farm size, and proportionally greater household expenditures
for housing, clothing, and other nonfood items.
The proximity of the T’ao-yuan plain to the colonial capital
as well as the prospects of heightened prosperity there brought
entrepreneurs to the area, perhaps none of whom anticipated
the magnitude of the commercialization of agriculture which
was to come during the 1920s and 1930s. Between 1912 and
1919 fourteen daisha routes were added to the original T’ao-
yuan/Ta-ch’i route which had been built in 1904 (Table 10-3 and
Figure 10-6). Operated by three companies, each focusing on
one market town along the trunk steam line, these daisha routes
facilitated the profound changes which were to take place in the
T’ao-yuan countryside. Passenger and freight traffic on these
routes swelled. Annual passenger traffic increased to 354,829
in 1921 and peaked at a figure of 396,016 in 1928. Freight, prin-
cipally agricultural produce, reached 62,134,160 chin in 1921,
almost tripling to 168,204,800 chin in 1928. Without the daisha
it is unlikely that agriculture would have become so commer-
cialized so quickly because peasants would have been unwilling
to produce a surplus unless it could be moved to market.
The monopoly on the transport of goods and passengers en-
joyed by the daisha companies was altered ultimately, however,
by the government’s decision to spur the construction of roads
in rural areas. Having completed at the expense of the colonial
treasury the principal arteries of Taiwan’s transportation
network by 1925, the governor-general’s transportation bureau
charged each of its prefectural and subprefectural units with
the capitalization of local roads of varying widths, some to carry
motor vehicles and others only pedestrians and animal-drawn
carts. Aware of the traffic generated by daisha between certain
points, motor feeder routes were built parallel to the profitable
private daisha lines. Such public roads undercut daisha advan-
tages and brought about competition. The decline in daisha
traffic was not precipitous but it was certain, as less costly
bus and truck transport took to the roads that were being laid
out at government expense alongside the daisha tracks (Table
10-4). By 1935, fourteen prefectural roads with widths between
7.4 and 11 meters had been built between T’ao-yuan, Chung-li,
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TABLE 10–3
Daisha Routes on the T’ao-yuan Plain
Route Length of
Track (km)
Date
Established
Date
Curtailed
T’ao-yuan Push Car Company
(33 stations; 340 daisha)
T’ao-yuan to Ta-ch’i 14.2 1904 n.a.
T’ao-yuan to Ta-yuan 16.1 1912 1939
T’ao-yuan to Nan-k’an 6.4 1913 1939
T’ao-yuan to Hsin-chuang
(via Ling-ting)
15.1 1912-14 n.a.
T’ao-yuan to Chu-wei 11.3 1919 1939
Pa-kuei-ts’o to Chung-li 16.3 n.a. 1939
(Keng-liao-chiao-Ch’ing-pu)
Ta-ch’i to Chiao-pan-shan 22.9 n.a. 1953
Chung-li Push Car Company (22
stations; 223 daisha)
Chung-li to Lung-t’an n.a. 1918 1935
Chung-li to Kuan-yin n.a. 1918 1953
San-ts’o-wu to Hsin-wu n.a. 1918 1935
Chung-li to Tung-shih n.a. 1918 1935
Hsin-p’o to Ts’ao-lo n.a. 1918 1935
Yang-mei Push Car Company
(16 stations; 74 daisha)
Hsin-wu to Shih-lei-tzu n.a. 1918 1939
Yin-ying-wo to Ta-p’o 31.9 1918 1939
Yang-mei to K’an-t’ou-ts’o n.a. 1918 1939
SOURCE: T’ao-yuan hsien-chih, chuan szu, ching-chi-chih, hsia
[T’ao-yuan hsien gazetteer, vol. 4, economics], pp. 57–61
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Figure 10–6. Push car railway development on the T’ao-yuan plain ca.
1930.
Yang-mei, and the outlying township seats.29 Intending to mo-
nopolize passenger revenue, the T’ao-yuan Push Car Company
organized a bus company in 1923 whose service ran parallel
to its own daisha route between T’aoyuan and Ta-ch’i. Similar
competing service developed between other pairs of towns
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Thus the push car companies
were able to introduce buses over routes which were to sup-
plant their original daisha routes with little loss of passenger
service to their rural patrons. The shift in passenger service was
direct and rapid. By 1939, passenger traffic on daisha had de-
creased by 96 percent over the 1921 statistic.
On the other hand, freight traffic on daisha increased
throughout the 1920s by almost three times before declining.
Even in 1939, daisha were carrying nearly one-third the freight
carried in 1921. For the most part, there was no dramatic shift
in this sector to a modern twentieth-century mode of vehicular
transport in the moving of agricultural produce. Although the
roads were not built for their special benefit, peasants took
to the roads, using slack-season labor to transport much of
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TABLE 10–4
Daisha Traffic on the T’ao-yuan Plain
Year Passengers Index Freight (chin) Index
1921 354,829 100.00 62,134,160 100.00
1928 396,016 111.60 168,205,800 270.71
1933 171,358 48.29 55,391,680 89.15
1935 224,941 63.39 70,390,380 113.29
1938 90,804 25.59 38,223,180 61.52
1939 13,330 3.76 22,083,860 35.54
1942 57,818 16.29 5,074,849 8.17
SOURCE: T’ao-yuan hsien-chih, chuan szu, ching-chi chih. hsia,
[T’ao-yuan hsien gazetteer, vol. 4, economics], p. 59
their own produce to market. During the 1920s and 1930s, im-
proved oxcarts—some with rubber tires—increased islandwide
to 65,000 in 1935. Furthermore, the number of bicycles, most
with a freight platform on the rear, increased from 32,140 in
1922 to 248,328 in 1935.30 Beyond doubt there was a marked
heightening of accessibility for even a runner with a carrying
pole as straight and level routes took the place of winding paths.
Although comparative haulage costs are not available for trucks
or carts in contrast to push car railways, figures are obtainable
that place the daisha at a clear time and cost disadvantage
when compared to motorized buses in carrying passengers
(Table 10-5). This information indicates the ability of bus lines
to offer lower fares and cut the travel time by over 50 percent.31
Daisha fares, moreover, generally varied with the terrain and
the weather. By the mid-1950s, daisha passenger fares av-
eraged 0.07 yen per mile as compared to 0.05 yen per mile for
buses. Average per mile fares on ordinary trains were 0.065 yen
for first class, 0.045 yen for second class, and 0.025 yen for
third class.32
The daisha had become extravagant relicts past their peak
utility. On the T’ao-yuan plain, daisha lines were curtailed one
by one beginning in 1935. By 1940, most had been abandoned
and the traffic absorbed on the roads. During World War II a cu-
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rious revival occurred because of gasoline shortages, but this
recovery was shortlived. Some of the lines were dismantled and
taken into the rugged interior where they constituted the sole
means of advanced transport until there, too, roads penetrated.
SUMMARY
The factors involved in the elaboration of a transportation
network are indeed complex. Improved transport not only stim-
ulates geographic change; it is itself altered by the cumulative
dynamics of that change. Moreover, although a basic transpor-
tation network assumes integrity in its wholeness, it must not
be forgotten that most networks evolve in piecemeal fashion.
The interdependency among existing transport modes and their
aggregate impact on economic development can seldom be pre-
cisely discerned. In Taiwan the creation of an articulated mul-
timodal transportation infrastructure was a necessary prereq-
uisite to effective colonial control and exploitation. Over a
period of half a century, the island was not only physically
integrated through the expansion and upgrading of transport
linkages. It was also transformed into a productive agricultural
appendage of Japan.
Push car railways played a signal role in this development.
As a flexible, low-cost mode of passenger and freight transport,
daisha served well as the predecessor of the road and the
railroad. Push car lines, furthermore, provided an efficient, cen-
tripetally oriented system of access routes radiating from
market centers that were themselves interconnected by the
north-south road and steam railway which terminated at the
ports. They were instrumental in articulating the insular
economies inherited by the Japanese. A unique component in
the sequence of transportation development in Taiwan, daisha
routes were later undercut by the development of feeder roads
that not only enabled the passage of motorized vehicles but of-
fered as well a surface favorable to carts drawn by people or
animals. The overall technical improvements initiated by the
Japanese during their colonial venture stressed the use of those
factors which were abundant and untransferable with little op-
portunity cost. Daisha typified this use of limited technology in
stimulating productivity and commercial accessibility in rural
areas. This innovative transportation mode was land-saving and
labor-intensive, it was compatible with a small-scale agricul-
tural system, and it did not put demands on the scarce factors
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TABLE 10–5
Fare and Running Time Comparisons between Buses and Daisha
Daisha Service Bus Service
Route Running
Time
(minutes)
Fare
(yen)
Running
Time
(minutes)
Fare
(yen)
T’ao-yuan to Nan-k’an 40 0.29 25 0.24
T’ao-yuan to Ta-ch’i 120 0.58 40 0.45
Chung-li to Kuan-yin 60 0.79 60 0.60
Chung-li to Lung-t’an 90 0.45 30 0.35
Yang-mei to K’an-t’ou-ts’o 90 0.45 45 0.45
SOURCE: Taiwan (Formosa) Shinchiku Province, Civil Affairs
Handbook (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Navy Department, 1944), p. 24; after Taiwan
Tetsudo Annal (Taiwan railway guide] (Taihoku: n.p., 1932).
of the economy. Today only vestiges of this intermediate tech-
nology are found in the high mountain core of the island and in
the vicinity of several aboriginal villages visited by tourists.
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Sugar: The Sweetener in
Taiwan’s Development
JACK F. WILLIAMS
Francois Valentyn, in his seventeenth-century study Oud en
Nieuw Oost-Indien, described the economy of Taiwan during the
Dutch period: “The Chinese … occupied themselves in trade and
agriculture, by which latter means much rice and sugar was
produced here, so that whole shiploads were annually sent to
other places.”1 In that brief statement one has a succinct and
accurate description of the economy that characterized Taiwan
for most of the several centuries of the island’s existence as
a subregion of Chinese settlement and development. Rice, the
dominant food crop, was used by the farmers for their suste-
nance, for sale on the local market, and for shipment to the
mainland. Rice largely set the character of the rural landscape
and agrarian cycle.
But also prominent in that landscape was sugar cane, the
principal cash crop, grown by farmers as a main source of extra
income. Sugar sold to middlemen eventually found its way on
ships to foreign markets, earning much, in some periods most,
of the foreign exchange for Taiwan. But even beyond export
earnings, sugar was indeed a sweetener in the island’s devel-
opment. The growing, processing, and marketing of cane sugar
had a profound and in many respects positive impact on various
elements of the economy and agrarian structure—land use prac-
tices, agricultural modernization, farm prices and incomes, and
employment. At the same time, however, the spread of cane cul-
tivation and the growth of the sugar industry, especially during
the Japanese colonial era, had a number of deleterious effects
on the same agrarian structure and economy. Taiwan underwent
an economic transformation after 1950: the relatively simple
agrarian economic system based on the two cornerstones of rice
and sugar evolved into a system that was highly diversified and
industrialized. Still, although the relative position of sugar was
diminished, the product remained a major element in Taiwan’s
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economic and cultural landscape. In short, no discussion of
Taiwan’s historical geography would be complete without ref-
erence to the role of the sugar industry.
THE INDUSTRY BEFORE 1895
No one has yet been able to pinpoint the exact beginnings of
sugar cane cultivation in Taiwan. The Chinese historical records
are imprecise on this point. All that is certain is that sugar
cane was already growing on the island when the Dutch arrived
in 1624. It may be surmised that the Chinese immigrants who
began to settle the island before the Dutch got there brought
cane seedlings with them from their native provinces of Fukien
and Kwangtung, historic areas of cane cultivation on the
mainland. As pioneers setting off for what was then a little
known and forbidding frontier island, the settlers brought with
them seed for crops they were used to growing in their native
areas, but without really knowing, in all probability, the suit-
ability of Taiwan for the crops. With sugar cane, at least, there
was no problem, as the island had a subtropical climate similar
to that of Fukien and Kwangtung, one well suited to cane
growing.2 Cane flourished from the beginning, albeit on a small
scale. By 1624, sugar was already a principal export item. In
fact, the first difficulties between the arriving Dutch and the
Chinese and some Japanese colonists already on the island
arose from Dutch efforts to impose an export duty on sugar and
rice.3
The Dutch and Sugar
The Dutch era was but a brief interlude in Taiwan’s long history
and left remarkably little permanent imprint on Taiwan’s land-
scape. The Dutch entered Taiwan only as a second choice
anyway, because of their being denied access to the mainland.
But once established in their little toehold on the southwest
coast of Taiwan, the Dutch set about making the most of their
opportunities. Apart from their vigorous missionary activities,
the Dutch aggressively promoted agricultural development in
the limited areas under their control. This endeavor included
the promotion of sugar cane, which the Dutch recognized as
a profitable commodity for trade via their Dutch East India
Company. Sugar exports rose, as a result, from a relatively low
volume of 120,000 to 300,000 catties (79–197 tons) in 1636 to
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a high of 2 million catties (about 1,300 tons) in 1660.4 Ch’en
Cheng-hsiang gives an even higher production figure of 6,000
metric tons of sugar by 1650, but, as James Davidson suggests,
a figure of even 5,000 tons was probably exaggerated in view
of the small area planted in cane at that time.5 More significant
is the fact that two-thirds of Taiwan’s sugar was already going
to Japan—a trading pattern established very early in the sugar
industry’s history.6
The Dutch impact, while of some consequence in helping
spread the cultivation of cane and the growth of the sugar in-
dustry, should not be exaggerated. As Wen-hsiung Hsu notes in
Chapter 1, there is some disagreement over the Chinese popu-
lation on the island. Most of the island was under the control
of non-Chinese aborigines who were outside the authority of
the Dutch. George Candidius, the first Dutch missionary on
the island, did write, however, that the aborigines close to the
Dutch on the southwest coast had acquired at least some agri-
cultural practices, including the planting of rice and sugar.7
Nevertheless, the aborigines had little if anything to do with
the sugar industry then; nor were they involved in succeeding
periods right up to the present time. The Dutch enclave was a
small territory less than the size of the present Tainan hsien.
Control extended only sporadically and weakly beyond their en-
clave. Still, by encouraging Chinese immigration to the island,
and by promoting the advantages of sugar cane in cropping
systems, the Dutch at least set the initial pattern that was to be
expanded upon in succeeding periods.
The Cheng Period and Sugar
Dutch plans for Taiwan were thwarted by the conqueror Cheng
Ch’eng-kung (Koxinga) and his plans to use Taiwan as an eco-
nomic and military base in his campaign to retake the mainland
from the Manchus. Cheng also recognized the merit of vigorous
sugar exports to help spur the economic revitalization of his
island retreat. Hence he gave great impetus to the sugar in-
dustry, introducing large quantities of seed plants from Fukien,
expanding the area under cane cultivation, and generally trying
to modernize operations (by the standards of that day).8
Cheng’s son, Cheng Ching, paid even greater attention to the
industry. By the close of the century, just after the Manchu gov-
ernment finally gained control over Taiwan, sugar exports had
reached as much as 18,000 metric tons a year.9
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Ch’ing Rule and Sugar
For slightly over two centuries following the collapse of the
Cheng family rule on Taiwan (1683–1895), the island was ruled
as a somewhat ill-regarded appendage to the mainland. The
well-documented neglect of Taiwan during the Ch’ing dynasty,
the longest continuous period of rule in Taiwan’s history, ex-
tended to the sugar industry as well. The administration of the
island reverted, in effect, to the various Chinese local groups.
Operation of the sugar industry likewise reverted largely to
private enterprise. Thousands of farmers continued to grow
cane, and the milling and marketing of sugar continued on
through the eighteenth century much as had been the practice
before then. In the mid-1700s, Luchow, the famed Chinese
statesman, noted the thousands of Taiwanese engaged in the
sugar industry and remarked on the fact that a large share
of the sugar consumed in China’s northern provinces came
from Taiwan. In 1833 the Canton Register recorded over twenty
junks arriving at the port of Tientsin loaded with sugar from
Taiwan.10
It was the stimulus of the western colonial powers in the
nineteenth century, however, that sparked a considerable ex-
pansion of the sugar industry toward the close of the Ch’ing
era on Taiwan. In 1856, Robinet & Company, an American firm,
became the first westerners to have commercial operations on
the island since the Dutch left almost two centuries earlier. The
firm set up shop in the port of Takao (Kaohsiung) to handle ex-
ports of sugar (among other things)—principally brown sugar
bound for Japan and both white and brown sugar destined for
the China mainland. Before 1870, total exports of sugar had
never exceeded 18,500 tons in any year. But then in 1870, due
to growing demand in Australia, exports shot up to a record
37,000 tons. The years following 1870, however, up to 1895,
were marked by extreme fluctuations in foreign demand for
Taiwan’s sugar as well as political complications such as the
Sino-French War of 1884. The unstable demand had profound
effects on domestic sugar production, a pattern that was to be
repeated many times in the ensuing century. The vagaries of
world supply and demand for sugar led to the elimination of the
Australian market by 1875, leaving only Japan and California as
major foreign buyers. The latter dropped out shortly thereafter
when it passed a tariff law on Formosan sugar which made it
uncompetitive against the growing American sugar industry.11
Thus, by the early 1880s, Japan was the chief foreign customer
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for Taiwan’s sugar, belying the notion that Japan created an arti-
ficial colonial relationship with Taiwan insofar as sugar was con-
cerned. In other words, Japan was a natural market for Taiwan
sugar. Not only did Japan’s rapid modernization and industrial
growth lead to an increase in sugar consumption, but the source
of that sugar was fairly close. In all likelihood, Japan would have
become Taiwan’s principal market for sugar even if Japan had
never colonized the island.
The impact of Ch’ing administration (or rather the lack of
it) was minimal on the sugar industry. The industry grew during
the two hundred years of that rule, but its growth was largely
initiated by private interests, stimulated toward the end by
foreign intervention in China and the Far East and the rising in-
dustrial state of Japan. Nonetheless, the sugar industry was still
very small at the turn of the century. Just as the Japanese were
about to launch their massive expansion of the sugar industry
in Taiwan, the total planted area in cane was not more than
14,000 hectares, over 80 percent of which was located in Tainan
prefecture.12 Yields were averaging anywhere from about 25 up
to 50 tons per hectare—respectable figures for that period but
quite low by modern standards.13 Myers calculated that dur-
ing the 225 years from the end of Dutch rule to the beginning
of Japanese rule, sugar production on Taiwan increased about
fiftyfold, or an annual growth rate of 1.75 percent, quite within
the capabilities of the limited agricultural system of the time.
But also significant was the fact that this increase was achieved
almost entirely by expansion in the cultivated area of cane, not
by increased productivity.14
The characteristics of the cane growing system in
nineteenth-century Taiwan are important also. Davidson, who
wrote at the turn of the century, described the system well.15
The chief characteristic was the many forms that the system
took. In the northern part of the island several types prevailed.
Sugar factories (really just small primitive mills) were often
owned by one man who obtained his cane supply from the
private growers in the neighborhood. Sometimes a miller would
handle all operations from cutting to selling the raw sugar,
paying the cane farmers half the total receipts from the sale of
the sugar. There were other arrangements as well. Sometimes
sugar millers would loan farmers the money to cover costs of
cultivation and then deduct that amount from the receipts of the
sale of the sugar before paying the farmers.
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In the southern part of the island, the contract system was
highly developed. There land was almost all owned by powerful
Chinese capitalists and landlords. They leased the land to
farmers, taking as rent a share of the sugar equal to 15 to 20
percent of the land value. Farmers could apply for a production
loan from one of the Chinese sugar merchants; in return the
farmer had to agree to sell the lender his entire crop at the
regular market price. Harvesting and milling of the cane were
sometimes done by a group of farmers jointly erecting a co-
operative mill. More commonly, however, milling was done by
the moneylenders or a syndicate of brokers representing them.
The farmers had to send their cane to the mill controlled by
the moneylender, who kept 7 percent as payment for milling
plus other deductions (for production loans and so forth). In yet
another variation, the moneylender would estimate in advance
the production of a field and make an offer to the farmer; if
the offer was accepted, the mill would send laborers to harvest
and transport the cane to the mill. This was a gamble for the
mill owner that, depending on events between planting and har-
vesting of the cane crop, could pay well or boomerang.
The mills themselves were modest operations indeed. The
typical factory was a small, crude structure, with traditional
machinery and facilities that were very inefficient in their re-
covery rate of sugar from the cane. The average mill had ten
to fourteen workers plus perhaps seven coolies to transport the
cane and sugar. It was estimated that there were 1,400 of these
tiny Chinese traditional mills in operation when the Japanese
took over.16
These complex variations in the cane growing system grew
haphazardly out of the give-and-take of a relatively free market
economy. Yosaburo Takekoshi, writing about the same time as
Davidson, but much more critically of the pre-Japanese era,
noted that in the typical situation in the south, the sugar factory
owners reaped exploitative profits. Factory owners took 15 to
20 percent of the cane as rent from tenant farmers, another 14
to 24 percent as interest on money loaned for production costs
or other purposes, and as much as 50 percent to cover the ex-
penses of the factory.17 Whether exploitative or not, this system
bore a number of similarities to the cane growing system de-
veloped during the Japanese and Nationalist periods and indi-
cates not only the continuity of economic and cultural systems
on the island through successive and quite different regimes but
also the early origins to which present features of those systems
can be traced.
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As interesting as the pre-1895 period may be, it is the years
after 1895 that are important as far as the sugar industry is con-
cerned. For it was during this time that the industry underwent
its greatest growth, took the form it still largely has today, and
had the greatest impact on the island’s economy and rural land-
scape.
THE MODERN SUGAR INDUSTRY
The basic statistics vividly indicate the remarkable growth of
the sugar industry during the past eighty years or so of
Japanese and Chinese rule. Sugar production increased from a
few thousand tons yearly around the turn of the century to a
peak during the Japanese era of over 1.4 million tons in 1939.
Following recovery from the war, production rebounded to an
average level of about 800,000 tons a year up to the present
time (Figure 11-1). Likewise, the area planted in cane expanded
greatly and reached a peak during the Japanese era of over
169,000 hectares in 1940—about one-fifth of all the agricultural
land in Taiwan at that time (Figure 11-2). Concurrently, exports
of raw sugar increased even more dramatically, reflecting the
fundamental role of sugar in the economy. Sugar exports ac-
counted for about 65 percent of all exports (by value) in 1920
and a staggering 80 percent of all exports in 1950 (Figure 11-3).
These figures show the growth. The question then is: How
did it take place and what were the consequences? Rather than
treat the Japanese and Chinese eras separately in a traditional
historical approach, it is appropriate to trace the essential pat-
terns, characteristics, and impact of the sugar industry through
the eighty-year period after 1895. This approach emphasizes
the basic thesis that the character of the industry, in practically
all respects, was established under Japanese rule, not in the Na-
tionalist era which followed.
Centralized Control
One of the most significant features of the sugar industry since
the Japanese era has been its highly centralized, monopolistic
organization. In keeping with its modernization strategy in the
home islands of Japan, the Japanese government adopted a pa-
ternalistic pattern of guidance and cooperation with private
Japanese companies in the development of the sugar industry in
Taiwan.
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Figure 11–1. Cane yield and sugar production: 1903–1975. [Data for
1903–1945 from Chou Hsien-wen, Jih-chu shih-tai T’ai-wan ching-chi
shih (Taipei: 1958); data for 1946–1975 from Taiwan Sugar Corpo-
ration (unpublished data).]
Certainly the demand was there in Japan for all the sugar
Taiwan could produce. In 1888, Japan consumed 200,000 tons
of sugar, or about 5 pounds per capita. By 1897 the figure
had risen to 10 pounds; by 1903 it stood at 12 pounds. (The
current figure is over 55 pounds.) The country was spending
20 to 30 million yen a year on sugar imports, and sugar was
one of the five most important import commodities for Japan
(Figure 11-4).18 One of Taiwan’s roles, therefore, was obvious:
to become the sugar bowl for the mother country. To do that, the
Japanese government vigorously promoted the growth of the in-
dustry.
In 1896, Dr. Nitobe Inazo, a graduate of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity in the United States and Halle University in Germany,
and one of the brilliant architects of Japan’s colonial plans for
Taiwan, was sent to the island to head the newly created Bureau
of Industry, which included agriculture and forestry. During
his five years in that post, Nitobe laid the foundation for the
colony’s economic development and expansion of the sugar in-
dustry. His plans consisted of an elaborate organization of agri-
cultural laboratories, field stations, and experimental farms for
rice and sugar cane, the development of improved breeds of
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Figure 11–2. Sugar cane’s share of cultivated land:
1902–1970. [Data from Taiwan Agricultural Statistics:
1901–1965 (1966); A History of the Taiwan Sugar Cor-
poration’s 30 Years (1976).]
poultry, pigs, cattle, tea, vegetables, and fruits, and the testing
of fertilizers and irrigation techniques. An extensive farm agent
system was also set up to ensure that every farmer would under-
stand instructions and be encouraged to increase production,
an important feature that had special bearing later on cane cul-
tivation.19
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Figure 11–3. Sugar’s share of total exports (by value): 1896–1970.
[Data from Chou (1958) and Taiwan Sugar Corporation (unpublished
data).]
The Japanese regarded the sugar industry as a “hothouse
product”—meaning that it needed protection and assistance in
getting a healthy boost. Thus in June 1902 came the first wave
of regulations, the “Measures for Promotion of the Sugar In-
dustry,” which specified the precise manner in which the gov-
ernment would assist private capitalists from Japan in setting
up operations in Taiwan.20 These elaborate measures covered
all aspects of the industry from land acquisition and other pro-
duction costs to the final marketing of raw sugar. The forms
of assistance were manifold: direct subsidies to private compa-
nies, tax benefits, loans, protective tariffs and a guaranteed
market in Japan, aid in construction of modern sugar mills, cane
railways, and other production facilities, and access to the latest
research developments through the establishment of what was
to become one of the world’s foremost sugar experiment sta-
tions—at Tainan in the heart of the old cane region.21
Japanese capitalists responded enthusiastically. The first of
the Japanese sugar companies, the Formosan Sugar Company
(also known as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, no kin to the
present TSC) was formed in 1900 with a capital of 1 million yen
(including a government subsidy of 6 percent of total capital
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Figure 11–4. Japan’s sugar supply: 1888–1902. [Data from Yosaburo
Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 246.]
investment). Among the principal investors were Prince Mori,
the Mitsui family, and the imperial household. The company
built its sugar mill at Kyoshito (Chao-tse-tao) on the railway be-
tween Tainan and Takao (Kaohsiung).22 Starting operations in
late 1901, this was the first modern Japanese sugar mill to be
built in Taiwan and was a harbinger of things to come. Other
Japanese entrepreneurs moved in shortly after. Vast tracts of
land on the island were opened up under government direction
and turned over to the sugar interests.23
In 1909 the government helped organize the Sugar Industry
Association of Taiwan (later reorganized in 1920 as simply the
Sugar Industry Association and in 1935 renamed the Sugar In-
dustry Association of Japan). This body, under whatever name,
became in effect a giant trust that controlled the entire sugar
industry. The various sugar corporations operating in Taiwan
reached collective agreement, through the association, on the
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prices to be paid farmers, production and supply of cane to
mills, marketing of sugar, and other matters related to the sugar
industry.24
Centralized control also meant the eventual elimination of
native Taiwanese participation in the industry beyond the
growing of cane. Through the monopolistic and exclusionist
practices of the sugar association, the primitive small-scale
Chinese sugar mills that dominated the industry at the turn of
the century had almost disappeared by 1920. Production was
taken over by the growing number of large, modern Japanese
mills that first appeared in 1901. By 1940 there were fifty of
these mills handling virtually all the production for the industry.
Not only were the Taiwanese squeezed out of business, but
along with them went the weaker Japanese firms that could not
stand the competition (or, more properly speaking, the collu-
sionist policies of the colonial government that favored certain
firms over others).25 Hence by 1940 four Japanese corpora-
tions—Taiwan, Meiji, Nitto Kogyo, and Enshuiko—dominated
the industry.26
Centralized control remained a principal feature of the
sugar industry after the Japanese left. In 1945, when Taiwan
was returned to China, mainland administrators and military
personnel took over virtually all important government posts,
excluding native Taiwanese at the higher levels, in a manner
that has been likened by some critics to a sort of second colonial
period for Taiwan.27 This takeover extended to the sugar in-
dustry as well. The collective assets of the confiscated Japanese
sugar corporations included: forty-two modern sugar factories
with a total daily grinding capacity of 65,000 metric tons, and of
which only eight had escaped the war with no damage; fifteen
alcohol distilleries; 114,000 hectares of land; over 3,000 kilo-
meters of narrow-gauge railway; and administrative staffs to-
taling 5,000 plus an additional 19,000 workers.28
Initially, sugar production was resumed in 1945 on a sort
of ad hoc basis. Government personnel were assigned to run
the former Japanese mills as individual units and to reconstruct
damaged facilities. The former Japanese managers were even
retained to smooth the transition. The government quickly con-
solidated operations, however. In May 1946, the Taiwan Sugar
Corporation (TSC), no relation to the former Japanese sugar
corporation, was created out of the combined Japanese assets.
This government-owned corporation was founded on capital in-
vested by the National Resources Commission of the Executive
Yuan and the Office of the Governor of Taiwan (plus some minor
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private capital). The former four Japanese corporations became
four branches of the TSC. The headquarters was set up in Taipei
with branches at major mills centrally located in the south-
west cane region—at Hu-wei, Ma-tou, Hsin-ying, and P’ing-tung
(Figure 11-5).29 The TSC became the sole organization with
authority to handle all phases of the sugar industry from initial
growing through harvesting, milling, and marketing. The TSC
set the farm price for sugar (and largely controlled the domestic
retail price as well) and decided who would grow cane. Unfor-
tunately (from the government’s perspective), the TSC did not
have the authority to set export prices. In some respects, the
TSC acquired greater monopolistic power than existed during
the Japanese era. There were important differences, however,
as we will note later.
The Regional System
Another feature of the sugar industry dating from the Japanese
era and retained under the Chinese has been the system of
cane supply regions. This system evolved early in the Japanese
era because of fierce competition among Japanese sugar mills
for the supply of cane. At first, farmers were free to sell their
cane to whatever mill they desired. But that haphazard system
led to extreme imbalances in supply and demand for cane. Fac-
tories competed strenuously among themselves. To alleviate
this problem and stabilize the industry, the government issued
in 1905 its “Restrictive Measures for Sugar Factories.” Under
these measures, the cane growing region was divided up into a
number of supply districts, one for each sugar mill. Each mill
was required to obtain cane only from its district—the move-
ment of cane from one district to another was forbidden—and
had to guarantee that it would buy all the cane grown in its
district. Since each mill had to announce in advance the price
it would pay farmers for their cane, farmers were theoretically
free to grow cane or not. Moreover, sugar factories could not
be established without permission from the government.30 The
result of all these measures was to set the spatial character of
the sugar industry on Taiwan: some fifty (at their peak) sugar
districts, each with a central mill run by a Japanese company,
drawing upon cane produced mostly by Taiwanese farmers.
While this system made sense for the stability of cane supply
and production, it nevertheless had the effect, in concert with
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Figure 11–5. Taiwan Sugar Corporation plantations and
cane regions: 1976.
the cane growing system, of restricting the farmer’s freedom of
action. In a sense, then, one could quite properly describe the
system as semi-feudalistic.
Under the Chinese, the system of cane supply regions has
been retained virtually unchanged since the Japanese era. The
one exception is the reduced number of regions (and hence
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greater average size of the regions) as the number of sugar fac-
tories declined after 1950 due to further consolidation, mod-
ernization, and a general reduction of the sugar operations of
the industry. Today there are twenty-five sugar districts grouped
into eight large regions; each region contains about three mills
and districts. As Figure 11-5 shows, the former sugar factories
closed or converted to other uses since 1946 were located pri-
marily in the northern half of the island, where cane grow-
ing conditions are less favorable than in the south. The same
restrictions that the Japanese formulated in 1905, in terms of
the supply of cane for each district, still apply today.
The Role of the Farmer
Apart from the cane supply regions, the basic structure of the
sugar industry at the farmer’s level was also set during the
Japanese era by the cane contracting system that evolved. At
first one might think it odd that the Japanese sugar companies,
which eventually owned well over 100,000 hectares, or about 10
percent of all the farmland in Taiwan, grew only a small portion
(about 20 percent on average) of the cane supply for their mills.
The remaining 80 percent was grown in a typical year by about
130,000 small Taiwanese farmers, each growing an average of
only one-half hectare. This is still the pattern today. Why this
small-scale approach? The basic answer is that it simply was
cheaper to operate this way. Through the monopolistic controls
of the sugar association, the Japanese sugar companies and
mills were able to set the terms of cane growing so that it was
very favorable financially for the companies, much more so than
if they grew their own cane.
The central mill in each sugar district would announce a
buying price at the start of each season, before the cane was
even planted, indicating what the mill would guarantee to pay
for farmers’ cane after harvesting. The farmers, in turn, were
theoretically free to accept the mill’s offer or not and to grow
other crops if they pleased. In fact, however, the sugar mills
developed a system of advances that effectively deprived the
farmers of freedom of choice. Andrew Grajdanzev, who studied
this matter closely in the early 1940s, demonstrated that
without question the system worked to the farmer’s disadvan-
tage.31 In the first place, much of the land owned by the com-
panies was rented out to farmers on the condition that they
grow cane. Moreover, water from the extensive irrigation
systems developed by the government was made available to
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the farmers on the condition that prescribed portions of the
land had to be planted in cane. This was particularly true in
the Chia-nan irrigation district in the southwest. George Kerr,
another authority on the Japanese era, vividly describes how
the Civil Administrator’s Office in Taipei would, at the request
of the sugar companies, instruct local policing agencies in the
cane region to harass small farmers who showed reluctance to
sell land to the companies or to sign contracts binding them
to supply sugar cane to certain mills at prices set by the mill
owners. “The Nitobe Plan in action raised the total output [of
sugar] and improved quality, but it reduced the farmer in the
sugar regions to a state of helpless dependence upon agencies
operating beyond his control.”32
Much of the land owned by the sugar companies was ac-
quired as a result of the extensive land survey of the island
carried out by the Land Commission in the early 1900s.
Landownership was often hard to prove because of the im-
precise land records maintained under Ch’ing administration.
If a Taiwanese claimant to land was unable to prove ownership
within a certain period of time, his land was automatically
confiscated by the government and put up for sale. Much of
this land was obtained by the sugar companies. Many farmers,
moreover, found themselves unable to support their families on
the tiny plots they could prove ownership for and were finan-
cially compelled to sell or lease their plots to others—such as
the Japanese corporations just beginning to set up large sugar
estates.33
This exploitation of the farmers extended to the prices that
mills offered them for their cane. The purchase price for cane
had nothing to do with the price of sugar; rather, it was set ac-
cording to the prevailing market price of rice, the principal com-
petitor crop of sugar cane. The trouble with this pricing scheme
was that the production costs of the two crops were completely
different. Ch’en notes that there was roughly a 2:1 ratio in the
production costs between sugar cane and rice, respectively, in
the late 1930s.34 As Table 11-1 shows, in the same period, at the
peak of the industry, with an average of 7.6 metric tons sugar
produced from a hectare of cane, the average cost for the sugar
company came to 1,336 yen, which, after deducting from gross
income of 2,058 yen for the sugar, left the company with a net
profit of 722 yen. The cane farmer, who received 524 yen, had
to deduct his production expenses from that amount before ob-
taining his net profit. Those production costs were estimated at
an average of 400 yen per hectare, leaving the farmer with a
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TABLE 11–1
Costs and Profits of Sugar Production: Taiwan Late 1930s
Costs and Profits Average per Hectare (yen)
Paid to farmer for cane 524
Milling costs 112
Consumption tax 445
Transportation and storage 255
Total production costs 1,336
Gross income from sale of sugar 2,058
Net profit to sugar company 722
NOTE: Figures are based on average yield of 7.6 metric tons of
sugar per hectare.
SOURCE: Ch’en Cheng-hsiang, Taiwan (Taipei: 1963), p. 316.
mere profit of 124 yen, about one-seventh that earned by the
sugar company. A well-known saying during this era, with con-
siderable justification, was: “Sweet is Taiwan sugar, but bitter is
the life of a cane farmer.”35
After the Chinese took over the industry in 1945, they had
to revitalize it from the ruins of wartime destruction. The gov-
ernment desperately needed the cash income from sugar ex-
ports, about the only thing Taiwan had to sell abroad. The
government also recognized the need for land reform, however,
for political and economic reasons. As a result the TSC had to
sell off all but about 40,000 hectares of its holdings in the land
reform programs of the early 1950s. To maintain the level of
sugar production (and exports) as high as possible, the TSC
was thus forced to continue the contract farming system of the
Japanese era, albeit with modifications. Ever since, the TSC has
been dependent on contract farmers for two-thirds to three-
fourths of its raw cane supply.
Although the farmers are in truth much freer to plant cane
or not than they were during the Japanese era, there are those
who argue that the policies of the TSC do not differ all that
much from those of the Japanese. Certainly the TSC is able to
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coerce or at least encourage farmers to plant a crop that is
usually less profitable than rice or other crops.36 The induce-
ments are varied and complex.
The Guaranteed Price System
One of the chief measures for stabilizing the supply of cane
is the guaranteed price system, which is simply an elaboration
of the system developed during the Japanese era—mainly in
the form of safeguards to protect the interests of both farmers
and government.37 In the early 1950s, the price that contract
farmers received for their sugar depended solely on the in-
ternational sugar price. After the Korean War, sugar prices
plummeted and caused a near collapse of the sugar industry
in Taiwan. Thus in 1954–1955 the TSC inaugurated the guar-
anteed price system, which was designed to put a floor under
the price farmers could expect to receive for their sugar. Each
year a sample survey of some two thousand cane farmers in five
main production areas is carried out to determine the costs and
returns of cane’s competitor crops. Since about 60 percent of
all contract farmers are located in the three main sugar districts
of Hu-wei, Hsin-ying, and Ma-chia, the guaranteed price for all
Taiwan is based on the opportunity cost of cane in those areas.
The guaranteed price is supposed to yield each contract
farmer a net profit at least equal to the net profit he could
earn if he grew other crops suitable for the same piece of
land. In actual fact, however, the TSC has never paid the cal-
culated guaranteed price because the opportunity cost of cane
production is too high in relation to export prices of sugar. In
1966, for example, the average export price of Taiwan sugar
was about US$54 per ton. The calculated guaranteed price for
that year was NT$5,700 (about US$127) per ton. If the TSC
had paid that price to farmers, it would have lost US$73 on
every ton of sugar. For 200,000 tons of sugar purchased from
contract farmers, the total loss would have amounted to over
US$14 million. The TSC obviously could not afford to operate at
such a loss.
The solution to the problem has been to offer a guaranteed
price considerably below the recommended one while making
up the loss to the farmers by maintaining artificially high farm
prices for their sugar sold domestically. In 1966, for example,
the actual guaranteed price was only US$96 whereas the do-
mestic price received by farmers was US$162. Even with the
reduced guaranteed price, however, the TSC still lost money
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during most of the 1960s on sugar produced by contract
farmers. There have been only three really profitable periods
for the sugar corporation since 1950: in 1957, in the period
1962–1964, and in the abnormal period 1973–1974.
In the past, whenever the export price was higher than
the guaranteed price, the farmers were paid according to the
export price. This arrangement produced a windfall for the cane
farmers but was undesirable from the government’s viewpoint
because it encouraged too many farmers to grow cane when
prices were favorable. Too many cane farmers are almost as bad
as too few—mainly because the TSC may then end up with more
sugar than it can handle in relation to Taiwan’s export quota
and domestic market. In the late 1960s, therefore, the TSC put
into operation a sugar stabilization fund. Whenever the interna-
tional sugar price is higher than the domestic guaranteed price,
a portion of the difference of the two is put into the stabilizing
fund to be used as a buffer when world prices plunge below the
guaranteed price.
The guaranteed price has had no marked impact on in-
creasing cane production, but it has helped prevent sharp drops
in production.38 Moreover, the stabilization fund has helped
prevent an excessive shift to cane cultivation in times of high in-
ternational sugar prices. Both policies have helped to moderate
use of agricultural resources.
The correlation between the international sugar price and
the number of contract farmers stands out clearly in Figure
11-6. Generally, there has been a two-year lag between the
two—that is, the peak sugar price is generally followed two
years later by a peak of contract farmers. This correlation re-
flects the long response time for sugar cane, one of the crop’s
greatest deficiencies. The most recent plunge in prices and
numbers of farmers came in 1965 when sugar prices fell to
record lows. As a result large numbers of farmers abandoned
cane cultivation. The total area planted in cane fell to less than
47,000 hectares by 1969–1970 and the number of cane farmers
dropped to about 110,000—the lowest levels in over twenty
years. Sugar prices began rising again in 1969, and the number
of contract farmers began to increase by 1970. The huge sugar
price increases of 1973–1974, which peaked at nearly US$0.60/
pound (but fell back to a more normal US$0.06/pound by the
end of 1976), caused another upward surge in numbers of cane
farmers.
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Figure 11–6. Correlation of world sugar prices and number of contract
farmers: 1950–1970. [Data from Jack Williams, “The Conflict between
Peasant and Public Interest in a Developing Country,” 1973.]
The Sugar Sharing System
Another of the TSC’s efforts to stabilize the supply of cane is
the sugar sharing system. Basically, this system involves the
division of the processed sugar, according to a ratio, between
the contract farmers and the TSC. Its purpose is to make cane
growing profitable for farmers.
The average contract farmer grows only about 0.4 hectare
of cane, which will yield on the average about 40 metric tons of
cane per crop.39 When the cane reaches the mill, the mill calcu-
lates the amount of sugar produced from that cane according to
the average value of commercial sugar yield during the milling
period. Hence during the milling period (which generally runs
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from early December to late April or early May), all the farmers
delivering cane to the mill will be paid according to the same
rate. This is essentially the way the Japanese did it too.
The present sugar sharing ratio is 45:55. This means that
after the contract farmer’s cane is processed at a mill, 45
percent of the sugar is kept by the TSC as payment for trans-
porting and milling the cane. The farmer keeps the other 55
percent, of which a fixed portion must be sold to the TSC at
the guaranteed price. This portion is now 45 percent; the re-
maining 55 percent can be freely sold by the farmer on the do-
mestic market. Thus a farmer who delivers 40 tons of cane to a
mill, from which 4.4 tons of sugar is produced (the current av-
erage of 11 percent sugar yield), would receive back 2.42 tons
of sugar (TSC would keep 1.98 tons), of which 1.09 tons (45
percent) would be sold to the TSC at the prevailing guaranteed
price and 1.35 tons (55 percent) would remain for the farmer
to sell on the domestic market. In 1970 the average price re-
ceived by the farmer on the domestic market was US$160 per
ton—about $64 more than the farmer received for his sugar that
was compulsorily sold to the TSC under the guaranteed price.
The higher domestic price for farmers’ sugar is thus maintained
by the government’s restricting the amount of sugar that can be
sold in Taiwan.
The sugar sharing ratio itself is determined according to
the production costs of both parties—the farmers and the TSC.
The production costs vary from mill to mill, but the costs for
all twenty-five mills are averaged together to produce a single
sugar sharing ratio for use in the twenty-five districts. The
sugar sharing ratio has changed over the years. When first
adopted in 1946–1947, the ratio was 52:48 in favor of the TSC.
Extreme land-use competition from other crops since then has
forced the government to increase the farmer’s share gradually
until the ratio is now 45:55 in the farmer’s favor. Likewise, the
percentage of the farmer’s share of sugar that could be sold do-
mestically has also changed over the years. Before 1965–1966,
the amount was 35 or 40 percent of the farmer’s 55 percent
share of the sugar. This proportion rose to 44 percent in the late
1960s, to 50 percent in 1970–1971, and to 55 percent today, re-
flecting the growing domestic consumption of sugar.40
Most of the sugar sold domestically in Taiwan comes from
the contract farmers. Sugar produced from the TSCs planta-
tions and obtained from the TSCs 45 percent portion of the
sugar sharing system is used to meet export quotas. The TSC
has exclusive control of all sugar exports. Sometimes the TSC
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is unable to dispose of all its sugar overseas and then markets
the surplus domestically. Much of this goes to food processing
factories, such as pineapple canneries. This surplus supply has
amounted to about 13 percent of the sugar marketed annually
within Taiwan.41
How does the farmer sell his sugar domestically? Taking our
average cane farmer again, of the 1.35 tons he receives from
the TSC to do with as he pleases, he takes about 5 percent in the
form of sacked sugar for his own use. The remaining 95 percent,
approximately 1.28 tons, is kept by the TSC in free storage as
a fringe benefit to the farmers. The farmer is given a sugar de-
posit certificate stating that the TSC has on storage 1.28 tons
of his sugar. The farmer can leave it in storage for up to a year,
but most farmers dispose of their sugar long before then by
selling their certificates to sugar dealers and agents for cash. In
fact, most farmers do so immediately after receiving their cer-
tificates. Not only are they anxious to get cash for spring tillage
and to pay farm taxes but they are also spared the problem of
trying to sell the sugar themselves.
Extension Activities
The TSC has several ways of strengthening the relationship be-
tween itself and the cane farmers. One of the most effective
is through extension activities. In this respect the policies of
the TSC and the former Japanese colonial rulers differ sharply.
There are a wide variety of these activities, many of which are
handled under the aegis of the Taiwan Sugar Cane Growers As-
sociation, a cooperative organization, founded in 1955, with a
membership of over 100,000 farmers.
Through the Taiwan Sugar Cane Growers Association, cane
study groups are organized to help the farmers improve their
cultivation techniques and hence their yields. High-yield con-
tests are run regularly, with cash awards to the top contestants,
as a means of stimulating productivity. Yields as high as 430
tons of cane per hectare have been achieved in this way.42
The government also has its own demonstration fields scattered
throughout the sugar cane districts. On these fields, the TSC
lavishes fertilizer, water, and care to produce yields of 400 tons
per hectare or more. The object is to show the farmer what is
possible with optimum production inputs, though average yields
could never get that high. (The average yield is normally under
80 tons; see Figure 11-1.) The TSC also helps farmers with
diversification programs such as cooperative hog raising and
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small-scale beef cattle raising.43 Various fringe benefits are also
provided to cane farmers, among them insurance, production
loans, education, and health care benefits.
The sum of all these programs and incentives aimed at the
cane farmer is a concerted effort by the government to sta-
bilize the supply of cane through essentially noncoercive mea-
sures, quite unlike the Japanese policies to induce farmers to
grow cane. And although the farmer today receives undoubtedly
a fairer share of the profits from sugar production, cane cul-
tivation remains less profitable than most other crops.44 That
farmers are still willing to grow cane suggests the influence
of motives other than profit in their decision making, including
such elements as security (a guaranteed profit) and the fringe
benefits and extension services provided by the TSC. While an
economist might argue that the TSC is promoting less than
maximum efficient use of land and other resources, one cannot
discount the human side of the equation: the positive effects on
the lives of cane farmers. All things considered, it would be dif-
ficult to describe the life of cane farmers today as bitter.
Impact on Land Use
Given the scale and complexity of the sugar industry on the
island, it is not surprising that sugar has had a profound impact
on land use. During the Japanese era, sugar cane was grown on
about one-fifth of the total cultivated land of Taiwan, peaking at
about 169,000 hectares in 1938–1939. Cane’s physical presence
was all the more obvious from the numerous sugar mills and
facilities that dotted the rural landscape and the hundreds of
miles of narrow-gauge railway lines that were built specifically
to transport cane to the mills and that only now are gradually
being supplanted by trucks. Even today, one can quickly detect
the presence of the sugar mills, often long before sighting them,
by the sickly sweet odor from the exhaust stacks that permeates
the air.
Under the Chinese the area of land devoted to cane has de-
creased but nonetheless still totals between 80,000 and 100,000
hectares each year—in other words, a decrease of nearly one-
half from the peak Japanese level. The population of Taiwan has
doubled since 1950, however, while the total cultivated area has
been expanded only slightly. Most of the increased agricultural
production since then has come from improved yields and more
intensive use of the land. Thus the fact that sugar cane still oc-
cupies as much as 11 percent of the cultivated land in some
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years has important implications. In fact, the cultivated area ac-
tually planted to cane is even greater than 11 percent in terms
of crop production potential. Since cane is a long-term crop, it
occupies the land for at least 12 to 18 months, during which
time several food crops could be grown on the same ground.
Most of the cane is grown by an average of 125,000 farmers
each year on tiny plots averaging only 0.4 hectare. The re-
mainder is grown by the TSC itself on its own 180 or so plan-
tations that average a few hundred hectares each at best. All
these fields are scattered over a large area throughout the
coastal plain. Hence the physical appearance of cane cultivation
is one of small isolated patches of cane interspersed among the
much greater area of rice fields. One does not get the same
visual impression of large-scale sugar cane cultivation as one
does in Hawaii. Moreover, the relative importance of the sugar
industry in the rural landscape and lives of the farmers is not
readily apparent.
Spatially, the area devoted to cane is now concentrated in
the southern half of the island. From the original hearth in the
dry uplands of the southwest coastal plain near the present city
of Tainan, cane expanded during the Japanese era as far north
as the Taipei basin, a very marginal physical environment for
cane, and into the east coast valley. Davidson describes fields of
cane that he observed on both banks of the Tamsui River near
Taipei at the turn of the century—fields that have long since
been converted largely to urban/industrial uses (Figure 11-7).45
At the same time, a major share of the cane was grown on irri-
gated paddy land, displacing in many cases irrigated rice. The
competition with rice became so keen, in fact, that the Japanese
developed the huge Chia-nan irrigation system after 1907 (com-
pleted in the 1920s) to turn thousands of hectares of drylands
into rotation cropland where rice and sugar cane could coexist.
Kerr relates how the government, by manipulating water sup-
plies in the Chia-nan region, was able to impose a three-crop
planting cycle over a vast acreage that is still followed today
(Figure 11-8).46
Because of this rotation system, cane can compete with rice
and other crops in the Chia-nan region, which remains the prin-
cipal area for cane cultivation. After 1945, low yields, popu-
lation pressure, and competition from other crops forced cane
cultivation out of the northern half of the island, where it had
been artificially maintained by Japanese colonial policies. Sugar
mills closed in the north and cane cultivation retreated to the
southern half of the island, where the crop’s comparative ad-
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Figure 11–7. Changes in the sugar cane area: 1915–1960. [Data from
Ch’en Cheng-hsiang, Taiwan (Taipei: 1963).]
vantage was much greater. Cane is now concentrated in the
southwest coastal plain from Chang-hua hsien south to P’ing-
tung hsien, but especially in the Chia-nan district. There is a
minor secondary area of concentration in the narrow east coast
valley.
The Chinese have expanded the cane area in a somewhat
different manner than did the Japanese. Whereas the Japanese
were involved primarily with opening up underutilized good
agricultural land, the TSC since 1950 has been engaged in a
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strenuous program of reclaiming marginal lands that were pre-
viously unused for any productive purpose. Several thousand
hectares of such land have been reclaimed, most of it in the
east coast rift valley, and in the P’ing-tung/Kaohsiung area of
the southwest. The lands reclaimed by the TSC have consisted
principally of stony land in former alluvial fans, riverbeds,
slopelands, saline lands, and tidal flats.47 Although the cost of
reclaiming these lands is almost as high as the cost of prime
paddy land (and yields average less than half that of paddy
land), the TSC still regards such reclamation as economically
warranted because of the severe land-use competition on
Taiwan and the difficulties of contracting the farmers to grow
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Figure 11–8. Cropping systems in the Chia-nan irrigation dis-
trict. [Data from Chou (1958), p. 33.]
cane, even with the TSCs powerful arsenal of inducements. As a
result, much of the development of the east coast valley in par-
ticular has been due to the efforts of the TSC, which has helped
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greatly to soften the rugged frontier character of the east coast
valley by opening it up to settled agriculture, a process first
begun by the Japanese.48 The TSC is now active in the reclama-
tion of tidal flats—not for cane cultivation, though, but for the
corporation’s many diversified operations.49
Impact on Agricultural Modernization
Although the Japanese brought modern farm technology and
operations to Taiwan, those innovations were introduced by co-
ercion and a generally exploitative system. Certainly this was
true of the sugar industry under the Japanese. During the
Chinese era, the sugar industry has had an even wider and
in many ways a more positive impact on agricultural modern-
ization.
For one thing, the sugar industry has diversified tremen-
dously, partly in response to the instability of world sugar
prices, partly to take advantage of economic opportunities. The
TSC now produces some fifteen or more products besides sugar;
in fact, it is one of the most diversified sugar companies in the
world. The main products are hogs and cattle. The TSC has led
the massive increase of the livestock industry in the last twenty-
five years. Although the move to livestock production has been
criticized by some as an inefficient use of valuable feed and
land, as well as a drain on the country’s foreign exchange be-
cause of huge increases in imports of corn, soybeans, and other
feed grains, at the same time the increased domestic produc-
tion has contributed to a diet richer in protein for the average
Taiwanese, it has reduced the volume of beef imports, and it
has greatly increased the volume of pork and live hog exports,
especially to Japan and Hong Kong. All of the TSC’s diversified
products have, in years of particularly low world sugar prices,
kept the sugar industry in the black. Even in good years, the
products contribute about half the income of the industry.50
Moreover, the TSC has been in the forefront of agricultural
mechanization, expansion of chemical fertilizer production and
consumption, land reclamation, groundwater development, and
promotion of cooperative farming. Many of these developments
were begun by the TSC and might never have entered the
island’s agricultural system without the TSC’s efforts. Particu-
larly noteworthy has been the corporation’s promotion of coop-
erative and large-scale farming to overcome the limitations of
the small family-farm system still dominant on the island. As
part of the “Second Land Reform” for Taiwan, the promotion of
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this kind of farming has been an uphill struggle pioneered by
the TSC, but it offers great promise for the future of agriculture
on the island.51
The TSC has also played an important role in the gov-
ernment’s technical cooperation programs with other devel-
oping countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many TSC
technical personnel participated in these projects, which had a
marked impact on Taiwan’s political standing in the world com-
munity for many years, although the goodwill effect of those ef-
forts appeared to have worn off in a number of countries by the
early 1970s. And with its mills scattered over the countryside
and the need for courting the farmers to grow cane, the TSC
has made many contributions to local investment projects—such
as the construction of drainage ditches, village paths, irrigation
canals, flood control dikes, and water supply installations for
rural communities.
Trade, Politics, and Sugar
Even under the Japanese, in spite of various protective mea-
sures, sugar production tended to wax and wane in response to
world sugar prices and domestic sugar prices in Japan. In the
postcolonial period, as noted earlier, sugar production became
even more closely affected by fluctuating world prices. With
the closing of the mainland China market in 1949, Taiwan’s
sugar industry was exposed to the harsh realities of the un-
stable world sugar market. Only 3 or 4 million tons of sugar are
marketed each year within the so-called free market.52 It is in
this very small fraction of the annual world sugar production
of 70 to 80 million tons that Taiwan must maneuver in seeking
markets. The island’s share of this free market averages 15 to
20 percent each year, making Taiwan one of the largest traders
in unprotected nonquota markets. Taiwan has been a member
of the various postwar international sugar agreements, which
have allotted the island over 600,000 tons as its yearly quota.
Those agreements have had only a marginal effect, if any, in sta-
bilizing world sugar prices, however, with the result that sugar
producers such as Taiwan have suffered from the roller coaster
trend of sugar prices. (See Figure 11-6.) One of the bleakest
periods for Taiwan was 1965–1968 when average world prices
bottomed at less than US$0.02/pound. The TSC lost money on
sugar exports during that period and was saved only by its
still profitable diversification program. A truly sweet period was
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1973–1975: sugar prices rose to their highest recorded level in
this century (or ever), at nearly US$0.60/pound earning Taiwan
a record US$250 million in 1975.
Along with wildly fluctuating earnings from overseas sugar
sales, Taiwan also has experienced problems in its markets.
In the late 1940s and 1950s, Taiwan exported sugar to many
countries of the world, but gradually most of those markets
dried up—either because of competition from other sugar pro-
ducers, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, or
because of the declining political fortunes of the Nationalist
Chinese government. In recent years Taiwan has been selling
its sugar primarily to just three customers: South Korea, Japan,
and the United States, in that order of importance. The politi-
cal ties between Taiwan and these three countries are no co-
incidence in relation to sugar sales, for all three countries pay
premium prices above the world average for Taiwan’s sugar.
How much longer this preferential treatment can last is the
question, given the political relations between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China.
While sugar prices and markets have had their ups and
downs, the relative importance of sugar in Taiwan’s export
earnings has declined fairly steadily, reflecting the growth of
Taiwan’s economy. In 1950 sugar accounted for 80 percent of
total exports of US$93 million. By 1975 sugar exports were
valued at US$250 million, but they accounted for only about 5
percent of total exports of nearly US$6 billion. Sugar is still im-
portant, in other words, but no longer the sustaining force for
Taiwan’s economy.
The Role of the TSC
We conclude this survey of the sugar industry with a brief sum-
mation of the role of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation in modern
Taiwan’s development. In spite of the relative decline of sugar
as an individual commodity within Taiwan’s economy, the TSC
remains the single largest corporation in Taiwan (and one of
the largest sugar corporations in the world), directly employing
over sixteen thousand workers but with indirect employment
and income effects on thousands of other workers in related in-
dustries and activities, not to mention the thousands of cane
farmers. Hence the monetary benefits from sugar production go
far beyond the easily measured dollars and cents from sugar
sales abroad. Moreover, the TSC remains one of the main gov-
ernment organizations in Taiwan, a major force in the economic
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structure and in policy decisions affecting agriculture, the
farmers, and the economy in general. In some ways, one can see
a distinct similarity to the old sugar association of the Japanese
era in terms of economic and political power; but there the sim-
ilarity ends, for the TSC is much more a positive than a negative
force in modern Taiwan.
THE SUGAR INDUSTRY AND THE FUTURE
The sugar industry has without question been a major force in
Taiwan, especially since the early 1900s. During much of the in-
dustry’s history, however, the benefits of sugar production have
accrued mainly to the government, not to the farmers who grow
the cane. Sugar has, in that sense, been a sweetener in the
development plans various governments have proposed for the
island, although the cane farmers today are probably better off
than at any time in the past.
Likewise, the impact of the sugar industry on the rural land-
scape and economy has been great in terms of land use prac-
tices and the agricultural development of the island. Indeed,
one might question what crop could have taken the place of
sugar as the great cash crop of Taiwan, especially in the last
eighty years. A number have come along, particularly since
1950, to provide competition to sugar, but none has had the per-
manence or broad appeal to farmers that cane has long had.
The fact that over 100,000 farmers, or about one in every seven,
consistently plant cane year after year says something about the
permanent role that cane has acquired in the agrarian system.
Nevertheless, the profitability of the industry for the gov-
ernment, and of cane cultivation for the farmers, has been
achieved only as the result of artificial price controls and sub-
sidies—and even then the profit has been remarkable in only a
few years out of the past quarter century. Without subsidization,
sugar cane has a poor competitive position with other crops,
and hence it could be argued that cane cultivation is not the
highest and best use of Taiwan’s limited and valuable agricul-
tural land. This basic fact may be of increasing significance in
the future if Taiwan’s population and food resource balance con-
tinues its present trend from a surplus position to an increasing
dependence on ever more expensive food imports. Sugar’s days
on Taiwan may, in fact, be numbered.
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Glossary of Chinese Terms
chang 丈
chen 鎭
ch’eng 城
chia 甲
chiao 郊
chieh 街
chieh-shou 結首
chih 支
chih-chao 執照
chin 斤
chin-shih 進士
chou 州
chuang 莊
chui-yuan-t’ang 追遠堂
fan 番
fan-tsu 番租
fang 房
fen 分
fu 府
hsia-chiao 下郊
hsiang 鄉
hsiao-tsu 小租
hsiao-tsu-hu 小租戶
hsieh-tou 械鬥
hsien 縣
hsien-hsia-shih 縣下市
hsien-keng tien-hu 先耗佃戶
hung mao 紅毛
i-min 義民
i-t’ien liang-chu 一田兩主
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k’au-t’ien t’ien 靠天田
k’en-chao 墾照
k’en-shou 墾首
keng-ting 耕丁
ku 股
kuan-tu shang-pan 官督商辦
liang 兩
liu-min 流民
liu-tui 六隊
pao-chia 保甲
p’eng-lai 蓬萊
pi 埤
san-chiao 三郊
shih 石
shuai 帥
shui-li 水利
t’ai-ch’e 臺車
ta-tsu 大租
ta-tsu-hu 大租戶
t’ien-ku 田骨
t’ien-p’i 田皮
t’ien-ti-hui 天地會
ting 丁
t’ing 廳
ting-chiao 頂郊
ts’o 厝
ts’un 村
t’u-ch’eng 土城
t’u-niu 土牛
t’un-t’ien 屯田
t’ung-hsiang 同鄉
t’ung-hsing 同姓
tung-yang chen-lu 東洋針路
Wang-t’ien 王田
wei-wai ling-hu 圍外零戶
wu 屋
ye-chu 業主
yeh-hu 業戶
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